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Between Liberalism and Capitalism:
An Introduction
to the Democratic State
Stephen L. Elkin

A book devoted to the "democratic state" must begin with the concept
itself. For as George Kateb says, the concept is "alien to the spirit of
representative democracy" (1979, p. 2). 1 After all, the variety of liberal
theory that provides the principal justifying account of contemporary
representative or liberal democracy argues that government is a contract
for the safety, convenience, and prosperity of the contracting parties. It has
only the life that these persons breathe into it, and it can make no claims on
them except ones that they authorize. Indeed, in one version of liberal
theory, government can do nothing for citizens that a complex array of
mutual-benefit societies could not in principle do better and less coercively.
Any argument that liberal democratic governments are "states," whether
it is made by way of explanation or justification, is then unwelcome to many
liberals because it implies that the basis of such governments is something
other than or in addition to contract and consent. The study of the
democratic state is likely then to be widely perceived as an unwise and
peculiar enterprise, plagued by contradictions.
The events of the last fifty years have also done little to encourage the
development of a political science built around a conception of the state . As
George Armstrong Kelly notes, theories of the state have become associated both with the organized evil of fascism and with what is thought of as a
"superannuated idealism of the nation 's corporate will" (1979, p. 21). If
this were not enough, in the hands of some Marxists the state has been
understood as the "executive ... committee of the . . . bourgeoisie" in a
sufficiently literal way to put off all but the most intrepid and committed
1
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theoretical workers in the Marxist vineyard (Marx and Engels, 1955, pp.

11-12).
What then accounts for the renewed interest in the state and particularly the democratic state? 2 It is possible to get along without a discussion of
the state as long as we believe that the direction of public action is defined
by the choices of private individuals. 3 Society directs government, we might
say, and the apparatus of popular control is the principal means by which it
does so. But several features of twentieth-century democratic political
economies have made this view of the connection between society and the
state increasingly problematic. These features have encouraged statecentered formulations that highlight the ability of the state to shape society
in directions that cannot be easily traced to direct expressions of citizen
opinion. 4
An introduction to the democratic state can usefully begin by looking at
the features of contemporary societies that have invited these formulations
and then tum to the formulations themselves. We will then be in a position
to consider the responses made by students of politics to the rise of the
democratic state, particularly its relation to the liberal theory that is at the
heart of our thinking about Western societies. The discussion as a whole will
provide the necessary foundation for characterizing the five essays that
follow.

POLITICAL FEATURES
OF CONTEMPORARY LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES
The features to be considered are in varying degrees common to
virtually all liberal democracies. But they will be discussed with an eye to
the American case, since it is the United States that informs much of the
analysis in The Democratic State and is the paradigmatic society for many of
the theorists discussed below.
The first feature of interest is the increasingly administrative character
of twentieth-century democratic government. To the liberal democratic
panoply of legislature, court, and executive have been added administrative
agencies that are not legislative or judicial or simply implementers of
statutory law. Such agencies exercise great discretion, which is often
loosely, if at all, bound by citizen preferences, statutory declaration, or
judicial review (see Lowi, 1979; Stewart, 1975). Given an economy
managed by such administrative officials, for example, the question naturally
arises, For whom is it being administered? If those responsible for economic
management have considerable discretion, it is plausible that they will use it
2
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systematically to favor business interests (i.e., those crucial to the economy's workings) over citizen opinion.
The same kind of argument can be made about the administrative
apparatus of contemporary government in its guise of provider of social
welfare. Social-we1fare programs are designed at least partly to pacify the
have-nots and are generally aimed at creating a work force that is amenable
to the requirements of a property-based market system. The features of
policies that have these purposes are unlikely to spring from popular
preferences (Bowles and Gintis, 1976; Piven and Cloward, 1971 and 1977).
The weakening of political parties has very likely increased the
discretion of public officials generally. However imperlect, parties have
been a principal means of transmitting citizen opinion to political authorities
and of enforcing accountability. The decline of parties opens the way for
government that is dominated by policy networks, iron triangles, and
coterie politics-in short, by groups of like-minded politicos who are able to
keep out intruders and successfully to promote their own policy preferences
(Heclo, 1978). Government begins to resemble a policy machine whose
inputs and outputs are increasingly detached from broad-gauged citizen
preferences. Parties provide no guarantee against the detachment of public
officials from citizen opinion (and under some circumstances may increase
it), but they have been important historical means by which society has
attempted to control government.
The diagnosis of public authority that has been loosened from its
moorings in consent and representation is further supported by our
increased understanding of the significance of business concentration. The
state as the handmaiden of capital is a more plausible interpretation when
the process of capital accumulation is visibly organized through large-scale
business corporations. It is one thing for capital accumulation to occur
through the market and through financial institutions that are able to work in
anonymity. But the creation of companies the size of the Fortune 500
suggests that organizations large enough to internalize at least some of the
process of capital accumulation might easily decide to ask for and get help
from government in doing so (Galbraith, 1967; Herman, 1981). A government already organized to manage the economy might indeed be receptive
to corporate needs and might begin to render decisions according to
whether they facilitate or retard capital accumulation. Public officials who
are seen talking regularly to corporate statesmen about the health of the
economy are unlikely candidates for analyses built around popular consent.
The facts of life in the contemporary international economy also
reinforce state-centered formulations. Although some countries have been
consistently mercantilist during the modem era, liberal societies have
typically been more hesitant to deeply involve public officials in bolstering
3
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the country's international trading position. This has now changed. Not the
least reason is a more competitive and interdependent international economy in which industrial and commercial abilities may be spread more widely
than ever before. Public officials now have substantial incentives to take a
strong lead in harnessing the nation's assets. Whether such efforts are in
the service of business interest or some conception of national interest
(Krasner, 1978) is less important than the evidence that public officials take
the lead in shaping national policy. A review of negotiations over the
international monetary system suffices to show just how large state discretion looms in a matter of fundamental domestic importance. Contemporary
debates over industrial policy suggest that state direction of national assets
to promote international competitiveness is now a widely contemplated step.
The marked discretion of state officials, weakly bound by popular
control, should not surprise us. Has not the rise of America as a world
power in the atomic age prepared us to think in statist terms? How else are
we to interpret the content of nuclear policy and the activities of the
national-security apparatus but in state-centered terms? While there seems
to be little doubt that the development of nuclear weapons and nationalsecurity agencies was a response to popular worries, policy in these areas
has evolved almost entirely from the preferences of those who staff the
bureaus of the executive establishment. If ever the ''state'' is at work, it is
here. The doctrine of "national security" and the various governmental
organs that elaborate it and provide the material bases in budget, weapons,
and armies provide fertile ground in which state theories can flourish
(Schurman, 1974; Halperin et al., 1976; Ross and Thomas, 1976).
This list of features of twentieth-century democratic politics strongly
suggests that governmental activity is systematically shaped by forces
beyond those generated by popular control. The discussion also indicates
that governmental action does not merely reflect features of society but also
actively shapes them. Government's sheer size, organizational ability, and
range of activities point to this conclusion. These observations have
prompted state-centered analyses of democratic politics, both of Marxist
and of non-Marxist varieties. 5 These analyses have attempted to capture
the active quality of government and the variety of forces that systematically
shape its actions.

CLASS LACKEYS, CLASS FIDUCIARIES,
AND STATE MANAGERS
In recent Marxist theories of the state, capitalism is no mere economic
order but is a complex social formation that joins the economic and the
4
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political. Having learnt that the connection between what capitalists may be
assumed to want and what public officials actually do is often tenuous, many
Marxists have discarded theories that turn on having an organized class
instruct public officials and have adopted arguments about the ''relative
autonomy" of the state. This phrase is meant to indicate that political
activity is indeed determined by the mode of production, but only ''in the
last instance" (Althusser and Balibar, 1970; Poulantzas, 1974).
The state, though ultimately in the service of capital, may act in ways
'' contrary to the short term economic interests of the dominant classes''
(Poulantzas, 1974:190). Still, its very workings serve to prevent class
cohesion by defining workers as individual citizens of a supposedly neutral
state. The state does this juridically, since its organizing legal principles
establish workers as individuals, preventing them from seeing the reality of
the class struggle and their common position in the mode of production.
Even as the state may accommodate some of the demands of the dominated
classes, it still individualizes workers, thus preserving the capitalist mode of
production which depends on (among other things) a competitive labor
market (Gramsci, 1971; Poulantzas, 1974).
There are other versions of how and why the democratic state
consistently acts to guarantee the interests of capital. Some theorists worry
less about autonomy and take as their central proposition that the state
''organizes'' capitalism in ways that capitalists cannot do themselves. Class
lackeys have turned into class fiduciaries. Because capitalists are competitors who operate in diverse ways, they are unlikely to be able to organize
themselves into class-conscious organizations capable of articulating clear
class interests. If the democratic state serves capital, these theorists argue,
it must be because of features of the state itself, such as how it raises its
revenues (Offe, 1974 and 1975; Block, 1977). Now this sounds very much
like those who talk about the state's being determined in the last instance by
the mode of production. And indeed, the difference in views is not always
easy to detect. But theorists like Poulantzas seem to argue that the juridical
character of the democratic state itself stems from the features of the
capitalist mode of production, while those who might be labeled fiduciary
theorists seem to argue that the features of the state that guarantee its
fidelity to capitalism arise from the historical development of the state. In
the hands of a theorist like Offe, the argument reads as if the interests of
capital are what state managers say they are and that the continuation of
capitalism depends on the exertions of the state. Class interests and class
conflict play a decidedly secondary role in such arguments.
A number of questions remain unresolved in Marxist analyses of the
democratic state. How important is the apparatus of elections and popular
control in explaining the direction of state actions? Is popular control the
5
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fayade behind which the real work of running capitalism gets done? If the
state is relatively autonomous, how autonomous is that? Is it autonomous
enough to dig the grave of capitalism (a possibility that Braybrooke rather
slyly entertains in his essay below)? If the state's autonomy is considerable
yet, in the end, state action is "determined" by the requirements of capital,
what precisely does the determining? Is it simply that capitalists are
ultimately powerful enough to give orders? Or are there reasons that public
officials, without being pressured, will choose to behave in the necessary
ways, as, for example, Offe sometimes implies? If the latter is the case,
what are the implications for a theoretical tradition founded on the assertion
that modes of production are somehow decisive in explaining the character
of political life ?6
Non-Marxists have also been impressed by the increasing pervasiveness of the state in democratic societies, but they have not started from the
premise that its form and content must somehow be explained by the
capitalist mode of production. 7 Nevertheless, they have been struck by the
importance, for political life, of a property-based domestic and international
market system and have assumed that the principal features of the political
order cannot fail to be influenced by the manner in which much of collective
life is organized. To suppose otherwise is to entertain an absurdity, they
imply, and in this they not only have Marx as a teacher but also Aristotle and
Madison (see, e.g., Lindblom, 1977; Krasner, 1978; Plattner, 1982). But
the implications of having the state guarantee that much of the society's
productive apparatus will be controlled by a small portion of the citizenry are
not as clear-cut to these theorists as to most Marxists. This is especially
true because these non-Marxists recognize that the state is also organized
around institutions of popular control that its officials likewise protect. This
fact seems to be just as prominent to these theorists as how the productive
capacity of the society is organized. Nevertheless, these non-Marxists
observe that popular control is far from perfect, allowing many crucial
decisions to be made in ways that are more or less completely shielded from
popular scrutiny (Lindblom, 1977; Dahl, 1977).
Out of such observations has grown up an eclectic political economy
whose starting point is typically the state officials themselves or whatever
institutional arrangements are labeled the state. Whether, by what, and how
the state is shaped are subjects left for investigation. Beyond that it is not
easy to characterize what I have already labeled an eclectic body of
literature. It is, however, possible to say what theoretical imagery does not
dominate.
In the arguments of these political economists, state officials are not
driven by the claims of interest groups, by self-interest narrowly defined, or
by the '' electoral connection.'' State officials are neither agents of powerful
6
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groups, businessmen dressed up as public officials, nor vote maximizers,
although each of these roles of course may shape their behavior. Nor are
they class lackeys or class fiduciaries. In short, state officials are thought to
have choices, and these choices are crucial to whether the political economy
flourishes, remains stable, declines, or crashes. But state officials don't
operate in an empty world. The world is structured; it presents obstacles
and opportunities, both of which may be promptly ignored since these
structural arrangements require interpretation.
Theorists have constructed a number of positions that are consistent
with this imagery. Some have argued that state officials are attempting to
manage a political economy whose basic dynamic is the competing pulls of
market and popular control. Their work suggests how the preferences of
large numbers of citizens, given voice by the apparatus of popular control,
may impede the running of a market economy. Profits and votes pull in
different directions (Elkin, 1982; Lindblom, 1977; Macpherson, 1966;
Wolfe, 1977).
There are Marxist versions of such arguments which are, however,
distinguished either by a belief in the laws of development of the capitalist
mode of production or by the view that the tensions just considered are, at
bottom, class tensions (see, e.g., O'Connor, 1973). When such theorists
speak about structural dynamics, they typically mean the motion imparted
by class struggle (see, e.g., Bowles and Gintis, 1982; Przeworski and
Wallerstein, 1982). By contrast, the political economists under discussion
are not class theorists. For such a theorist as Lindblom, the central building
blocks of societies are control systems, not classes. It is the competition
between business and popular control that provides the central dynamic of
what he terms market-oriented polyarchies. 8 These political economists
also tend to doubt that there are capitalist laws of development, or they
suppose that there are other operative "laws" having to do, for example,
with the path of democratization in Western societies. The implication is
that the tension between market and popular control is not going in any
particular direction but is an essential feature of the regime, to be managed
intelligently or not by public officials.
Other political-economy-minded theorists doubt whether it is accurate
to speak of tensions at all or, if they exist, whether it is quite so difficult to
manage them as implied (Miller, 1982; Plattner, 1982; Zuckert, 1982). After
all, they argue, property rights and the rights that undergird the apparatus
of popular control have long been thought to be compatible, because they
stem from the same, principles. Political leaders presumably know this, and
while some of their rhetoric may suggest an awareness of tensions between
big business and the people, more often they appeal to the belief that free
enterprise and democracy are mutually supportive. That was the Founders'
7
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hope, these theorists argue, and most citizens believe they are the
beneficiaries of the founding design. In these analyses, too, the skill of state
officials in interpreting the character of the political economy is essential to
explaining both how officials act and the overall direction of the political
economy.
More internationalist-oriented arguments about political economy may
also be found, in which state managers attempt to serve the national interest
as they navigate in a complex world system. In these analyses the principal
dynamic is typically the conflict between the managers who defend and
advance their conception of the nation's interests and those who defend
bureaucratic preserves and seek to advance domestic political goals (see,
e.g., Schurman, 1974; Krasner, 1978). So far there exists no compelling
synthesis that combines an analysis of the state as an actor in the world
arena and interpretations of state-society relationships.
Marxist and political-economy analyses of the democratic state do
merge at one specific point: an increase in the influence of the democratic
state has not been accompanied by increased confidence in public authority.
In Habermas 's influential formulation, we are experiencing a ''legitimation
crisis" (1975) in which the beliefs necessary to sustain a managerial state
are weakening. Perhaps perversely, the shift from market decision to public
decision has been accompanied by a decline in trust in government. Here, as
in other cases, political scientists who are engaged in elaborating theses on
the state may only be reflecting the transitory experience of ordinary
citizens. If this is the case, we can expect to find that as these citizens learn
to live with the new forms of collective problem solving and as those who
have lost out under the new regimen or who are philosophically ill-disposed
to accept it are finally defeated, the rash of worried inquiries into the future
of the democratic state may decline.

LIBERAL AND DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES
How has our political thinking responded to analyses of the democratic
state? In particular, how have assertions that systemic forces shape state
activity and that the state shapes society influenced thinking about the
prospects for liberal societies? The question of liberal prospects, of the
continuation of a society built around individual autonomy, must be counted
as the central question for our political thinking, regardless of whether we
wish for a new society or only for retention of what is best in the present
one.
Regrettably, many political scientists seem to be unconcerned. Many
who are empirically minded remain indifferent in their work to some of the
8
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central features of twentieth-century democratic politics and to efforts, like
the ones just canvassed, that seek to interpret those features. It is difficult
not to be contentious here, but the essential point seems to be that much of
political science simply takes for granted its own foundations in a particular
liberal view of the relationship between state and society. In this view,
politics is implicitly understood as a deputy for society, designed to resolve
conflicts among social groups which they cannot resolve for themselves.
The results are acceptable, it is believed, because the deputies are
instructed and their actions are reviewed. Society is viewed as directing the
state, and the principal link between the two is the apparatus of popular
control. Since many political scientists appear to be only dimly aware that
these are their underlying presuppositions, they do not perceive the
challenge inherent in state-centered analysis that is critical of such views. 9
The difficulties of perceiving the challenge are compounded for many
empirically minded political scientists because any intimation that statecentered analyses are fundamental is all too easily translated into the belief
that some analysis of the power elite is being called for. And since it is
widely believed that arguments such as those of C. Wright Mills cannot
withstand either empirical or analytic scrutiny, the tendency to ignore statecentered analysis is strengthened.
Furthermore, many of these political scientists are reluctant to consider questions such as the prospects for liberal society because they sense
that they will need either to join hands with political philosophers or to study
the subject themselves. This they are reluctant to do. The celebration of the
fact/value distinction, the praise of "scientific" political science, and the
effort by the empirically minded to turn political philosophers into ''normative" specialists (in which guise they may easily be disregarded, since no
right-thinking American believes that anyone possesses a special expertise
in "values")-all conspire against the acceptance of state-centered analyses.
Some students of politics have been more aware of how profound a
challenge "stateness" poses to a liberal account of the workings and
purposes of contemporary Western societies. One large group has responded by arguing (sometimes implicitly) that liberal theory can accommodate the challenge, because in its various forms it provides the guidance to
interpret what is occurring and directions on how to respond. Three
versions of this response may be discerned, each of which takes as central
that a political order organized around the self-directed pursuits of individuals is still desirable and possible. These versions may be labeled: radical,
expansionary, and chastened liberalism.
Radical liberals wish to go back to what they believe are the roots of
liberal society. They argue that the growth of the democratic state must be
9
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reversed, because it has resulted in an increase in bureaucratic discretion
and in collective decision making, both of which have diminished liberty. The
remedy is to restructure the society so that it will rely as little as possible on
collective decision making and as much as possible on contract and private
cooperative agreements. Free-market advocates (M. Friedman, 1962),
libertarians (D. Friedman, 1973), contractarians of minimalist persuasion
and their public choice fellow travelers (Nozick, 1974; Buchanan and
Tullock, 1962), and Hayekians (Hayek, 1973)-all join in the effort to rescue
liberal society from the state. Most of these theorists understand the rescue
operation as securing a society of autonomously choosing individuals, a
rescue operation made necessary because these (same?) individuals have
(mistakenly?) constructed a quite different social order. The most thoughtful of these theorists recognize the dimensions of the reconstruction task.
Expansionary liberals come in two varieties: optimistic and temperate.
The optimists are inclined to view the rise of the democratic state as an
opportunity to use public authority for the creation of just the sort of rightsbased society that liberalism has promised but, in their view, has not
secured (see Ackerman, 1984; Dworkin, 1977; Okun, 1975; Rawls, 1971;
Reich, 1964). The state, rather than being the enemy of autonomous
individuals, is or can be either the creator or the guarantor of individualism.
The forms of relations among citizens and between citizens and officials are
now visibly a question of choice, it is argued, subject to reconstruction
through law and legislation. The distinction between state and society is not
to be dissolved, but the balance is to shift so that the state is the creative
element that remakes society in the state's liberal image. There is little
agreement about the sources of evaluative guidance for this effort at social
reconstruction, if indeed there be any. What the most thoughtful theorists
do agree on is that the activist democratic state may not be easy to guide in
the manner that liberal theory requires.
The temperate expansionary liberals are better tutored than their
brethren in the ways of power and the limits of social rationality. They still
hope, however, for a state that will be capable of tempering the arbitrary
exercise of private power. Here we find Lindblom (1977; with Cohen, 1979)
and Dahl (1982; with Lindblom, 1953), for example, who understand the
limits of bureaucratized social problem solving and the difficulties of
controlling political leaders but who reason that only state authority is
capable of remaking property relations and the internal life of the business
corporation. These are said to place severe constraints on the day-to-day
freedom and the popular control of authority that liberalism promises. The
least optimistic among these theorists, which may include Lindblom himself,
wonder whether state officials can in fact escape the grip of the business
corporation in order to undertake the necessary reforms.
10

BETWEEN LIBERALISM AND CAPITALISM

Chastened liberals worry deeply that in the end, an activist state will
break down any distinction between state and society, between public and
private, and will usher in the end of liberalism. A state that is capable of
regulating everything will be thus tempted, they argue, and will proceed in
ways that are arbitrary and produce unwarranted privilege. Chastened
liberals believe that liberal theory provides the necessary diagnosis and
remedy, this time in the form of constitutionalism. The positive administrative state is here to stay, they say, but it needs to be constitutionalized. The
leading contemporary statement is by Lowi (1979), who is perhaps less
persuaded than are other chastened liberals that state officials have great
autonomy since he thinks that grants of discretionary authority are rapidly
given content by interest-group preferences (cf. Lowi, 1979, with, e.g.,
Wilson, 1980). Constitutionalism, for Lowi, means freeing public authority
from the power of interest groups and tying it to explicit statements of
public objectives that are offered by the legislative process.
Other defenders of liberalism, equally drawn to constitutionalism but
doubtful that state officials are as tied to interest groups as Lowi supposes,
are also skeptical about the possibility of constitutionalizing administrative
discretion through a strengthened legislative process (see discussion in
Stewart, 1975; Wilson, 1980). Some theorists rely instead on educating
administrators in a constitutional ethos and on the checks and balances of
the original constitutional design (Rohr, 1983; Storing, 1980).
Yet another group of theorists have concluded that the rise of the state
has rendered implausible a liberal account and justification of our present
political order. The state-centered analyses surveyed so far teach, they
argue, that political reconstruction of the most profound kind is called for. In
the phrasing of a recent book, what is wanted is ''strong democracy'' based
on "talk"; that is, deliberation about what is common to us as citizens
(Barber, 1984). These democrats, as it is appropriate to call them, equate a
state-centered politics with an undesirable bureaucratized political life
dominated by expertise at the expense of the ordinary citizen's judgment. 10
Such a political life promotes passivity when active citizenship is needed. If
the various shades of liberals look to Hobbes for inspiration, these
"democrats" look to Rousseau, who suspected any separation between
citizens and collective decision making (see Pateman, 1970; Walzer, 1976;
Unger, 1983).
If liberals, even optimistic liberals, rely on the distinction between
public and private as the cornerstone of the good society, democrats wish to
tie politics as closely as possible to the ordinary life of the citizenry, to break
down what they believe is the artificial barrier between state and society. A
state-centered politics cannot provide the widespread opportunity to struggle and deliberate over the content of the common good. Such a politics asks
11
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too little of its citizens, democrats say, and consequently may get too little
when the collective good of the society is threatened. The more thoughtful
democrats also concede that strong democracy may ask too much of citizens
and use their participation in ways that are profoundly pernicious (Barber,
1984; Sandel, 1982).

THE ESSAYS

Much contemporary American political science, especially in its more
determinedly empirical branches, has ignored the theoretical challenge
posed by the increasing centrality of the state in the life of liberal democratic
societies. In many professional students of politics this inattention helps to
produce a bland, unexamined faith that they are studying a sound constitutional regime whose mainspring is the electoral connection. The tacit
assumption is that nuclear arsenals of the present size, international
monetary policy, and accelerated depreciation schedules, to mention just a
few items, are consonant with the broad citizen preferences. The mainstream of late-twentieth-century American political science seems no better
prepared to confront the principal political facts of the twentieth century
than did its intellectual progenitor, mid-century behavioral political science.
That political science flourished after genocide, the explosion of nuclear
bombs, the rise of fascism, and the eradication of democratic regimes . Much
contemporary political science appears to inhabit a mental world in which the
legitimacy of liberal democracy is either not a problem at all or is thought to
be one of psychology, not of something actually having gone wrong. That
liberal democratic regimes are at best precarious achievements seems not to
have sunk in.
For any single set of papers to remedy these deficiencies would be a
great achievement. The authors of the papers that constitute this volume
have more modest ambitions. Their work seeks to show how the rise of the
democratic state calls into question at least the most facile explanations of
the workings of liberal democratic politics and the least reflective justifications that have been offered in its defense. None of the papers advances
specifically Marxist analyses of liberal democratic politics, although most of
the authors are conversant with such work, as the papers themselves make
clear. Instead, their principal intellectual ties are to the body of literature
herein labeled eclectic political economy and to the variety of liberal and
democratic theories that seek to interpret the rise of the democratic state.
Two general questions guided the writing of the essays: What is the
character of the democratic states operating in advanced capitalist economies? and, What may we hope for from the political life of such states?
12
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The opening essay, by Roger Benjamin and Raymond Duvall, argues
for having a variety of types of states operate in capitalist economies. This
must be the starting point for an inquiry such as ours since, unless the
character of states varies under capitalism, no inquiry into the democratic
state can have much if any meaning. Capitalism itself would determine the
essential features of the state, and claims of democratic control would be
bogus or at best a distraction from the serious business of the state to
maintain capitalism. Benjamin and Duvall also discuss the related theme of
the autonomy of the state and consider the complexities that lie behind this
concept. They then turn to the transformation of the democratic state under
capitalism, emphasizing that changes in the kinds of goods that citizens wish
to obtain through the market and through state provision have had a
substantial impact on the character of political activity. Increasingly, they
say, citizens in advanced capitalist or postindustrial societies are concerned
with the ''social relations of production'' -that is, with quality-of-life issues,
regulation of externalities, and positional goods. The politics of such a
society, they imply, is likely to tum increasingly on expertise and ideologyon ideas in general-rather than on a struggle for material possessions.
David Braybrooke, whose essay comes next in the volume, builds
much of his argument concerning the prospects for a significant transformation of the democratic state under capitalism around just such political
changes. For Braybrooke, the state may be sufficiently autonomous to
transform itself in directions that are contrary to the wishes and interests of
controllers of capital. He argues that within the state apparatus there is a
large array of professionals who have a strong interest in moving beyond the
status quo. Their cumulative efforts, Braybrooke contends, may avoid the
legitimation crisis recently described by Habennas. Habermas attributes
this crisis in part to an increase in state intervention to deal with the new
kinds of goods mentioned by Benjamin and Duvall. But the normative
justification for such extensive involvement of the state is missing, says
Habermas. Braybrooke considers how it might emerge.
Braybrooke argues, in effect, that ideology, styles of collective
problem solving, the varieties of professional expertise, the apparatus of
popular control, and the control of productive assets must all be analyzed in
order to understand the future of the democratic state. His paper may be
read as an example of how Marxist themes may be employed within a more
comprehensive explanatory framework that is also sensitive to normative
concerns. Without directly claiming to be so, the paper is a subtle critique of
much Marxist and liberal theorizing as well as an instructive effort in
combining normative and explanatory analysis.
All the essays in the volume reject the image of public officials as
cyphers and of state action as serving a dominant class. But whether public
13
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officials are best understood as entrepreneurs, running something like a
particularly powerful business firm selling in a political marketplace, or
whether they must be understood as having more complex motives is a
question on which the authors are divided. Peter H. Aranson and Peter C.
Ordeshook, whose paper comes third in the volume, lean heavily on the idea
of the state as being an extension of market transactions. Working from a
public-choice perspective, they treat the state much like a business firm (or
a set of firms) engaged in a series of transactions with citizen-consumers.
Officials are assumed to be dependent enough on votes and citizens are
assumed to be informed enough about how to pursue their interests so that
there will be no question of state action being in the service of a single class
interest. Interestingly, Aranson and Ordeshook share some of the worries
of theorists on the Left that state action is, in their terms, "welfaredegrading.'' But their version is that the state is too attentive to multiple
particular interest groups, which have succeeded in using public authority to
supply themselves with benefits, shifting the costs to the collectivity as a
whole.
The principal theme of Aranson and Ordeshook's essay is the failure of
the present form of the democratic state to do an adequate job of translating
broad citizen preferences into public action. As Braybrooke does, they
move naturally from the explanatory to the normative, directing their
analysis to how individual choice may be strengthened as the informing
principle of democratic government. The very questions asked by all of
these theorists are value laden; the criteria for judging the justice of the
democratic state provide guidance for what is important to explain.
My essay, which comes next in the volume, also moves from
explanatory matters to the justice of liberal democratic states. I argue that
state officials are not closely bound by voter and group preferences,
although the apparatus of popular control does matter. Neither are they in
the service of a dominant class interest. My argument is consistent with
Braybrooke's. The state operates in a capitalist economy, and institutions of
popular control are at work; but public officials have an agenda of their own.
For me, this principally means that they have their own ideas about how to
generate high levels of economic performance and that they seek to deflect
citizen demands that may impede their own efforts to induce growth.
My deepest concerns are normative; I ask whether liberal democratic
states are nothing more than tools of domination and arenas of class
struggle. I contend, instead, that they are mixed states and that, as such,
they embody competing claims to just rule. The liberal democratic state is
not derivative of economic arrangements, nor is it divorced from them. It is
neither the handmaiden of capital accumulation nor an agent effectively
14
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directed by popular control. Its workings are more complex, as are the
grounds of its justification.
The three essays by Aranson and Ordeshook, Braybrooke, and Elkin
are all liberal analyses of the workings and reform of the democratic state. In
the concluding essay, Norman Furniss considers some democratic remedies
and analyzes the kinds of political orders that reform of democratic states
under capitalism might produce.
Furniss asks in effect, What may we hope for from democratic political
life? He argues that the "regime crisis" of advanced democratic capitalist
states will most likely result in either a successful defense of the welfare
state or in its retrenchment. Neither result, however, is particularly
appealing because the theoretical foundations and the economic basis of the
welfare state are becoming increasingly shaky. Moreover, neither of course
produces any serious reforms of democratic capitalism. But there are
important reform currents at work which, Furniss argues, are intriguing in
theory if far less likely to be realized than is the continuation of the welfare
state. He considers two reform proposals: socialism in production and
autogestionnaire democracy. The first aims to cut away at the distinction
between state and market and at the present definition of property rights,
which is at its core. The second looks to "civil society" as the locus for
reform, as opposed to state, party, and political program. One might
suppose that with autogestionnaire democracy, Westem political thought
has come full circle, back to Rousseauist images of state and society.
In Fumiss's view, what we may hope for is more of the same, but the
same is morally suspect. Whether wide-ranging reform will be possible
depends in part on the development of a morally inspiring vision of a more
fully democratic society. He says, however, that it will be difficult to fill the
moral void created by the increasingly problematic status of democratic
capitalism.
It is striking that all the authors discuss the rise of the administrative
state as being a possible barrier to the achievement of justice in democratic
states. The essays show a deep concern with the decline of public forums
that encourage, for example, justification of any proposed distribution of
benefits and burdens. Braybrooke notes that the rise of administrative
discretion has its positive side, freeing professionals to develop and
advocate reformist schemes. But collectively, the authors (including Braybrooke) are drawn to decentralized nonadministrative forms of social
decision making. If the democratic state is to retain its legitimacy, they
imply, it must develop additional institutional arrangements that will rely
heavily on participation in public forums and will allow greater possibilities
for individuals to define and pursue their own interests through various
kinds of mutual adjustment processes.
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The authors argue, then, that students of the democratic state under
capitalism ought to enlarge their pantheon of seminal theorists. Adam Smith
and Max Weber should be added to Marx. We need the perspectives of all
three if we are to obtain a theory of the democratic state that will pay due
regard to the power of administrators and to the proper direction for reform
efforts, as well as to the influence of capital. And if we follow the essayists in
their concerns for a just political order, the theory of the democratic state
must also take its bearings from political philosophy. This last is the most
important thing we learn from the essays. The very questions that we ask
about the state are formed through our thinking about what is possible and
just in political life. The essays demonstrate that these normatively
informed questions can be pursued through a variety of theoretical frameworks, from radically individualistic and empirical to structural and speculative.
The theory of the democratic state is not, then, a Marxist preserve,
although, indeed, Marxists have done much of the serious work to date.
Liberals (and democrats) can and must contribute. They must because their
explanatory paradigms are radically incomplete without an analysis of the
state and because the sort of political order to which their political science
contributes and which it sometimes celebrates is undergoing marked
change. Failure to analyze the democratic state will make these political
scientists irrelevant in the most important contemporary political struggles.
A theory of the democratic state is not just an exercise in explanation
and demystification. That, indeed, has been the principal emphasis to date.
Instead, it is a part of the effort to examine the political regimes that men
are capable of, given the kinds of beings they are. Marxists who do not join
their analyses of what is to a sustained discussion of what is possible and
desirable will help to usher in what is reprehensible. In this they will be
joined by political philosophers who are indifferent to empirical analysis and
by empirically minded political scientists who are too interested in explanation to notice the fundamental reconstruction of the political life that they are
trying to explain.

NOTES
1. Cf. Carl Friedrich's remark that "only in Britain, where the idea of modem
constitutionalism was developed in antithesis to the 'state' concept in the course of
the revolutionary struggles of the seventeenth century, did the doctrine [equating
state and sovereignty] fail" (1950, p. 17).
2. See the recent overviews by Camoy, 1984; Jessop, 1982; and Nordlinger,
1981.
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3. Some terminological matters require attention. "Democratic state" should
be interpreted here as meaning the state in liberal democratic societies, i.e.,
societies organized around popular sovereignty and a concern for individual rights.
As noted, liberalism is the justifying account of how such societies work.
4. For present purposes the state can be defined as the constitutional-legal
entity that sets out the authoritative policies of the society and controls the principal
means of organized coercion. Benjamin and Duvall, in their essay in this volume,
provide a more elaborate discussion.
5. For an overview of Marxist theories see Camoy, 1984; and Jessop, 1982. On
non-Marxist theories see Nordlinger, 1981.
6. Cf. Raymond Williams's (1977) remark that "a Marxism without some
concept of determination is in effect worthless. A Marxism with many of the
concepts of determination it now has is quite radically disabled'' (p. 83). See also the
scathing essay on Althusser by E. P. Thompson (1979).
7. Because this is a variegated collection of theorists, it is not easy to
collectively characterize their work. Convenience of exposition and space both exert
a homogenizing pull which the reader should guard against.
8. Contrast here Poulantzas, 1973; and Lindblom, 1977. Offe (1974 and 1975)
is an ambiguous figure in this regard since class does not play the major role in his
analysis, that position being reserved for the state serving capital.
9. The empirically minded have been joined by the instrumentally minded, but
with a twist. Many policy scientists ignore the rise of the democratic state simply by
positing its existence and trying to promote the efficient achievement of whatever
policies it produces.
10. Instead of calling these theorists "democrats," it might be better to
describe them as liberals who wish to democratize liberalism. This may be Barber's
view, for example. But the issue of how far democratization is to go is not addressed
in enough detail in the work of democrats, although Barber goes further than most.
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2
The Capitalist State in Context
Roger Benjamin and Raymond Duvall

The recent resurgence of scholarly interest in the state has resulted in an
active debate about the relationship between state and society. 1 The largest
contribution to this debate has focused on the state in capitalist society, and
much of it has been influenced in one way or another by classical Marxian
concerns about the nature of the capitalist state. This has meant, by and
large, that it is not the state in the abstract that is of greatest interest;
rather, the capitalist state in capitalist society is the explicit concern of
theorists. As a result, much of the current debate is conducted within the
framework of what is referred to as "the theory of the capitalist state. " 2
One of the central questions in the current debates about the
relationship between state and society concerns the autonomy of the
capitalist state. Some maintain that the state is completely autonomous, an
actor with its own interests, existing unto itself and for itself (Krasner,
1978). Others, following the classical Marxian perspective (perhaps Miliband, 1969) may believe that the state exists as an instrument of the
dominant capitalist class, and therefore exhibits no autonomy. At least this
position is typically injected into the debate, if only as a straw-man position,
and it is essentially represented by the famous dictum that' 'the executive of
the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the
whole bourgeoisie" (Marx and Engels, 1972:33). Most participants in the
debate, however, seem to have gravitated toward the position that the state
is to be understood as being relatively autonomous (see, e.g., Hamilton,
.1982; Evans et al., 1985). This seems to be a safe intermediate position, but
its vagueness about the extent and the form of the relative autonomy of the
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capitalist state permits the debate to continue uninterrupted. What it means
for the capitalist state to be relatively autonomous remains controversial.
The continuation of this debate within the framework of the theory of
the capitalist state is, in many respects, to be commended. Certainly, few
scholarly endeavors are of greater current importance than the effort to
understand the nature and the role of the state in capitalist society-its
structural basis and the significance of its operational independence.
However, we believe the foundations of the debate can be improved in
at least two important respects. First, there is lack of clarity and shared
meaning in the use of the term "the state" among different scholars from
different intellectual traditions. Put simply, the state means different things
to different people. This means that a debate about the relative autonomy of
the state may be (and frequently is) unfruitful because the participants may
not share an understanding of what it is that is allegedly relatively
autonomous. We address this issue of conceptual clarity in the next section,
where we distinguish five conceptions of the state.
Second, in much of the debate, there is not enough sensitivity to the
importance of context. We find this ironic, because the clear implication of
setting the debate within the framework of ''the theory of the capitalist
state" is that context does matter. In particular, the implication is clear that
capitalism somehow constitutes or defines a unique, special context for
which a theory of the state will take on a different form from what it will for
the state in contexts other than capitalism. It is not the theory of the state in
the abstract that sets the framework for the debate about relative autonomy; rather, it is the theory of the capitalist state. Capitalism, as a context,
must matter.
The problem, and the source of the irony, is that this implication is not
pursued to its logical end. Discussion of the theory of the capitalist state
suggests that capitalism constitutes a single, undifferentiated context
everywhere. In our judgment, this is an inappropriate attitude, and it
certainly contributes to inhibiting fruitful debate about the relative autonomy
of the state to the extent that participants in the debate have fundamentally
different contexts of capitalist society in mind as they address (and talk past)
one another. It can and should be recognized that there are fundamentally
different kinds or forms of capitalist societies in the modern world system.
These different forms of capitalism define importantly different contexts for
the state, so that the extent and the form of the relative autonomy of the
state are likely to differ among societies.
This does not mean that we advocate an extreme relativist or
historicist view in which context is all and generalization is impossible.
However, we do reject as inadequate a theory that purports to be
universally applicable across all contexts (see Benjamin, 1982). Fundamen20
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tal differences in context are not entirely idiographic; to reject universalism,
then, does not necessarily mean to accept a doctrine of complete social
uniqueness. The key to this , however, rests with the word "fundamental,"
which we use repeatedly in this discussion as a modifier in setting our
argument about resolving the tension between universalism and contextual
uniqueness. If every difference in context is equally important, then one
must adopt an extreme historicist position. But if some differences are
fundamental, while others are merely superficial or apparent, then one can
reject universalism and recognize that context matters to the validity of
theory without going to the extreme of uniqueness.
For our purposes, when distinguishing different contexts of capitalism,
fundamental differences concern the basic organizing principles-what
might be called the "laws of motion" (Marx, 1967:10) or the basic dynamic
and structural underpinnings-of the capitalist mode of production in
different societies. Our argument is that, in the modern world system, there
are different kinds of capitalist societies, based on fundamentally different
organizing principles or "laws of motion," and that a debate in the
framework of the theory of the capitalist state is disadvantaged by a failure to
take account of these fundamental differences in the contexts of capitalism. 3
Here we skirt the issue of just how many fundamentally different
contexts of capitalism there are (or might be). The taxonomic exercise of
identifying contexts could be quite useful. It might include such categories
as primitive capitalism, competitive industrial capitalism, and late capitalism.
Or it might make use of the periodization offered by Stavrianos (1981),
which distinguishes mercantile (or commercial) capitalism, industrial capitalism, monopoly capitalism, and defensive monopoly capitalism. To pursue
the development of an exhaustive typology, however, would lead us away
from our primary objective, which is to demonstrate how context can be
better incorporated into theoretical debates about the relative autonomy of
the capitalist state. Therefore, we ignore many different kinds of capitalism
and choose here to limit our attention to two ideal types (in the Weberian
sense). We call those two fundamentally different forms of capitalism
advanced (or "post") 4 industrial and dependent (or "peripheral") industrializing, respectively.
We develop our argument about the contextual basis of the relative
autonomy of capitalist states in three stages, after we discuss, in the next
section, the alternative conceptions of the state. In the second section we
specify the distinguishing features of the two ideal types of contexts of
advanced-industrial and dependent-industrializing capitalist societies. Then,
in the third section, we employ these contextual differences to analyze the
state in context, asking how it might be conceived and understood as a
different creature in the advanced-industrial and dependent-industrializing
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capitalist contexts. Finally, in the fourth section, we offer contrasting
theoretical arguments about the character, structure, and dynamics of state
autonomy in the two contexts. We argue that one will draw different
conclusions about the relative autonomy of the state when different
conceptions of the state are used or when different capitalist contexts are
referred to.

THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE
There is considerable confusion about the term "the state." It means
different things to different analysts and theorists. To us this suggests a
problem that must be addressed head-on before one can hope to conduct a
dialogue about such theoretical issues as the relative autonomy of the state.
It makes little sense to plunge into those theoretical issues unless or until
there is a shared understanding of the central concept, the state. Unfortunately, little has been published to help promote conceptual clarification and
shared understanding (see, however, Netti, 1968; North, 1979). This
section is an effort in that direction.
The first place to begin is to recognize that some political scientists
disparage any use of the term and do not regard the state as a meaningful
concept. This position seems to have two complementary sources. One is
the behavioral revolution, with its aversion to abstract concepts; the other is
an extreme individualistic (and reductionist), liberal philosophical perspective-namely, that the political process involving individuals and groups in
interaction (often in an institutional setting) is the only appropriate unit of
analysis. The effect has been that, for much of the postwar era, many liberal
behavioral scholars have denied the existence of such a thing as the state,
regarding it, instead, as an abstract fiction, nothing more than the reification
of complex processes of interaction among individuals and groups in
institutional settings (see Lowi, 1979; cf. Truman, 1951; Bentley, 1908).
Fortunately, this position is no longer ascendent in political science (Evans
et al., 1985), but it still must be recognized as an influential perspective that
contributes to the lack of conceptual clarity about the state.
Beyond this conception that the state is not a meaningful concept, at
least five different conceptions of the state are currently in circulation. The
differences among the five are not small; they range from narrowly
exclusive to broadly inclusive notions, and as such they imply different
understandings and theories of the capitalist state. We approach them in
order from most narrow to most inclusive conceptions.
1. The first and narrowest conception is of the state as a unit of action
or as a unit of decisional authority. According to this conception, the state is
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an actor that makes decisions and/or policy. Essentially, when one is
employing this conception, the state is virtually synonymous with the
government-by which is meant the collective set of personnel who occupy
the positions of decisional authority in the polity, and the collective, but
diverse, set of institutional agencies through which authoritative decisions
and actions are taken. Whenever "the state" is used to refer to an actorwhen, for example, one talks of state policy, or of the state doing
something-the reference is generally implicitly to the government or some
governmental agency or bureaucratic institution(s). Hence, this first,
narrow conception of the state is being employed. It is the most concrete of
the five conceptions of the state-an institutionally tangible ''entity'' that
does things and has or makes policy.
This conception of the state is compatible with the extreme liberal
tenets of the behavioral revolution, in treating the state as a collection of
individuals and institutions that occupy role positions (those of governing
authority) and that act as a group to govern. Thus, typically those in the
tradition of pluralist/interest-group liberalism who write about the state at all
employ this narrow conception of the state; 5 for them the state is, in effect,
the government and/or governmental institutions and hence is a decisional/
policy actor. But this conception is found outside of the pluralist, liberal
tradition as well. Stephen Krasner' s weak state-strong state dichotomy and
his arguments about a "statist" perspective (1978), while they are
avowedly nonindividualistic and distinct from the liberal tradition, rest on a
rather narrow conception of the state as a unit of action, which has state
interests and pursues state policy. Again, implicitly, this grounds the
conception of the state in governmental decisions and the actions and
interests of governmental agencies. Similarly, the tradition in international
relations that refers to states as actors is rooted in this first conception.
In all, the conception of the state as actor has wide currency. But it is
not the only conception, and indeed, as will be made clearer below, we do
not believe that it is the most fruitful conception. The remaining alternatives, however, are more abstract notions-not in the sense of being more
vague but, rather, in the sense of being less tangible, less concrete.
2. The first of these alternatives (our second conception) is of the state
as the organizing principles that give "totality," or an underlying structural
coherence (at an abstract level), to the myriad and diverse agencies and
institutions of governance. This is the conception of the state apparatus as
an organized, coherent whole-the structure of the state apparatus. In a
sense this conception includes or subsumes the first, narrower conception,
but it also goes beyond that conception. The personnel and the institutional
agencies (including the public bureaucratic, administrative agencies) of
government are elements of the whole, but they are not, themselves, the
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organizing structure and hence are not the state in this second conception.
Here, the state is not an actor or a mere aggregate of discrete individual and
institutional actors; rather, it is the structuring principles according to which
that aggregate as a whole is organized. Attention is directed to the
organization and processes of governance, not to the decisions and actions
of the government and/ or governmental agencies per se. The state, in this
second conception, does not act or do,· rather, it is a structure.
This means that scholars who operate with this conception recognize
and acknowledge the frequently incoherent, often inconsistent, and even
competitive actions and policies of the separate, diverse agencies of
government, while talking of a (abstractly) coherent set of structuring or
organizing principles underlying them. Public bureaucracies can compete,
but they stand in structured relation to one another and, together, to
society. Later we say more about just what those structuring principles are.
For now, it should be enough to illustrate how this conception has been
employed in the scholarship of quite disparate traditions. One example is
provided by the neoconservatives and liberal socialists in the U.S. (Huntington, 1975; Bell, 1975; Etzioni, 1977/78; cf. Downs, 1967) and Britain (King,
1975; Rose and Peters, 1978), who have noted the tremendous growth of
the state apparatus and its increasing penetration of society. Of course, they
evaluate this change very differently; but they concur on identifying a
structuring principle that concerns the functional scope of and penetration of
society by the administrative agencies of government across a whole range
of social and economic activities (see also Skowronek, 1982; Tilly, 1975). In
a similar vein, discussions of the rise and development of the welfare state
(Wilensky, 1976; Flora and Heidenheimer, 1981; Hage and Hanneman,
1980; Skocpol and Ikenberry, forthcoming) or, in a different context, the
bureaucratic-authoritarian state (O'Donnell, 1973; Collier, 1979) are based
on a conception of the state in terms of organizing principles, not in terms of
courses of action or kinds of policy. Likewis.e, neo-Marxists now often refer
to the managers of the state apparatus as comprising a new "stratum" in
social relations of production, sometimes even a new class whose size and
interests set it apart from other classes (Wright, 1978; Poulantzas, 1973;
O'Connor, 1973). This is clearly an attempt to identify a structural principle
that provides abstract coherence to the state.
3. The third conception of the state that can be identified also revolves
around structural principles, but in this case not those that underlie the
organization of the agencies of government. Instead, this conception
emphasizes the structural principles that define and constitute social
relations of political power and control in society. In that sense, it is based
neither upon a particular set of individuals or their actions, as is the first
conception, nor upon a particular set of concrete institutions, as is the
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second. Rather, it is based on the less tangible, the more abstract, set of
social relations that constitute effective political power in society. This is
essentially a class conception: in effect, the state is the ruling class.
Obviously, this conception generally encompasses both of the first two
conceptions in that the personnel who occupy high positions of authoritythe government-and the social ''stratum'' of the state apparatus are
generally conceived as being part of the ruling class and as serving the
interests of the ruling class. But this conception goes beyond those in that it
includes also all elite positions of effective political power. Just what
constitutes the set of such positions changes across time as the economy
and polity change and become more differentiated in roles. Whereas, for
example, the controllers of the mass media are not part of the state in the
first two conceptions, they may have an important place in this conception.
Similarly, perhaps, do labor leaders and the intelligentsia.
Although this conception is clearly associated with neo-Marxist analysts from C. W. Mills (1959) to E. 0. Wright (1978; see also Therborn,
1978; Block, 1977), it should not be confused with the classical Marxist
notion of the dominant social class (Althusser, 1970). The latter is defined in
terms of social relations of production and exists as the class that dominates
in the primary mode of production in society-for capitalist society, this is
the bourgeoisie. By contrast, the state as the ruling class is a concept that is
defined in terms of the occupation of positions of political power. It may, or
may not, be thought to overlap substantially with the dominant class,
depending on one's theoretical preconceptions. This means that one can
employ the conception of the state as the ruling class (or, more generally, in
terms of social relations of political power and control) without smuggling in
an implication that one is really referring to the state as '' the executive
committee of the bourgeoisie." In sum, this is not a conception that is a
theoretical short-cut toward acceptance of a crude instrumental Marxist
perspective. Whether the ruling class is an instrument of the dominant class
would remain a theoretical and empirical question. Instead, this is simply a
more inclusive and abstract conception than the first two in saying that the
state, per se, has to be understood as being more than the organized totality
of the governmental apparatus. The latter is certainly a central part of the
state; but also included are extragovemmental social relations of political
power and control.
4. A fourth identifiable conception is even broader. It, too, is structural, but not in terms of relations between social classes. Instead, the state
is conceived of as the enduring structure ofgovernance and rule in society; in
effect, it is the corpus of law in both the de jure and the de facto senses (see
Hart, 1977). This is a conception of the state as the entire institutional-legal
order; it is the machinery and the means by which conflict is handled, society
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is ruled, and social relations are governed. This conception visualizes the
state as being all of those explicit and implicit regulations-many, but not all,
of which are codified in laws and administrative rulings-that govern social
and economic relationships.
It may be argued that the first and second models of the state actually
derive from this deeper model. It is in terms of this conception that we
would place definitions of property rights as being features of the state per
se (e.g., Furniss, 1978a, 1978b), and those definitions, after all, determine
what property falls into the public rather than the private domain. It is from
within the body of law of a society that regulatory practices do or do not
emerge. For example, changes as to what appropriately falls under private
and public property rights are what creates a climate for environmental
protection by the governmental apparatus. Public-choice theorists in the
United States have been active in working on property-rights theory
(Buchanan, 1975; Aranson and Ordeshook, infra); critical theorists in
Europe also are joining the debate (Braybrooke, infra). Neither school,
however, explicitly recognizes the institutional-legal order as its conception
of the state. About the closest that one can come to finding this conception
identified explicitly is in the standard textbook literature on international
relations, where the state is typically defined as a "system of political
authority.' ' 6
5. Fifth, and broadest in scope, is the conception of the state as being
the dominant normative order in society. This is the most comprehensive or
inclusive conception because it subsumes the entire institutional-legal order
and more. It is associated with the Gramscian notion of the hegemonic state
(Buci-Glucksmann, 1980; Livingstone, 1976; Showstack-Sassoon, 1978) in
that its focus is on the politically relevant norms and customs existing in the
value system which form a "tacit" level of rule in society. The state, in this
conception, is virtually synonymous with the ideational/ideological/normative bases of social order; it is, if you will, the warp and woof of societal
fabric which consists of the dominant, or hegemonic, idea systems and
normatively accepted practices that structure social relations. State and
society become virtually indistinguishable.
The norms attached to participation and authority differ from one
society to another (also over time within a society). The nature of these
norms determines the individual's relationship to the group, even to the
government; for example, whether one is to be subordinate or equal. From
Antonio Gramsci (1971) and Jurgen Habermas (1975) we learn that language
itself reinforces the society's "system of domination." This point is
accurate in a Sapir-Whorfian sense. Macrosocietal institutions may be
hierarchical and reinforced by the understandings attached to the concept of
authority and by the language used to describe it. Such understandings may,
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however, evolve as norms, and values change. If this occurs, there will be
pressure to change the existing system of hegemony ,7 the existing
characteristics of the state as conceptualized in the second and fourth
models above. In that sense, this conception underpins and structures at
least those two narrower notions of the state.

Recognizing the wide disparity in conceptions of the state-from single
and unitary actor to an entire dominant normative order-we must ask
ourselves how to proceed. One cannot act as though the differences do not
matter; indeed, the reason that the fivefold distinction between conceptions
of the state is important is that one derives very different problems,
arguments, and conclusions, depending on which conception one operates
with. We suspect that much of the confusion surrounding debates and
discussion over the state develops from authors who shift from one
conception to another without explicitly realizing or noting it (see, e.g., n. 6
above). By making the fivefold distinction, one is in a better position to
choose which conception of the state to examine. Our position is that the
five are not equally useful conceptions.
Viewing the state as an actor is too narrow a conception in our view. In
order to make the concept a meaningful and useful addition to our tools of
analysis, it is better to view it in broader, more structural terms than this
first conception. This is because the state as actor is virtually fully
redundant with, and duplicative of, another well-established conceptnamely, the government and its agencies. Here, the term "the state" is
really nothing more than a "trendy," sexy label for an older bottle. Such a
relabeling buys little save confusion. As a result, we believe strongly that
when one employs a conception of the state as a unit of action/decision/
policy, one should instead talk of the government and/or its institutional
agencies. The state is not an actor; rather, the government and its agencies
are.
Similarly, the state is not usefully conceptualized as the ruling class or
as the social relations of political power and control in society (the third
conception). That concept is too ambiguous: it would be a challenge, at best,
to identify the ruling class precisely, and therefore, the state would
necessarily remain a loose empirical notion. The state as ruling class
requires substantial reconceptualization before it can be made useful. We
need a structural method of determining which elites emerge and with what
kind of impact on political power and control.
Finally, the fifth conception is too inclusive: virtually everything is a
part of the state when it is defined as the dominant normative order.
Theoretical development is artificially truncated, because the interesting
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questions about state-society relationships are eliminated by subsuming
'' the state' ' under ''society'' -the two are virtually indistinguishable under
this conception.
For us, then, only the second and fourth conceptions of the state are of
theoretical interest and empirical utility. Each, we believe, is open to
reasonably precise identification. One can ''identify'' the organizing principles that underlie and give coherence to the institutional aggregate of public
bureaucracy and administrative apparatus; similarly, one can ''observe'' the
established corpus of law that constitutes a legal order. In addition, each is a
theoretically ''unique'' concept, distinguishable from other related concepts. Neither is highly redundant with other common concepts, allencompassing in its scope of reference, or exclusive of interesting theoretical questions by definition.
Thus, in our judgment, there are two distinct but useful conceptions of
the state. The first is the continually operating (i.e., administering,
regulating, etc.), relatively permanent institutional aggregate of public
bureaucracy and administrative apparatus as an organized whole. This is
State 1. The second, State 2, is the more encompassing institutional-legal
order, which is the enduring structure of governance and rule in societythe machinery and the means by which conflict is handled, society is ruled,
and social relations are governed. We will employ both State 1 and State 2 in
the analysis that follows. 8 Thus, our concern is with the relative autonomy
of the structuring principles that underlie the institutional aggregate of public
administrative apparatus, as well as the relative autonomy of the institutional-legal order. We shall not consider the relative autonomy of the
government (as actor or decision-making unit), the ruling class generally, or
the entire normative order.
As conventionally posed, the issue of the autonomy of the state
concerns the degree of independence of the state from its structural basis in
society. At the most general level, the question revolves around whether
the state is "mere superstructural reflection" or is an "expression'' of
social structure. This takes more particular form in a set of questions about
the relationship of the state to the dominant social class in the capitalist
mode of production: To what extent is there, or is there not, an effective
class basis of the state? Is the state more than a reflection of and an agency
for the interests of the dominant class? Does the state, independently of
dominant class interests, transform social relations and social structure?
Most concretely, do some "statist" interests transcend the class basis of
the state and therefore shape and direct it?
To some people, these questions may provide an intangible and, as a
result, ambiguous definition of state autonomy. We recognize that we
approach the issue somewhat differently from the way in which it is
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sometimes conceived. Frequently, emphasis is placed on actions, decisions,
and rules; that is, autonomy is often thought to revolve around what the
state does. Accordingly, the guiding questions generally are: Are the state's
actions hostile, or at least neutral, to the wants or desires of members of the
dominant class? Do its decisions and rules originate from within itself rather
than emerging as responses to the wishes of capitalists?
Our problem with these questions is that they are excessively focused
on action, decision, wishes, and wants. As such, it is really an issue of the
decisional insularity or independence of the first conception of the state
discussed above. That conception we have rejected on the grounds that it is
virtually redundant with the concept of the government or other particular
agencies of the state. It may well be interesting to know how much
decisional or action latitude the government has vis-a-vis the desires of the
capitalist class. But that is not really a matter of the relative autonomy of the
capitalist state per se.
Governments and bureaucracies do and will make decisions, take
actions, and institute rules to which members of the capitalist class object.
Does that mean, however, that the capitalist state is necessarily relatively
autonomous? For us, the answer is clearly no. The reason is that the two
conceptions of the state that we find sensible both point less to what the
state does than to what the state is. In particular, the issue is the extent to
which the basic form or character of the state-the set of organizing
principles that give it coherence or ''totality'' -is in accord with and in the
service of the objective interests of the dominant, the capitalist, class.
Posing the issue in this way presupposes that we can go beyond the
decisions of governments, the actions of particular bureaucratic institutions,
and the specifics of concrete legal pronouncements in order to see a
''totality'' -a coherent set of organizing principles-which is the state
(whether as administrative apparatus or as institutional-legal order). In
addition, it presupposes that we can ascertain the extent to which that set of
organizing principles is in the service of-or is neutral with respect tofundamental class interests (as distinct from conscious or expressed desires
of members of a class). These may seem heroic presumptions, especially to
persons who are accustomed to thinking in terms of the decisional
independence of the government or other particular agencies of the state.
Certainly they lead such persons to feel that the definitional questions that
are posed above are rather ambiguous and fuzzy by comparison to the
tendency to think about whether governmental actions and policies differ
from the wishes of capitalists. But we believe that when one captures the
essence of the two conceptions of the state with which we are working,
questions about whether it is "a reflection of the basic interests of the
dominant class" are seen not to be inherently ambiguous.
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DIFFERENCES IN THE CONTEXTS
OF ADVANCED-INDUSTRIAL AND
DEPENDENT-INDUSTRIALIZING SOCIETIES
In this section we delineate what we regard as the relevant ways in
which advanced-industrial9 and dependent-industrializing10 capitalist societies differ from each other, by analyzing their respective structural
expressions . 11 Three dimensions of differentiation provide the basis for our
analysis. They are: (1) the complexity and/or clarity of the class structure;
(2) the substantive expression or manifestation of class interests; and (3)
the locus of capital accumulation dynamics, the underlying processes
through which spheres of production and exchange, class structure, and
class interests are transformed. Together these three dimensions enable us
to sketch the two ideal types of contexts in terms of social structural
configurations, objective and expressed class conflicts, and transformation
dynamics. We develop the sketches by considering each of the three
dimensions in tum.
COMPLEXITY AND CLARITY OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Complexity and interdependence are two particularly important features of an advanced-industrial society. Growth in functional specificityespecially with respect to the increasingly important service sector that has
seemingly endless components-produces a complex, integrated system of
production and exchange. Indeed, new sectors develop as outgrowths of
others. The increased complexity itself produces ''crowding'' effects and
the need to restore order; recognition of the interdependence of seemingly
disparate sectors also develops. Diversity, specialization, and sectoral
integration, then, are the structural hallmarks of the spheres of production
and exchange in the advanced-industrial context. It is a world in which
industrial production per se is no longer dominant and in which information
becomes crucial.
By contrast, the dependent-industrializing economy is structurally
simple. A small number of sectors dominate the economy, and each of the
dominant sectors is, relatively speaking, internally homogeneous; that is,
there is, within any sector, low functional or role specificity. In addition,
sectors exist in comparative isolation from one another; indeed, they
develop quite independently, as frequently in response to processes
elsewhere in the world system as to domestic economic processes (Duvall
et al., 1981). As a result, there is extensive variation across sectors in
sectoral dynamism, the extent of capital accumulation, and returns to
factors of production. Sectoral imbalance, disarticulation, and intrasectoral
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homogeneity, then, are the structural hallmarks of the economy in the
dependent-industrializing context (Sylvan et al., 1983).
In a sense, complexity begets complexity, and simplicity begets
simplicity. A highly variegated system of production and exchange can be
expected to contain a complex class structure. Extensive role specificity and
complex integration of sectors conjoin to produce a structure of subtly
differentiated classes and extensive groups which are not easily classified in
the conventional class categories of the capitalist mode of production.
In a word, the advanced-industrial context is marked by a highly
ambiguous class structure. To be sure, there is an unambiguous labor class,
a readily identifiable capitalist class, and a petit bourgeoisie, as conventionally understood. But there is much more; or at least there is considerable uncertainty about the class status of many in terms of the categories of
labor, bourgeoisie, and petit bourgeoisie (Braverman, 1974; cf. Martin and
Kassalow, 1980). Consider the recent debates about the so-called middle
strata. What is the class status of the salaried white-collar bureaucrats, the
technicians, the intelligentsia, the professionals? When such groups constitute as much of the economically active population as they do in the
advanced-industrial society, no analysis of class structure can afford to
ignore them. Nor is their effect unimportant in blurring class division or the
pervasiveness and depth of the objective class conflict.
To what extent are the interests of the bourgeoisie, as the dominant
class in the capitalist system, objectively at odds with, or objectively
compatible with, the interests of these groups? An inability of scholars to
provide a definitive analytical answer to that question points to a fundamental feature of the advanced-industrial capitalist context that is important for
our analysis; namely, that in advanced-industrial capitalism the class basis of
the state is ambiguous (both analytically and in practice) to the extent that
neither class structure nor class interest is sharply defined.
By contrast, the relative simplicity of the production and exchange
systems of the dependent-industrializing context is associated with a much
more straightforward class structure. Classes are more clearly defined; the
objective conflict in class interests is at least analytically apparent. This is
not to say that ambiguity is entirely absent; there is a significant technobureaucratic elite in dependent-industrializing societies (Kautsky, 1972;
Duvall and Freeman, 1983). But that technobureaucratic elite is not
equivalent to the ''middle strata'' in postindustrial society, in terms either
of social pervasiveness or of effect on the clarity of the class structure.
Rather, in the dependent-industrializing context, conventional capitalist and
precapitalist classes clearly compose most of the society. The exact
composition, of course, varies from society to society; but typically, both
the peasantry and labor (including literally a reserve army of unemployed)
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are large. The conventional petit bourgeoisie is apparent, and there
generally is a (small) national bourgeoisie and a landed aristocracy. Finally,
and significantly, the international capitalist class is represented, although
generally not through the physical presence of members of that class.
In comparison with the advanced-industrial context, then, in dependent-industrializing capitalism the class basis of the state may be relatively
unambiguous (both analytically and in practice), because class structure and
class interest are substantially more sharply defined.
THE EXPRESSION OF CLASS INTERESTS

Unambiguous class structure promotes a recognition of objective class
interests. Complexity and ambiguity of structure make it more difficult to
recognize and to express one's basic class interests. This means, ceteris
paribus, that the behavioral manifestation or expression of interests is more
likely to follow objective class bases in the dependent-industrializing context
than in the advanced-industrial context. This is to say that the expressed
interest of social groups is more obviously based in and revolves around
social relations of production; the production and realization of physical value
tend to underlie the major manifestations of competition and conflict.
In this sense, then, the dependent-industrializing context is one in
which the basic processes of capital accumulation are paramount in defining
what interests are pursued by groups. How production is to be organized
and how the physical value that is produced is to be realized, by whom, and
to what extent are the dominant questions over which interests manifestly
conflict. Politics quite literally is a matter of ''who gets what.''
This is markedly less true in the advanced-industrial context, where
objective class interests are less recognizable. There, interests grow less
out of social relations of production than out of what might be called social
relations of consumption. That is, the expression of group interests
concerns general "quality of life" issues-how is life to be lived, with what
kinds of rights, responsibilities, and privileges-much more than issues of
how production is to be organized or how the physical value that is produced
is to be realized. What might be called "positional goods" (Hirsch, 1976)
are of equal importance to goods that one physically possesses. Furthermore, group competition and conflict revolve much more around the
creation and regulation of externalities from the processes of production and
consumption (Mishan, 1972). In the advanced-industrial context, manifest
group interests are more concerned with the processes of consumption
saturation (with respect to physical possession goods), which are often
believed to be more basic than processes of capital accumulation (see
Scitovsky, 1976). This is made possible because objective class interests
are ambiguous and because the levels of material consumption are so high.
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THE DYNAMICS OF STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION

There is a reciprocal relationship between the expression of interests
by groups and the basic dynamics through which social structure is
transformed. Structural transformation leads to the expression of different
interests, and in some part, the manifest pursuit of interests by groups
helps to channel the transformation of society. In this light, the varied
expression of interests in the two capitalist contexts can be expected to be
associated with different underlying dynamics through which those contexts
are structurally transformed. And so it is.
In dependent-industrializing capitalism, the basic dynamic rests with
the production and reproduction of the means of production. The conventional model of expanded reproduction is applicable here, although the
sphere of reproduction goes beyond the dependent economy itself and
includes the world economy. By contrast, in advanced-industrial capitalism,
the locus of the transformation dynamic has shifted; it now rests increasingly with the production and reproduction of the ''means of consumption.''
What, then, are the implications of this basic difference in the two
contexts? Since the process now revolves primarily around the means of
consumption in advanced-industrial capitalism, the accumulation and expansion dynamic is substantially diminished. Slower and slower growth is, then,
the expectation for advanced-industrial capitalism (see Baumol, 1967;
Benjamin, 1982; cf. Olson, 1982). This expectation is countered only to the
extent that a vigorous technological research-and-development (R & D)
sector remains central and/ or that ''growth' ' (of income) is sustained by the
repatriation of money capital from the periphery of the world system.
By contrast, in dependent-industrializing capitalism, the focus of the
process of expanded reproduction on the means of production implies that
the accumulation and expansion dynamic is potentially enlarged. For
example, "boom growth" is at least logically compatible with the dependent-industrializing context of capitalism. The extent to which that potential
is actualized in any particular dependent-industrializing society, of course, is
highly dependent on the ways in which that society is and has been
incorporated into the world system. One of the major distinguishing features
of dependent capitalism is the strong, indeed almost entirely determining,
exogeneity of the process of expanded reproduction. Both the impetus for
and the constraints on that process are imposed by processes and agencies
that are operating elsewhere in the international system (see Kurth, 1979;
Evans, 1979). This means that the process of accumulation is a local
reflection of an internationalized process (Dos Santos, 1970; Cardoso and
Faletto, 1978).
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A SUMMARY CONTRAST OF THE Two CAPITALIST CONTEXTS

In table 2.1 we attempt to represent the major distinguishing features
that set advanced-industrial and dependent-industrializing capitalist societies
apart as two fundamentally distinct ideal types of capitalism in the contemporary world.
TABLE 2.1
FUNDAMENTAL CONTEXTUAL DIFFERENCES IN ADVANCED-INDUSTRIAL
AND DEPENDENT-INDUSTRIALIZING CAPITALIST SOCIETIES

DISTINGUISHING
DIMENSION

ADVANCED-INDUSTRIAL
CAPITALISM

DEPENDENT-INDUSTRJALIZING
CAPITALISM

Structural complexity

Sectors of economy are
interdependent and homogeneous with high
differentiation functionally within sectors.

Sectors of economy are disarticulated and heterogeneous,
with low differentiation functionally within sectors.

Class structure is ambiguous; the class of
many groups is uncertain.

Class structure is unambiguous; conventional capitalist and precapitalist classes
are socially pervasive.

Revolves around social
relations of '' consumption,'' with emphasis on
' 'quality of life'' issues
more than objective
class interests.

Revolves around social relations of production, with emphasis on organization of
production and realization of
the value of production along
objective class interests.

Rooted in process of
consumption saturation.

Rooted in process of capital
accumulation.

Production and reproduction of '' means of
consumption.''

Production and reproduction
of means of production.

Diminished potential for
growth.

Signfficant potential for
growth.

Expansion is dependent
on maintenance of centrality of R & D sector
and extraction from periphery.

Expansion is dependent on
the form of incorporation into
the world system.

Expression of interests

Transformation dynamic
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The table and our previous discussion indicate that advanced-industrial
capitalist society is structurally complex and ambiguous; extensively populated by groups whose social class is not easily identified; marked by a
relative saturation in the consumption of physical-possession goods; typified
by competition and conflict among groups over '' social relations of consumption" (i.e. , "quality of life" issues, ' 'positional goods, " and the creation
and regulation of production and consumption externalities); structurally
transformed by processes of production and reproduction that revolve
primarily around the ''means of consumption''; and logically tending toward
slower and slower growth except to the extent that technological R & D
remains central and/ or income can be extracted from the periphery of the
world system. Dependent-industrializing capitalist society, by contrast, is
structurally simple; has a sharp, unambiguous definition of class structure in
which competition and conflict among groups generally follows objective
class interests about the organization of production and the realization of the
value produced; is structurally transformed by processes of production and
reproduction of the means of production; and may or may not exhibit
substantial growth.
Our task is to apply these defining statements of two distinct and idealtype contexts of capitalism and to analyze the different nature and role of the
capitalist state that exists in each of them.

THE STATE IN DIFFERENT CAPITALIST CONTEXTS
Earlier we said that analysis can and should proceed with respect to
two distinct conceptions of the state. State 1 is the relatively permanent
institutional aggregate of public bureaucracy and administrative apparatus as
an organized, coherent totality. State 2 is the more encompassing institutional-legal order; the enduring structure of governance and rule in society.
For each of these two conceptions we shall see how the state is a different
kind of creature in the two contexts of advanced-industrial and dependentindustrializing capitalist societies because different structural expressions
are provided by those two contexts. How is the public institutional
aggregate as a coherent totality to be understood as having a basically
distinct character in advanced-industrial society, in contrast to dependentindustrializing society? And how is the dependent-industrializing legal order
fundamentally different from that in advanced-industrial society? Let us
consider these issues, beginning with the second, broader conception of the
state.
35

Roger Benjamin and Raymond Duvall
THE INSTITUTIONAL-LEGAL ORDER

IN DIFFERENT CAPITALIST CONTEXTS

There is virtually an unlimited number of ways in which one could
compare and contrast states in different contexts. When one conceptualizes
the state as the entire institutional-legal order, the possible points of
comparison include the whole range of expressions of the law, both codified
and not codified. Hence, the task of drawing out differences in the state in
different contexts could quickly become a very difficult, if not an impossible,
task; every legal difference could be understood, in a sense, to be a
difference in the state. But theorists of the state, including ourselves, are
rarely concerned with every apparent difference. Instead, we concern
ouselves with the basic, or fundamental, organizing principles of the state as
an institutional-legal order. This means that we must direct our attention
away from particular laws and legal provisions per se and toward the more
basic principles that underlie them. Those organizing principles, in effect,
constitute the structure of the state. 12
We shall argue that the structure of the state as an institutional-legal
order includes at least three kinds of organizing principles. The first of those
revolves around the notion and definition of rights: What constitutes a right?
Who has rights and of what kind? Under what conditions do rights obtain?
The second organizing principle for the legal order concerns the notion and
definition of private and public (or social) spheres: How are public and
private domains differentiated with respect to what types of activities, social
relations, and possessions? What constitutes private and public ''goods''
and responsibilities? Third are the organizing principles addressed to the
resolution or management of the tensions among conceptions of freedom,
equality, order, and justice: How is each of those terms to be understood?
When tensions exist among them, however they are understood, what are
the rules and mechanisms through which the tension is handled? For us,
then, an effort to analyze differences in the state in different contexts must
include at least an examination of how legal order differs with respect to
these three sets of issues as organizing principles.
The Notion of Rights. To speak of ''rights'' introduces a concept with a
complicated past in the history of philosophy. But we believe it is important
to direct attention to an indispensable theme for understanding the essential
principles of an institutional-legal order; what persons can claim as rightfully
due them is one of the foundational elements of any legal order, or State 2.
We regard "rights" as being the set of legally recognized and protected
privileges or immunities that are generally but informally (e.g., traditionally)
agreed to be useful, just, or moral, as well as the set of legally constituted
privileges or immunities that are created or established things that one may
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properly claim as one's due. Examples of the former might include the
trinity ''life, liberty, and property''; examples of the latter might include the
right of various groups to vote. To examine this set of organizing principles,
then, is to focus on the basic characteristics of the array of legally
recognized and/or legally created just claims that are available to persons in
a society.
Because of the differences in class structure and transformation
dynamics in dependent-industrializing and advanced-industrial societies,
what is included in rights differs substantially in the respective legal orders.
In simple or most basic terms, rights in dependent-industrializing society
are centered on the "life, libery, and property" trinity, with particular
emphasis on the material dimensions. In the extreme, they reduce almost
entirely to property rights. Accordingly, the state is primarily an embodiment and articulation of authoritative principles regarding the ownership,
control, and utilization of property, including in property, of course, the
means by which production is carried out in society. Typically, individuals
have the right (1) to own and to dispose of property without much
restriction; (2) to employ other individuals to work on the property they
own; (3) to organize into new entities (companies, firms, etc.) that have the
same rights as individuals; and (4) to accrue the benefits of organized
ownership of property without limitation. Concomitantly, individuals who do
not own effective property do not have a right to any particular '' quality of
life.' ' They have only the right to attempt to accrue benefits of property
ownership and the right to sell their labor to work toward that end. Often,
however, they do not have the right to organize into new entities for selling
their labor (such as guilds or unions) in the same way that property owners
have the right to organize into companies.
We believe that this characterization represents the essence of legal
orders in the dependent-industrializing societies of Latin America and East
Asia. It portrays a state that is clearly rooted in and consistent with the
fundamental structural features of the dependency context. It is the legal
order for a society in which (1) well-defined class interests revolve almost
entirely around social relations of production and (2) the basic dynamic is the
process of capital accumulation through the reproduction of means of
production. Property relations are the essence of society; property rights
are the essence of the state.
By contrast, rights in advanced-industrial society are much more
differentiated and complex. Property rights are basic in this context too; but
they are significantly infringed upon by the articulation of other rights. The
way in which life should be lived itself becomes, in advanced-industrial
society, a matter of rights. Persons have the ''right' ' to be free from worry
about potential harm in consuming some commodity, the ''right'' to an
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adequate standard of living, the ''right'' to participate, and so on through
myriad '' quality of life'' rights, including, perhaps, even such things as the
"right" to breathe clean air.1 3 On the one hand, this means that the state,
as an institutional-legal order, is greatly expanded relative to the dependentindustrializing state; there is a fundamental difference between the contexts
of rights in the scope of the state. For one thing, the conception of rights is
broadened considerably by a more liberal (re)interpretation of what the
trinity "life, liberty, and property" includes or implies, so that legally
recognized rights are more numerous. For another, the set of legally
constituted or created rights is larger.
But simple enlargement of the set of rights is not the only difference,
because, on the other hand, the extension of nquality of life" rights
amounts to an infringement of property rights. The right to a healthy
environment, for example, has real implications for the rights of owners of
the means of production to use and to dispose of their property as they see
fit. 14 Thus, the state as an institutional-legal order is different in character as
well as in scope from the dependent capitalist state. The difference in
character clearly reflects the fundamental differences in social structures.
The advanced-industrial state is rooted in a society of ambiguous class
structure, in which interests revolve, in part, around "quality of life"
issues, as well, of course, as around property issues.
Private and Public Realms: The Boundaries between Individual and
Collective Domains. Closely related to the difference in rights in the two
contexts is a different legal status for kinds of responsibilities and
''goods.'' 15 In dependent-industrializing societies, Samuelson's distinction
between public and private goods captures much of the essence of the legal
order. In that order, a certain (limited) class of things is, in effect, defined as
"pure" public goods (e.g., national defense, law and order, the money
supply); and these become the responsibility of the government to deliver.
Most everything else is implicitly treated in this institutional-legal order as a
"pure" private good-that is, their production and/or consumption are of
concern to those directly involved and, hence, are not legally a matter of
social or public responsibility but are, rather, to be left to the private pursuit
of individuals. The distinction between the domain of individual pursuits and
the domain of social concern and collective responsibility is, then, pretty
sharply drawn in the dependent-industrializing state . 16
The pure public/private distinction becomes blurred and less meaningful in the advanced-industrial context. The legal system recognizes fewer
seemingly private goods as being free of negative externalities. For
example, whereas citizens are expected to internalize negative pollution
effects from "private" factories in dependent-industrializing societies,
these effects are treated as public or collective matters in advanced-
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industrial legal orders. Indeed, in advanced-industrial societies there is a
general reluctance to acknowledge virtually any goods as being free from
externalities that negatively affect the quality of life of some groups. Under
these circumstances, just what constitutes the set of private goods as
opposed to public goods becomes rather ambiguous, and the distinction
between the domain of individual pursuits and the domain of collective
concern and public responsibility becomes blurred and the object of intense
political controversy. For instance, parental authority over children becomes problematic as the pursuits of parents, the pursuits of children, and
collective responsibility for children's welfare collide. This blurring of the
public-private dimensions of goods in the advanced-industrial context
contributes to an enlarged political arena, especially a markedly greater use
of litigation (a) as citizens are driven to act collectively to ward off unwanted
negative externalities that they are no longer willing to internalize and (b) as
the "normal" channels of political participation are unable to produce
effective responses to the complex problems being raised by extensive
ambiguity in the distinction between the private domain and the collective or
public domain (see Benjamin, 1982). One may thus speak of the decline of ·
government and yet the rise of politics.
To the extent that a basic feature of the state as institutional-legal
order is the definition and articulation of principles regarding public versus
private concerns-collective versus individual domains-the advanced-industrial state is, at base, both more pervasive socially and more ambiguous
in nature than is the dependent-industrializing state. Again, we see that
State 2 is clearly rooted in and compatible with the fundamental character of
the social context in which it exists.
Tensions among Freedom, Equality, Order, and justice. We are brief
here, not because the tensions are easy to resolve philosophically, but
because the contrast is quite stark in the handling of these tensions in the
legal orders of dependent and advanced capitalist societies. The institutional-legal order that is the dependent-industrializing capitalist state resolves the tensions unambiguously in favor of economic freedom and social
order; the basic principles underpinning the institutional-legal order that is
the advanced-industrial capitalist state include, as well, those of social
equality and distributive justice (see Flathman, 1980; Carens, 1981).
The essence of the dependent-industrializing capitalist state is to
promote and protect the opportunity of property owners to accumulate
wealth and to expand the stock of property that they employ to that end-in
a word, to foster capitalist development. Growth, development, and
accumulation are symbols that help to effect a consensus that freedom to act
(by property owners) is more important than are concerns of equity which
would lead to constraints on economic freedom -(for property owners). But
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entrepreneurial freedom depends on social order and stability (O'Donnell,
1973; Collier, 1979; Cardoso and Faletto, 1978; Cole and Lyman, 1971).
And so State 2 also entails a fundamental commitment to social order, which
is a commitment severely to curtail the freedom to act of those who would
challenge or disrupt the ability of property owners to act freely with their
property. The differential among groups in regard to realization of the
economic and social fruits of development is taken to be the normal order of
human affairs. Social inequality is a necessary and hence acceptable byproduct of development; turmoil with respect to social inequality is a fully
unacceptable threat to social order, to be met with the full force of the state.
Hence, the dependent-industrializing capitalist state can be thought of as

repression that is committed to entrepreneurial freedom.
In the advanced-industrial context, economic freedom and social order
come under challenge when the unwillingness of subordinate citizens and
groups to internalize the negative consequences on their quality of life
comes to be embodied in the basic principles of the legal order. Social
equality is then legally defined and accepted as a desirable and expected
social condition. And mechanisms that are distributively just (in the Rawlsian
sense) are pursued, even somewhat at the expense of order-preserving
outcomes. 17 The result is a rather chaotic State 2, in which tensions among
freedom, equality, order, and justice are not clearly resolved in any
particular directions. In this respect, the advanced-industrial capitalist state

can be thought of as chaos committed to the simultaneous provision of all the
(somewhat incompatible) classical liberal ideals.
In sum, State 2 takes on a fundamentally different form in the two types
of capitalist societies, with, we shall argue below, very different implications
for the relative autonomy of the state (cf. Sacks, 1920). The dependentindustrializing capitalist state is a limited state in which property rights are
the hallmark, private and public domains are clearly demarcated, and the
commitment is to entrepreneurial freedom in a (repressive) system of social
order. By contrast, the advanced-industrial capitalist state is a socially
pervasive, but somewhat chaotic, state in which quality-of-life rights are
extensive, the distinction between private and public is blurred and
ambiguous, and the commitment to economic freedom and social order is
appreciably challenged by a parallel commitment to social equality and
distributive justice (cf. Rawls, 1971; Nozick, 1981).
THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS AND CONTEXTUAL DIFFERENCES

To analyze fundamental differences in State 1, we must come to grips
with the basic structuring principles that give coherence-that is to say unity
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or ''totality'' -to the aggregate public bureaucracy and agencies of the
government. 18 What, then, are those organizing principles which structure
the administrative state? Again recognizing that we cannot offer a fully
developed theory in response to this question, we believe that at least three
kinds of organizing principles require consideration. One is the fundamental
scope and orientation of the state: How deeply and extensively do the
agencies of state pervade and intervene into society? What is the socialeconomic extent of the activities of state agencies? In what direction, or
with what orientation, are those activities, in the aggregate, moving
society .19 A second kind of organizing principle is the social composition of
the state: To what extent are the personnel of state agencies homogeneous? In what ways are they distinct from other segments of society? The
third kind involves the structural constraints on the activities of state
agencies: What is the relationship in practice of the administrative apparatus
to the government and to the broader institutional-legal order? Together,
these three sets of basic organizing principles define the nature and
structure of the state. That concept, then, does not refer simply to the
separate administrative agencies in the aggregate; rather, the state is the
functional scope and orientation, the social composition, and the structural
constraints of these administrative agencies (and other agencies of the
state). Let us consider the three in tum.
The Functional Scope and Orientation of The Administrative State. In
dependent-industrializing society, the range of activities of the public
bureaucracy is limited. This is consistent with the limited character of the
institutional-legal order. The public bureaucracy engages in the provision of
the "pure" public goods mentioned above, so that machinery exists to
provide security and order (this machinery is often extremely well developed and sophisticated) and to promote the conduct of economic intercourse. Beyond that, the functional scope of the dependent-industrializing
state is limited, by and large, to intervention into and involvement in the
sphere of production. This involvement can be quite extensive, however. It
includes a whole range of activities through which state agencies (including
state corporations) attempt to encourage and promote an expansion of
capital accumulation in society. These activities to trigger and channel
growth in the means of production include extensive financial intermediation
in the form of heavy borrowing and domestic lending to provide working
capital to indigenous firms; the active promotion of exports; creation of
incentives for foreign investors; and a direct entrepreneurial role through
the ownership and control of dynamic industrial enterprises (Duvall and
Freeman, 1981; Bennett and Sharpe, 1980). This extensive involvement on
the uproduction side" by the dependent-industrializing State 1, in conjunction with a security machinery that is frequently well developed and
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interventionist, tends to produce a functional orientation that can be labeled
''bureaucratic-authoritarian state capitalism,'' or what Cardoso and Faletto
(1978) call "the entrepreneurial-repressive state."
By contrast, the functional scope of the advanced-industrial state
appears to be virtually unlimited. State agencies are involved in the myriad
regulatory activities that derive from the complex, ambiguous character of
the institutional-legal order. Almost every question of who can do what,
with and to whom, is officially affected by and is under the purview of some
administrative agency. Thus, in contrast to the dependent-industrializing
state, the functional scope of the advanced-industrial state is not limited to
the provision of pure public goods and intervention on the ''production
side. '' Rather, it also includes extensive involvement on the '' consumption
side,'' through Keynesian demand-management activities (i.e., income,
price, and employment policies). Indeed, the extent of thls social-regulatory, "consumption side" intervention is typically so great that, by
comparison, involvement on the ''production side'' may appear to be less
extensive than it is for the dependent-industrializing capitalist state. And
this '' consumption side'' intervention generally seems to be consistent with
the most frequently offered label for the functional orientation of the
advanced-industrial state, the welfare state. 20
The State 1 whose functional realm is limited to the provision of
''pure'' public goods and to active intervention to promote capital accumulation through state capitalism is rooted in a society in which the fundamental
dynamic is that of capital accumulation through the production and reproduction of the means of productions. The State 1 whose functional realm is
virtually unlimited, entailing vast social regulatory and welfare activities, is
rooted in a society in which the fundamental dynamic is that of consumption
saturation through the production and reproduction of the means of
consumption.
The Social Composition of the State. The personnel of the administrative
state are, in a sense, similar in both contexts. They are the '' modem
organization men'' -highly trained professional administrators and technicians. In that respect, the dependent-industrializing state looks quite like
the advanced-industrial state; indeed, one of the striking features of the
contemporary era is the difficulty of distinguishing the technobureaucracies
of different countries. But the social role of these state personnel is quite
different in the two contexts.
In advanced-industrial society, they are part (but only part) of a socially
extensive ''middle stratum.'' The professional administrators and technicians who compose the public bureaucracy are virtually indistinguishable
from the professional administrators and technicians who compose the
private bureaucracies of society. Indeed, there often is appreciable mobility
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for members of the ''middle stratum,'' as persons move from one
administrative or technical position to another in the academy, the large
corporations, foundations, other organizations in the "private sector," and
the public bureaucracies of the state. Like the members of the "middle
stratum'' in the private sector, state personnel are drawn from diverse
backgrounds. Social mobility brings them from laboring-class and petitbourgeois families; social respectability brings them from homes of the
intelligentsia, and even of the bourgeoisie. In short, in advanced-industrial
society, State 1, which is composed of a group that is not distinct from much
of the rest of society, is in itself heterogeneous in social background
(Lindblom, 1977). What shapes a cohesive bond for this group is little more
than the functional requirements of the state.
In the dependent-industrializing context, the personnel of the state are
not part of a socially extensive "middle stratum." Instead, they form a
small, socially distinct group-in effect, a technobureaucratic elite (Shils,
1968; Duvall and Freeman, 1983). As a group, they are typically Western
trained and oriented and, hence, are socially distant from much of the
indigenous society. So, State 1 in dependent-industrializing society is
composed of a group that is quite distinct from the rest of society. Its
members are, through training and acculturation, relatively homogeneous;
and they have as a cohesive bond, beyond the joint operation of the
machinery of state and an elite status, a shared orientation to the
metropolitan ''center'' of the world system. 21
Constraints on the State. Functional scope, orientation, and social
composition are not the only fundamental organizing principles that give the
administrative state coherence and ''totality." No less important are the
structural relationships that the public bureaucracy has with the central
locus of governmental decision making and with the broader institutionallegal order. In particular, What shapes and directs the role of the
administrative state in society and economy? How does it affect the central
decisional government and/or the nature of the institutional-legal order?
Here, the difference between the advanced-industrial state and the dependent-industrializing state is subtle, but nevertheless important.
In advanced-industrial society, the administrative apparatus is constrained by the institutional-legal order, which permits and fosters a set of
basic challenges to the operation of the administrative machinery. The
public bureaucracy in all advanced-industrial societies is being challenged by
a wide array of groups, under the aegis of the legal order. Some of these
groups push the public bureaucracy to promote the social equality that is
legitimated by the legal order; other groups challenge the bureaucracy to
provide relief from negative production and/ or consumption externalities;
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and still others refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of the administrative
order itself. 22 In short, the law is continually being used to reshape the
nature of the authority emanating from the administrative apparatus. As a
result, the state as legal order constitutes a constraining, influencing
context for the state as organized machinery of governance.
In tum, the organized machinery of governance, the administrative
state, constrains the central decisional government. Governments come,
and governments go; but the administrative state endures. And it endures
as an institutionalized aggregate of regulations and procedures (gradually
changing as a reflection of the broader institutional-legal order). As such, it
profoundly shapes and channels the policy decisions of government. In this
way, in advanced-industrial society, the most basic relationships of constraint flow from the broad institutional-legal order to the administrative
apparatus, then to the decisional center of government. In this sense, the
legal order, State 2, is most fundamental in advanced-industrial society.
The direction of constraining relationships is reversed for the dependent-industrializing state. Possessing a limited functional scope and consisting of an elite that is socially distant from much of society, the public
bureaucracy in dependent-industrializing society is much more a creature of
the government. The role of the administrative apparatus as a whole is
largely determined by governmental directive. As governments come and
go, so the role and nature of the state is often altered. The not uncommon
shift from a populist, quasi-welfare state to bureaucratic-authoritarian state
capitalism is illustrative of this point.
In tum, the public bureaucracy importantly shapes the legal order in
dependent-industrializing society. The legal order of preindustrial-dependent societies (i.e. , that in existence during the phase of classical dependency
or pure neocolonialism) is generally not entirely congruent with the
structural requisites of the accumulation and growth of capital. The property
rights of entrepreneurs are not paramount; nor is the public domain sharply
demarcated from the private in a legal order that typically reflects the
interests and needs of the landed aristocracy and their relationship to the
broader peasantry. To make the transition from classical dependency to
dependent-industrializing society, this legal order, State 2, must be changed
to facilitate entrepreneurial initiative and rapid accumulation. As a general
rule, to the extent that the change is accomplished, it is the administrative
apparatus, State 1, that initiates and directs the process. In this sense,
State 1 helps to make the institutional-legal order that is the basis for
capitalist development. Direction and constraint emanate from the top;
State 1 is more fundamental than State 2 in the dependent-industrializing
context.
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In sum, the administrative state is marked by quite different characteristics in the two types of capitalist societies, with, we shall argue, different
implications for the autonomy of the state. The dependent-industrializing
capitalist state is (a) functionally limited to the provision of "pure" public
goods and to intervention on the "production side"; (b) functionally
oriented toward state capitalism and bureaucratic authoritarianism; (c)
composed of a Western-oriented technobureaucratic elite that is socially
distinct from much of indigenous society; and (d) largely the creature of the
government and the shaper of the emerging institutional-legal order. By
contrast, the advanced-industrial capitalist state is (a) very broad in
functional scope with extensive intervention on the ' 'consumption side'' in a
welfare-state orientation; (b) composed of members of a socially extensive
and heterogeneous ''middle stratum'' and hence socially integrated with
much of society; and (c) appreciably curtailed by the institutional-legal
order, while being an effective constraint on the government.
These differences, as well as those developed above for State 2, are
summarized in table 2.2.

CONTEXT AND THE RELATIVE AUTONOMY
OF THE CAPITALIST STATE
There are a number of implications from our argument. We shall draw
only the points that are relevant to differences in the relative autonomy of
the state in the dependent-industrializing and advanced-industrial contexts.
The major conceptual distinction to be kept in mind here concerns the
degree of autonomy of the state versus its conformity with the fundamental
structural features of the society and the economy. These two are not the
same thing. The latter is an issue of whether the state is rooted in societal
conditions, whereas the former is a matter of whether the state has a
distinct class basis. Said differently, the autonomy of the state concerns the
extent to which the state reflects and serves the basic interests of the
dominant class; the conformity of the state with society concerns the extent
to which the state reflects societal conditions generally.
We have, we trust, provided a strong enough argument to conclude
that both types of capitalist state are deeply rooted in the respective
societies of advanced-industrial and dependent-industrializing capitalism.
Each reflects the general character of the social context in which it exists,
and hence, each exhibits conformity with social conditions. This means, for
example, that in advanced-industrial society, the state/society distinction
blurs, and the state may be said virtually to merge with society (Lindblom,
1977; MacRae, 1978). It is very difficult to tell where the private domain
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TABLE 2.2
FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES IN ADVANCED-INDUSTRIAL AND
DEPENDENT-INDUSTRIALIZING CAPITALIST STATES

CONCEPTION OF
THE STATE

DISTINGUISHING
DIMENSION

ADVANCEDINDUSTRIAL
STATE

DEPENDENTINDUSTRIALIZING
STATE

Institutionallegal order

Notion of rights

Property rights are
infringed upon by
extensive "quality
of life " rights .

Property rights are
paramount.

Public and private domains

Distinction between
public and private
is blurred as collective externalities
are widely recognized.

Public domain is
limited and clearly
demarcated from
private domain.

Tensions among
freedom, equality, order, and
justice

Commitment to
economic freedom
and social order is
challenged by commitment to social
equality and distributive justice,
with resultant ambiguity.

Commitment to
economic (entrepreneurial) freedom
and social order is
dominant.

Functional
scope and orientation

Virtually unlimited,
with extensive intervention on the
'' consumption
side''; welfare
state.

Limited to provision
of "pure" public
goods and intervention on "production
side " ; state capitalism.

Social composition

Socially indistinct
from exteQsive,
heterogeneous
"middle stratum"
of private sector.

Socially distinct as
technobureaucratic
elite with Western
orientation.

Structural relations with govemment and
legal order

Constrained by
legal order; constrains government.

Constrained by government; constrains
legal order.

Administrative
apparatus as
organized
whole
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ends and the public one begins. In a large part this is directly due to the
complex, ambiguous nature of the advanced-industrial context itself, in
which manifest interests revolve around ambiguous ''quality of life'' issues.
Where, in this context, could the regulatory machinery be said to begin or
end?
Similarly, the sharp demarcation of state from society in the dependent-industrializing context reflects the structural simplicity of that type of
society, in which classes are readily distinguishable and class interests
dominate. The emphasis on "pure" public goods (particularly social order,
economic growth, and security of entrepreneurial opportunity) and the
absence of recognition of collective externalities add up to a relatively
limited administrative order. The simple differentiation of the class structure and the absence of society-wide complexity and interdependence allow
a straightforward identification of the line between the state and society.
In short, the capitalist state conforms to and mirrors the social
structure of capitalist society.
But what, if anything, does this say about the relative autonomy of the
state? To deal with that question, we must consider how the major features
of the state, discussed above, relate to or reflect the interests of the
dominant class in society. Because we are dealing with types of capitalist
society, we have implied that the capitalist mode of production is the
dominant mode of production23 and, hence, that the capitalist class is the
dominant class. To what extent, then, do the basic organizing principles that
underpin and provide coherence for the legal order and the administrative
apparatus of dependent-industrializing and advanced-industrial societies
reflect and serve the class interests of the capitalists? Conversely, to what
extent do they represent and serve interests that are independent of or at
odds with the interests of the capitalist class?
As we have characterized it, the institutional-legal order that is
dependent-industrializing State 2 must be seen as unambiguously a representation that is in the service of the interests of the bourgeoisie. Its
principal feature is to provide guarantees for the protection and utilization of
the property rights of owners and controllers of the means of production.
These are the interests of the bourgeoisie. The dependent-industrializing
State 2 in the current era of capitalism, then, is the creature of (i.e., is a
direct representation of the interests ot) the capitalist class, which includes
both the national bourgeoisie and the international capitalists. 24 It fits well
the classic Marxian model of the capitalist state and is not autonomous.
However, we argued above that of the two conceptions of the state,
State 1-the organizing principles of the administrative apparatus~is the
more fundamental in dependent-industrializing society. The structure of the
public bureaucracy contributes to the making and shaping of the legal order,
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while that order has only a very limited constraining role in the organization
of the administrative machinery. This means that it is more important for us
to direct our attention to the issue of the autonomy of State 1. 25
To deal with that issue, we must address the interests that are served
by the basic organizing principles (and operation) of the public bureaucracy
as a whole. Above, we have identified three kinds of organizing principles
for the administrative state. Let us consider the class interests served by
each of those.
First, the social composition of the state typically creates a strong
commitment to capitalist development and, hence, an affinity with the
interests of the capitalist class. In part, this is due to an ideology of
developmentalism and growth among the personnel of the state, which
derives largely from their Western training and orientation. That ideology
and orientation, in tum, dispose the state personnel to set capital accumulation among the highest objectives of the state, thereby creating something
of a natural receptivity to the needs of international capital and the national
bourgeoisie. The natural receptivity is heightened by the fact that the
personnel of the state-the ' 'state managers'' -constitute a relatively small
elite, socially distant from much of indigenous society and, as a result,
generally inattentive to labor and the peasantry.
Second, the effective constraints on the administrative state emanate
largely from the government, which, typically in dependent-industrializing
society, is based on a supporting coalition of international capital, local
capital, and the technobureaucratic elite (Evans, 1979). Such a fragile but
all-important supporting coalition fosters a desire by the government to aid
the capitalist class, and this is true whether the government is military or
civilian, elected or not. Whatever constraints the government is able to
place on the administrative state will tend to be toward that end of aiding the
capitalists, in order to retain their crucial political support.
Third, the limited functional scope and bureaucratic-authoritarian statecapitalist orientation of the dependent-industrializing administrative state
means that owners of the means of production are essentially unfettered in
their activities. The state's intervention on the ''production side'' also
generally does not constitute a challenge to the interests of the capitalist
class per se; 26 it is typically a complement to those interests in stimulating
the process of accumulation in sectors of the economy in which the private
sector is unable or unwilling to perform adequately (Duvall and Freeman,
1981).
Thus, the characteristic pattern in dependent-industrializing countries
is for the public bureaucracy as a whole clearly to serve the interests of the
dominant capitalist class. Each of its basic organizing principles disposes it in
that direction. But it should be noted that this is a disposition, a characteris48
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tic pattern, a tendency; it is not a logical necessity. Thus, the conclusion
that we must reach is that State 1 in dependent-industrializing society is
typically not effectively autonomous. 27
By comparison, the organizing principles of the administrative state
appear to be relatively autonomous in advanced-industrial capitalist societies. Why is this the case? While citizens may be content to absorb the
marginal impacts of "pure" public goods, collective externalities signal
political conflict by their very nature. The greater the level of collective
' 'contamination'' and responsibility, the greater the call for state agencies
to be responsive to political demands and to regulate or to curb the
unwanted negative externalities emanating from the production and consumption of so many goods. In short, the impetus for the relatively
autonomous administrative state lies with the greatly increased realm of
collective responsibility. Our argument about this is made in greater detail
elsewhere (Benjamin, 1982), but, in sum, collective goods result from the
advanced-industrial context, with its attendant complexities and interdependence. This context produces "crowding" effects that result in many
more unwanted negative ''spillovers.'' We noted earlier that citizens regard
many fewer goods as being strictly private. Virtually everything is regarded
as infringing on one's '' quality of life'' or as affecting or comprising a
''positional good.'' As citizens demand that the state deliver more specialized goods, including regulation, the size of the administrative order
grows. Growing to a point of almost unlimited social pervasiveness,
composed of socially indistinct personnel, and manifesting a mixed orientation of welfare statism and state capitalism, it develops an ambiguous and
quasi-independent set of interests. Under such conditions, the public
bureaucracy as a whole develops independence from any single set of class
interests. It is to precisely this dynamic that most of the recent literature on
the relative autonomy of the capitalist state refers.
But again, as we did for dependent-industrializing State 2, we have
reached first and most easily a conclusion about state autonomy for the less
fundamental of the two conceptions of the state. In advanced-industrial
society, it is the general institutional-legal order that is the more basic (in
the sense of providing effective constraints on the administrative state) and,
hence, perhaps, the more relevant for theoretical analysis.
What judgments are in order about the interests that are represented
by the legal order that is the advanced-industrial state? We think the answer
must be that this is not clear. We are convinced that the legal order-which
has developed historically and has been partially codified over the entire
period of capitalist development-is used by diverse classes to mount a
challenge to many aspects of the administrative state in advanced-industrial
society. Whether the basic organizing principles of that legal order may be
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said to represent a fundamental challenge to the basic capitalist interests in
society is, however, uncertain. There are two possible positions. 28 One
may argue that despite the extensive recognition of collective externalities,
the emphasis on "quality of life" issues, and the endorsement of principles
of social equality, the basic bourgeois-class dominance of state and society
continues to be served by the legal order. The basic fabric of the legal order
may promote social stability, the effective management of labor as a factor
of production, and popular political legitimacy more than a real transformation of society in which the fundamental interests of the capitalist class are
seriously eroded. Alternatively, one may plausibly argue that it is time to
wonder whether the characteristics of the advanced-industrial legal order
described here do not suggest the need to think about a postcapitalist
context and a postcapitalist state. If the administrative state dominates
market processes and if the legal order is being used to challenge the basic
legitimacy of the administrative state, perhaps a fundamental transformation
is occurring. This transformation may be sufficiently ''revolutionary'' that a
profound alteration in the class basis of the capitalist state is being
effectuated in the context of advanced industrialism. At any rate, the
interests that, at base, are served by the advanced-industrial legal order are
still in doubt.
Our conclusions about the relative autonomy of the state in different
capitalist contexts are summarized in table 2.3.
TABLE 2.3
CONTEXT, CONCEPTION, AND AUTONOMY OF THE STATE*

CONTEXT
ADVANCEDINDUSTRIAL

DEPENDENTINDUSTRIALIZING

ORGANIZING PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE
APPARATUS

Quite autonomous.

Characteristically tending
not to be autonomous.

LEGAL ORDER

Degree of autonomy is uncertain,
but autonomous
characteristics are
apparent.

CONCEPTION

T

1

Starkly not autonomous.

• Arrows represent the direction of effective constraints in the relationship between the two
conceptions of the state.
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CONCLUSION
Theories of the capitalist state need to be more attentive to a number
of conceptual issues. First, greater care should be given to specifying which
conception of the state is being employed. Several alternative conceptions
exist. Some are more useful than others, but each is apt to have different
implications for the development of a theory of the state. We have tried to
demonstrate these points with reference to two conceptions of the state:
the public administrative machinery as a coherent totality, and the broad
principles that structure the institutional-legal order.
Second, there should be greater concern than is currently expressed
for the way in which social context affects the elements of a theory of the
capitalist state. Implicitly, proponents of such a theory maintain that context
is relevant; otherwise it would be a theory of the state rather than a theory
of the capitalist state (i.e. , presumably the context of capitalism per se is
relevant to the nature of the state). But the implication is rarely followed
sufficiently far; namely, to the explicit recognition of different contexts of
capitalism. In fundamentally different types of capitalist society the nature of
the state can be expected to be quite different. We have attempted to
illustrate that point with reference to the contexts of advanced-industrial and
dependent-industrializing capitalist societies.
Third, the conceptual distinction between the autonomy of the state
and the conformity of the state with society should be kept clearly in mind.
Autonomy is a more abstract notion than congruence between social
structure and the nature of the state. It is generally the case that state and
society conform (in the senses discussed in this chapter). But that says
precious little about the autonomy-the class basis-of the state.
Pursuing these exhortations about conceptions and contexts, we have
developed the argument that the relative autonomy of the state is variable
and is a function of the social context in which the state exists and of the
conception of the state that is employed. In particular, the state in
dependent-industrializing society tends not to be autonomous, although that
conclusion is clearer for the state as institutional-legal order than for the
state as organized, structured, public-administrative machinery. Conversely, the state in advanced-industrial society appears clearly to be
relatively autonomous, at least for the state as the organizing principles of
the public bureaucracy. But for the institutional-legal order, the relative
autonomy of the advanced-industrial capitalist state is ambiguous and
uncertain.
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NOTES
1. The resurgence of interest in the state was indicated when the Social
Science Research Council in 1983 created a continuing Committee on States and
Social Structures and when the American Political Science Association in 1981
designated the state as the theme of its annual convention. It is also indicated by a
marked increase in the volume of published scholarship about the state over the past
decade or so. Consider, as a select few examples, Ackerman (1977), Anderson
(1974), Buchanan (1975), Evans (1979), Giddens (1980), Hamilton (1982), Holloway
and Picciotto (1978), Jessop (1982), Katzenstein (1977), Krasner (1978, 1984),
Mandel (1975), Nordlinger (1981), Skocpol (1979), Tilly (1975), and Wright (1978).
2. Of course, not all of the literature is self-consciously a part of' 'the theory of
the capitalist state.'' Some items cited in note 1 above view the relevant theoretical
scope more broadly and, hence, in effect drop the confining label "capitalist" from
the theoretical framework, preferring to talk instead about ''the theory of the
state." For reasons that will be made clear below, we believe that the presumed
possibility of such a context-free theory of the state is entirely unfounded. As a
result, the literature of greatest importance, in our judgment, is attentive to context,
at least in limiting the scope of theory to the state in capitalist societies. But in
referring to this theoretical framework in quotes, as we do in the text, we do not
mean to suggest that there is a single, well-formulated, widely accepted theory of
the state in capitalist society. Instead, we mean only to signal that a broad
framework, not identified with any particular school of thought, has come to be
accepted, if only implicitly. That this framework is broad is indicated by the explicit
adoption of it and reference to the theory of the capitalist state by such diverse
authors as Frankel (1982), Hamilton (1982), Jessop (1982), O'Connor (1973), Offe
and Runge (1975), Poulantzas (1973, 1978), and Wolfe (1977).
3. This position is consistent with Marx's own perspective. Consider a
passage from the "afterword to the Second German Edition" of Capital, in which
Marx approvingly quotes from a published characterization of his methods by one of
his critics: "But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the
same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx
directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary,
in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own. . . . As soon as society has
outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to
another, it begins to be subject also to other laws" (Marx, 1967:18). For an
enlightening discussion of this issue of Marx's perspective on contextually specific
laws of motion of capitalism see Farr, 1983.
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4. Various terms are used in the literature to identify the different contexts to
which we are referring. We do not wish to pursue the ternrinological debate about
the best or most appropriate labels here. We do recognize, however, that labels are
not simply ''neutral'' words; they bring with them complex connotations that include
basic conceptualizations of, and even theoretical implications about, the phenomena
to which reference is being made by the label: certainly the now widely used term,
''postindustrial society'' carries a debatable set of connotations that we would prefer
to avoid in this chapter.
5. This is the literature summarized by Lowi (1979).
6. See, for example, Russett and Starr (1981:46-47), who write: "The state
has no concrete existence; it is a legal abstraction. Through its government and the
representatives of that government, the state undertakes legal commitments''
(1981:47). More abstractly, Deutsch offers as a definition: "A state is an organization for the enforcement of decisions or commands, made practicable by the existing
habits of compliance among the population. Such organized enforcement is an allpurpose instrument" (1978:79; emphasis in original). In these and similar definitions
from texts on international relations, the state is distinguished from the government,
which is the more concrete unit of decision and action through which the state (as
abstract legal order) governs. Unfortunately, in spite of such formal distinctions,
which are provided by standard textbook definitions, most students of international
politics go on to talk about states (or nation-states) as actors. But that is
inappropriate, because ''systems of authority" and "legal abstractions" do not act;
governments do. This represents a common, but unfortunate, conflation of the first
and fourth conceptions of the state.
7. Possibly the best literature on this subject deals with the United Kingdom
(Bernstein, 1974; see also Holloway and Picciotto, 1978), where, indeed, it appears
that substantial disjunctures exist between the macrolevel social, economic, and
political institutions, which remain hierarchical, and the microlevel context of
interpersonal relationships, where equality and participation are increasingly dominant (see, e.g., Lindberg, 1975; Pateman, 1970; Braverman, 1974). Scholars who
write on this topic, including those cited here, however, do not necessarily adopt the
fifth conception of the state as we have characterized it. They may recognize the
importance of the ideological/normative order without identifying that as the state.
8. These must be recognized to be two distinct conceptions. It would be
inappropriate to suggest that the two be collapsed into a single concept of the state,
as Krasner (1984) attempts to do. In his stating that we combine the two, he has
misunderstood our argument.
9. In this chapter we use the term "advanced-industrial societies." As
indicated above, alternative terms are frequently employed, most commonly
perhaps, "postindustrial." Indeed, one of us, Roger Benjamin, has previously
attempted to define the salient characteristics of postindustrialization as the point at
which the service-and especially including the public-sector accounts for a greater
proportion of the economy than the industrial sector. In societies such as those of
Great Britain, Denmark, Sweden, and Holland, the public sector itself accounts for
approximately one-half of the gross national product. For the United States, Canada,
and Japan the size of the public sector is moving toward the British case (see
Benjamin, 1982).
10. Dependent-industrializing societies are a subset of the broad, amorphous
category of dependent countries. They have been variously labeled as the semiperiphery (in the Wallersteinian tradition of world systems), or as countries
0
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experiencing "associated dependent development" (Cardoso, 1973); "dependent
development" (Evans, 1979); or " industrialization on the periphery" (Caporaso,
1981). Essentially these labels are intended to set apart a relatively small number of
countries from the bulk of peripheral or dependent societies. Whereas the latter are
marked by relatively little economic growth or development and typically by the
dominance in the economy of a small number of traditional export sectors, the group
of "dependent-industrializing" countries often experience substantial growth, and
much of that growth is based on the development of various industrial sectors.
Examples of dependent-industrializing countries are Brazil, Mexico, and perhaps
Argentina and Venezuela in Latin America; Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong,
Singapore, and perhaps Malaysia in East Asia (see Duvall and Freeman, 1981,
1983).
11 . This section is addressed solely to structural expressions that have a direct
and important bearing on the relative autonomy of the state . It does not attempt to
make a comprehensive characterization of the two contexts. Nor does it offer an
analysis of the fundamental structuring principles, or ''laws of motion,'' of advancedindustrial and dependent-industrializing capitalism. Rather, we assume that those
fundamentals are different for the two contexts. Instead, we simply point to some of
the important structural expressions of those differences. Thus, the reader should
not mistake this section as our effort to describe the fundamental ''laws of motion''
of two kinds of capitalism. We do not offer such a description in this chapter.
12. This point seems to be worth noting. For many scholars, the concept of
structure refers only to institutions or to relationships among institutions. For them,
it would probably not make much sense to talk of the structure of the state when the
state is conceptualized in abstract terms as the institutional-legal order. That
position, it seems to us, is unfortunate . A legal system does have structure, and that
structure is the set of organizing principles that, in effect, make the legal system a
system rather than merely an aggregation of disparate laws. To conceive of
structure only in concrete terms blinds social analysts to those abstract organizing
principles which more generally constitute structure.
13. We do not mean to imply that all of these are necessarily legal rights in all
advanced-industrial societies. They are simply illustrative of the ideal-type characterization of the advanced-industrial society. Nor would all of them fit perfectly our
definition of rights. For example, the "right" to breathe clean air, per se, is not
really a legally recognized or legally constituted just claim. Nevertheless in
advanced-industrial societies, legal systems more and more typically include principles that essentially bestow the status of rights on such '' quality of life'' claims. The
purpose of our illustrative list, then, is to point to the kinds of claims and privileges
that come to be among the set of legal rights in advanced-industrial societies but
generally not in dependent-industrializing societies.
14. Property rights do not disappear or fall by the wayside; but they can be
infringed upon. Our presumption is that, because advanced-industrial is, after all,
capitalist society, the infringement on property rights has real limits-in particular,
the point at which the imperatives of production begin to be severely threatened or
undermined.
15. Whereas rights are legally recognized or constituted just claims of immunity
or privilege, goods are valued states of affairs. These are generally not legally
recognized or constituted; rather, they are individually and/or socially defined. But
the way in which the legal system handles the distinction between those goods that
are matters of private concern and private pursuit, and those goods that are matters
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of collective (or social, or public) concern, is a fundamental element of the legal
order. Thus, the legal boundaries between private and public goods-or individual
and collective domains-is a fundamental organizing principle of the state. These
legal boundaries are not simple, explicit formulae . Instead, they are subtly implied by
the corpus of laws and regulations that stipulate various issues as being of social or
public concern and responsibility. By default (not by explicit demarcation) , other
goods are implicitly of private concern and are legally left to individual pursuit. Thus ,
the organizing principle in which we are interested is the number and nature of goods
that are legally recognized as being matters of social concern and public responsibility.
16. It should be kept clearly in mind that we are referring here to the state as
the legal order. We are not considering the broader conception of the state as a
moral/normative order. If we were, our conclusions would likely be quite different.
As moral/normative orders, dependent capitalist states (societies) are not typically
the picture of atomized individualism that we paint here. But the legal order
generally does recognize few goods as being matters of social concern and public
responsibility. By legal implication, most goods remain in the domain of private
individuals. The State 2 per se, then, clearly distinguishes public from private goods .
In the larger moral/normative order that is society, however, many of the goods that
are legally implied to be in the private domain may be regarded as matters of
collective concern. They may be the responsibility of such collective institutions as
the church, the community, a philanthropic organization, the extended family, or
even a corporation-but not the government.
17. An important part of the Rawlsian notion of distributive justice concerns
"equity of opportunity" and, concomitantly, "equality before the law" (which are
distinct from what we call social equality-Le., equality in the actual realization of
social goods). Such principles of distributive justice certainly are important in
advanced-industrial legal orders. But the extent to which they are permitted to
undermine the commitment to principles of economic freedom and social order
should not be exaggerated. Recall Anatole France's remark that "the law, in its
magnificent impartiality, forbids rich men and poor men alike from begging and
sleeping on park benches. "
18. To repeat a point made above , it makes little sense to conceive of the state
simply as the set of disparate administrative agencies, each doing its own separate
thing. The state is that set of agencies as a coherent whole, or totality . Rather than
being concerned with what the separate agencies do, the theorist of the state must
be attentive to the organizing principles that give coherence to the disparate set. It is
a matter of seeing ordering principles in apparent chaos-what the welter of
bureaucratic agencies is, at base, all about.
19. To avoid possible confusion, we should note explicitly the implication of this
phrase. In talking about the orientation of the state as a concept that refers to the
general direction in which the myriad (and seemingly disparate) activities of the
agencies of the state (public bureaucracies, etc.) are moving society, we clearly
acknowledge that state agencies do move society. This does not imply, however,
that the state necessarily is autonomous; that state agencies have an impact on
society does not mean that, in the aggregate, they do so autonomously.
20. See Furniss and Tilton (1977). One is tempted to say that whereas
dependent-industrializing society typically fosters state capitalism, advanced-industrial society generally gives rise to the welfare state. That would be misleading,
however, because the advanced-industrial states, too, are heavily involved on the
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''production side.'' Their extensive '' consumption side'' intervention makes their
"production side" involvement appear to be less substantial than it actually is.
Indeed, it may be argued that the welfare-state aspect is little more than a
sophisticated form of management of labor as a factor of production (see Skocpol and
Ikenberry, forthcoming). Moreover, one cannot ignore the ways in which the
welfare state has recently come under severe attack by governments in several
advanced-industrial countries. To what extent this phenomenon represents a
fundamental change in the functional orientation of the state is still uncertain. But it
seems clear that the imperatives of production and the perceived need for a
stimulation of industrial expansion have bred a formidable attack on the welfare
state. The industrial imperatives that underlie this attack, incidentally, constitute a
major part of the reason that we are no longer comfortable with the connotations and
implications of the label ''postindustrial'' society.
21. Members of the technobureaucratic elite from Brazil probably share more
in common (in terms of interests and world view) with their counterparts in South
Korea than with most of the population of Brazil. This cultural aspect of the modem
world system is too often overlooked as a profoundly important part of its operation.
22. This is one of the themes of the Frankfurt school (see Habermas, 1975;
Offe and Runge, 1975).
23. We presume that in most societies there are multiple modes of production
in existence at the same time. That is, there exist a number (greater than one) of
abstract organizing principles through which labor power is employed for productivity (i.e., modes of production). But for any society, one can identify the abstract
organizing principles of the social relations of production that are the predominant, or
the most characteristic, in that society.
24. It should be pointed out that we are referring to fundamental class interests,
not to conscious interests of individual members of a class. Those fundamental class
interests concern both the preservation of a system of relations of production (i.e., a
mode of production) in which the class continues to be dominant, and the facilitation
of that class's ability to achieve the maximal extraction and realization of surplus
value from labor. This says nothing about conflicts of (specific, conscious) interests
among segments, or factions, of the capitalist class. The national bourgeoisie may, at
times, be at odds with international capitalists, and the government may be called
upon to intercede in such conflicts. This does not mean that the state is or is not
necessarily autonomous.
25. However, if State 2 is not autonomous and if State 2 is made and shaped by
State 1, then clearly the expectation is that State 1 also is not autonomous. That is, if
the structure of the public bureaucracy creates a legal order whose basic organizing
principles are unambiguously in the service of the interests of the bourgeoisie, then
one would expect that the basic organizing principles of that public bureaucracy
would also reflect those interests.
26. Individual members and, indeed, whole fractions of the capitalist class,
however, may feel quite threatened by the state's intervention on the "production
side.'' The alliance politics of the government's supporting coalition is often affected
by the perceptions of threat on the part of various factions of the capitalist class
(Freeman, 1982). Nevertheless, nowhere, to our knowledge, has the state
capitalism of dependent-industrializing states really threatened to displace or
eliminate the capitalist class.
27. At this point it is worth reemphasizing an important conceptual distinction
on which our argument rests; namely, the distinction between autonomy as a
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structural concept and the divergence of policy from expressed interests as a
volitional, or action, concept. The dependent-industrializing government may (and
almost certainly does) make policies to which members of the capitalist class object
vigorously, while the principles around which the apparatus of state is organized or
structured as a totality clearly and strongly dispose the state not to be autonomous
from the interests of the capitalist class.
28. It may be instructive for the reader to know that each of the two current
authors is disposed to accept a different one of these two positions as being more
defensible.
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Contemporary Marxism on the
Autonomy, Efficacy, and Legitimacy
of the Capitalist State
David Braybrooke

Granting that the capitalist state operates with some autonomy, Marxist
writers grant at least that there is some possibility of its operating to
safeguard the long-run interests of capitalists against the internecine effects
of their competing short-run interests. Contemporary Marxist writers
agree that the capitalist state has become more active and more important.
More people are involved in it, and it is involved in a greater variety of
specific tasks. Has it become more autonomous? There is some confusion
on this point; however, contemporary Marxist writers stress matters that
come close to implying that it has; and these writers agree that it has been
efficacious enough to keep capitalism going until now.
Will it be efficacious enough to keep capitalism going indefinitely?
Contemporary Marxist writers are reluctant to agree that it will. They
argue that, in fact, it is beset by intensifying crises about efficacy and
legitimacy. Most of them incline to think that these crises cannot be
resolved without transforming society radically. However, society has
already been substantially transformed with the enlarged activity of the
state. Given that its autonomy has enlarged, too, the question arises
whether the state cannot further transform society-and itself-enough to
manage the crises, even so far as bringing in a genuine fonn of socialism, if
no managing short of this will do. This is not a question about the capacity of
some machine or team, considered apart from its field of action; it is, rather,
a question about what sort of field of action the state in late capitalism
furnishes. What are the chances of managing the crises by continuous
transformation within the normal bounds of political settlements, that is tc
say, without a rampage of destruction from the Left or Right?
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I shall be concerned, in the discussion that follows, to explore this
question as it arises in Marxist theory freely fonnulated in the West, in the
writing chiefly of O'Connor, Mandel, Poulantzas, and Habermas. I shall,
however, refer briefly to a few other writers to show how widely
preoccupation with the question is shared and how much convergence there
is in answers to it; and before I take up contemporary writings in detail, I
shall outline the Marxist theory of the state as Marx and Engels conceived
it.

THE CLASSICAL MARXIST CONCEPTION OF THE STATE
The classical conception, formulated by Marx and Engels, is more
complicated, in the hands of either, than the charge that the state is merely
the instrument of the ruling class. They, like Poulantzas following them,
understand that the state is an arena in which several classes are
represented, struggling for power (Marx, 1875; Engels, 1884; see also
Poulantzas, 1978). If under capitalism it is a '' committee for managing the
common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie'' (Marx and Engels, 1848), it is a
committee that also has to take into account diverse interests, including the
interests of other classes. Nor are these other classes just classes like the
great landowners or the independent peasantry with which the bourgeoisie
perhaps have to share dominance in the state. The dominated classes must
be counted among them, too, even before they achieve formal representation in parliament.
For the state in every epoch, considered as ''a material condensation''
in whose name actions are taken and policies are followed, 1 is engaged in the
pursuit of certain general purposes: it is said to act, and it perforce in some
respects does act, on behalf of all the people who belong to it. In part, no
doubt, this is so because it always suits the purposes of a ruling class to
provide certain services to the classes that they rule: for example, they will
protect their serfs from being killed or carried off by other oppressors.
However, in part it is because the state and the purposes ascribed to it can
only be understood~by the ruling class itself-as having something like full
generality and, with this, some freedom to act contrary to demands by the
ruling class-in other words, some autonomy. This is made plain in that
pregnant medieval document Magna Carta: even laws that, in assigning
different privileges, assign greater privileges to the ruling class than to
other people are laws that hold for everybody. Whatever liberties they
assign the less privileged classes are in principle just as much to be
respected as those assigned anybody else.
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This complication of inherently general purposes, of course, is much
more prominent and wide-sweeping in the state of the bourgeois epoch than
ever before. The bourgeoisie have proclaimed an end to privilege. The
rhetoric of the state-of the political arena-in their time is the rhetoric of
universal rights and justice for all. This rhetoric has not corresponded
exactly to reality: the person who wrote into the Declaration of Independence the assertion that "all Men" are endowed with "unalienable Rights"
to "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness" actually owned slaves, as
did a number of other people who, with remarkably little self-questioning on
this point, signed the Declaration. Nevertheless, the rhetoric of universal
rights and justice for all has a force to be reckoned with. A state that uses it
is subject to embarrassment from policies inconsistent with it. A state that
speaks in a rhetoric of privileges for the beautiful and wellbom is not.
As I shall show, the complication of general purposes is directly
reflected in Marx's and Engels' s conception of the state. Nevertheless, the
assertion that the state simply, steadily, and consistently serves the ruling
class has some claim to being regarded as the core of their conception,
especially since one may attach to that core all sorts of things that the ruling
class has done, or supports having done (if they consult their interests
intelligently) in the course of efforts, by themselves or by other people
active in politics, to keep the system that favors them going. In the core
itself, however, must be put the function of repressing any outbreaks of
violence or tendencies toward such outbreaks on the part of the oppressed
classes, most lately on the part of the proletariat. It is to carry out this
function that an institution has arisen with troops, sheriffs, judges, and
executioners at its command; and it is this function that is most continuously
important to the ruling class, though that class does need, from time to
time, armed protection from external enemies as well.
Yet even in carrying out this function, the state inevitably does
something to serve the oppressed classes as well. It provides them, too,
with some protection against violence, external or internal. It also fosters,
in the sphere of comparative order that it creates, the operations of the
economy, from which one may well think that the oppressed classes benefit
more than they would from continual, aimless warfare. These good things
flow from the protection, among other things, of private property, despite
the manifold drawbacks of that institution. It is not quite clear whether Marx
or Engels is ready to add to the good things the public works explicitly
assigned the state by Adam Smith (roads, bridges, harbors, canals) and
public services such as education (conceded by Smith as not improper;
1776). Would not doing so confuse the state-the government of men,
which is going to wither away-with the administration of things, which is
not? Perhaps we should understand the state as an institution centrally
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concerned with law and order (repression) and defense that takes on to
some extent the administration of things. An arena defined by certain rules
and generating others expands both as regards issues to be resolved and as
regards the people specially concerned with issues during various stages of
policy formation. The arena will shrink on one side as the state withers away
during the dictatorship of the proletariat, that is to say, during the period in
which the proletariat democratically uses the inherited state apparatus for
its own purposes, excluding the remnants of the bourgeoisie from political
functions. It will shrink on the side where it originally was laid out, leaving
only parts added later.
There is something even more important than the administration of
things that is done by the state-by the bourgeois state more amply and
consistently than by any previous system-and that will persist after the
functions of repression and defense wither away. The state achieves at least
an approximation of a genuine community embodying purposeful reason at
the service of all the people who belong to it, without discrimination. As
such, it invites and to some extent-to the extent of approximationdeserves the rational consent of all those people.
While discrimination, as between social classes, continues, rational
consent can at best be given by some people only temporarily and with
grave reservations. Certainly the proletariat can never accept as a permanent arrangement the sy~tem of exploitation tolerated-indeed fostered-in
the economy by the bourgeois state on the basis of private property in the
means of production. Yet even the proletariat can endorse the advance that
''the democratic republic, '' the most fully developed form of the bourgeois
state, has made over earlier forms (Engels, 1884; Marx, 1875). What the
democratic republic establishes, Marx and Engels insist, is "an illusory
community," ''a substitute for community''; but even this is a "collective
expression of individuals" (Marx and Engels, 1846). Not only in the rhetoric
that it uses, but also in real effects, it goes beyond the market and civil
society (society organized just so far as required to establish the market) to
lay down at least some of the prerequisites of the genuine community
(Marx, 1843; see also Marx and Engels, 1846).
Marx and Engels do not themselves quite get to the point of saying that
to some degree, the state deliberately and systematically corrects in the
public interest the bad effects of the market, which fall, of course,
persistently, with most impact, upon the proletariat. However, Engels does
explicitly assign to the bourgeois state the double function of, first, checking
(besides possible encroachments by the workers) the aggrandizement of
individual capitalists at the expense of the rest (which would often be at the
expense, too, of the rest of the population; Engels, 1880) and, second, of
moderating class antagonisms (Engels, 1884). In both connections, the
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state-those who carry the day in the arena-must affect to be acting in
''the common interest'' or ''the public interest,'' and again, to some extent
it must be genuinely doing so if it is to succeed. So it would be no great
surprise to Marx or Engels to see the state in late capitalism doing even
more than the British Parliament or Bismarck was willing to do to relieve
the hardships suffered by the working class. Unemployment insurance,
pensions, health services, and extensive measures of consumer protection,
as well as factory legislation, thus can all be assimilated to the classical
Marxist conception of the bourgeois state and its activities. On the other
hand, it is not entirely easy to reconcile this conception, once these
functions have been admitted, with Marx's and Engels's expectations
regarding the catastrophic future of capitalism and the state.

THE CLASSICAL MARXIST PROGNOSIS
FOR THE CAREER OF THE STATE
At its simplest and most notorious, the prognosis offered by Marx and
Engels envisaged the economic crises of capitalism growing worse and
worse, while the proletariat-ever worse off, ever larger, ever more classconscious-became more and more aware that it need not put up with the
crises and with the system of exploitation, in crisis or out. Marx and Engels
did not expect-at least they did not predict-that the system would ever,
given sufficient time to get rid of gluts and depress wages, be incapable of
starting up again on the economic side. It would be on the political side that
the decisive breakdown would occur: the masses would not, in the end, give
the capitalists and their economy any more time (Marx and Engels, 1848).
The proletariat would rise in violent revolution, seize the state, and during a
transitional period of class dictatorship, work through it to eliminate the
distinguishing features of capitalism in favor of a system of comprehensive
participant planning.
Did Marx or Engels expect that the state would be simply repressive in
the face of the unrest that the crises of the economy and its discriminatory
features would be arousing? Being simply repressive might well increase
the chances of the simple prognosis's turning out to be true, though modern
methods of repression (amplified and technologically elaborated since
Marx's and Engels's time) might, skillfully used, succeed uncomfortably
often. The militancy that repression might provoke could, furthermore, be
anticipated and dampened by judicious measures of relief continuing provisions like those mentioned above, or by ad hoc measures. Unskillfully used,
it is true, these might, through a mechanism of rising expectations, actually
increase disorder. Looked at closely and skeptically, the simple prognosis
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seems indeterminate on the point of truth. We know, however, what Marx
would have thought of any attempt on the part of the state to forestall
transformation by adopting measures of relief that substantially raised the
standard of living of the proletariat. With capitalism and private property,
exploitation would continue. The proletariat, however comfortable its
members might be, would continue to be trapped in a system of iniquitous
enslavement (Marx, 1875). It would have quite sufficient reason for
intransigent opposition.
Yet Marx, with some support from Engels, also considered that
advanced bourgeois societies, in which the state took the form of a
''democratic republic,'' might be able to manage the transformation from
capitalism to socialism peacefully, arriving through elections and parliamentary debate at what had to be done (Marx, 1872; Engels, 1895). (Engels
seems to have considered that once arrived there, the thing would be done
abruptly.) Neither Marx nor Engels had enough confidence in this possibility, or interest in it, to work it out, which is a pity, since it has
implications that considerably modify both their prognosis and their conception of the state. For does not granting the possibility imply granting that at
least one advanced form of the state may be capable of transforming itself,
indeed of arranging for its own dissolution?
It is true that an approximation to this capacity is already implied in the
dictatorship of the proletariat. There the state, under the direction of the
proletariat, will set up the system of social planning and simultaneously step
by step dismantle the system of repression. However, there the transformation occurs only because a united and theoretically informed proletariat
imposes upon the state purposes that have not themselves been developed
within the state. Self-transformation in a democratic republic would be a
different matter. Here the bourgeoisie, reduced in self-confidence, perhaps,
if not in relative numbers, and not organized enough or resolute enough to
abandon normal peaceful politics, would accept a succession of victories in
elections and in parliament by some combination of the proletariat with other
dissidents; perhaps also a series of successes in economic organization:
cooperative, nonprofit corporations, worker ownership, and worker control. In political discussion the bourgeoisie might even in some proportion be
convinced by the arguments offered by their opponents.
For might not these arguments make abundant use of the rhetoric to
which the bourgeoisie themselves have been committed? That rhetoric not
only insists upon the virtues of peaceful, orderly constitutional change. It
grants suffrage to all, and it insists upon universal rights and justice in terms
that, in the Marxist view, cannot be made good without being made
superfluous by the transformation into communism. The provisions under
the democratic republic for full free debate would help make this fact (if it is
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a fact) more and more visible and compelling. In doing so, debate, under the
provisions, would make it clear that the general purposes that direct the
state cannot, in their advanced forms (i.e., the forms of the bourgeois
declarations, dropping all class-interested reservations), be realized except
by a transformation in which the state as such will disappear (Engels, 1880;
Marx and Engels, 1848). The possibility of peaceful self-transformation is
the possibility that in its final form the state will be rational enough to give
way to a system, yet more rational, in which its purposes are fulfilled and
transcended.
What has the Marxism of our own day made of this possibility? One
cannot say-one could hardly expect-that it has seized upon it with
unanimous enthusiasm. Indeed, many currents of contemporary Marxism
run emphatically in an opposed direction. 2 The core conception is not dead.
It, with the simple prognosis, often dominates in propaganda and still
supplies a standard framework of rhetorical cliches in many serious,
learned, even sophisticated contributions. The survival of the bourgeois
state for a hundred years after Marx's death, through two world wars and a
depression deeper than anything that bourgeois apologists or Marxist
revisionists like Bernstein would have thought possible, has been explained
away by reference first to imperialism and second to expenditures on
armaments. Is not the most commonly held Marxist view on the subject the
simple thought that unless the bourgeois states were spending enormous
sums on armaments, they would collapse, as was classically predicted?
This view does, of course, in effect concede that so long as the
bourgeois states manage to keep up big arms budgets, they may survive
without fatal amounts of social unrest. This is hardly self-transformation into
a fully rational community. It is, described in disobliging terms, buying off a
sufficient proportion of the masses with comforts and meantime increasing
the risks of destroying the whole species. Nor is it self-transformation-in
Marxist eyes-if the arms budget is set aside as a sort of unfortunate
accident and the state is conceded some genuine credit for its expenditures
on what O'Connor calls "social investment'' (infrastructure) and "social
consumption" (social insurance; O'Connor, 1973). For these things might
figure among the costs of keeping going anyway.
Nevertheless, it is possible, and illuminating, to look upon the most
sensitive and elaborate discussions of the state in late capitalism offered by
contemporary Marxists as commentaries on the possibility of self-transformation. These discussions are for the most part, one way or another, very
skeptical about the possibility. Yet some currents in contemporary Marxism, represented in these discussions, do accept-indeed explicitly accept
(waiving the disobliging tone in which the acceptance may be given)-the
possibility. Chief among these currents is Eurocommunism. The chief
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things to cite there are the official program of the Italian Communist Party
and the theoretical contribution of the leader of the Spanish one. 3 Moreover, even the most skeptical currents agree with the others about the
factors to be taken into account and in their general picture of the late
capitalist state. Hence, in characterizing them all, it is possible to make use
of the most sensitive and penetrating analysis to be found among them, that
offered by Ernest Mandel (1976, 1978, 1979), though Mandel continues,
somewhat inconsistently, to rely on an abrupt revolution by the proletariat
and vigorously rejects the possibility of self-transformation.

MANDEL, O'CONNOR, POULANTZAS, AND HABERMAS
ON THE STATE IN LATE CAPITALISM
I shall thus expound-briefly-Mandel's views as representative of
contemporary Marxism; but I shall give as much attention to Habermas's,
which supplement Mandel's views in part and in part conflict with them
(Habermas, 1975, 1970). The conflict dialectically sharpens the issue of selftransformation. Further light on the issue can be gained by comparing
Mandel's and Habermas's formulations with those of O'Connor (1973) and
Poulantzas (1973, 1975, 1978).
Mandel, generalizing the classical Marxist conception, ascribes three
grand functions to the state: first, repression; second, social integrationspecifically the integration of the dominated class; third, establishing those
general conditions of production not assured privately. As a comment on the
first two functions, compatible, I think, with Mandel's view of them, one
may add Poulantzas 's teaching that the state is not ' 'an instrument of force''
in the hands of a dominant class (or classes) organized outside it. The
dominant classes arrive within the state at whatever degree of organization
they enjoy; simultaneously they settle, in struggles within the state, what
scope for action the dominated classes will have and what concessions are
made to their interests, concessions compatible at once with their being
dominated and with their being integrated (Poulantzas, 1973, 1978).
In the course of carrying out the second function, the state, as we
would expect from the classical conception, has and must have a certain
amount of autonomy. Mandel is more forthright and more classical on this
point than is Poulantzas. Mandel (1976) accepts it that autonomy means
some freedom of action vis-a-vis the dominating class (or classes), including
some freedom to act by professed public principles. Poulantzas has two
views of autonomy, neither of which is explicitly aligned with the classical
conception. On the one hand, he insists that what autonomy amounts to is
that the several dominating classes that control ''the power bloc,'' as well
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as the multiple fractions into which they are divided, will each have some
branch or branches of the state apparatus following policies favorable to its
interests (Poulantzas, 1978). On the other hand, however inconsistent in
tendency the policies of these different branches may be with each other,
they may reflect an ''equilibrium of force,'' arrived at by all contenders
(including the dominated classes) within the distinctive field of action
furnished by the state (Poulantzas, 1973, esp. n. 26). Autonomy so viewed
would mean being just that distinctive field of action, with policy outcomes,
whether in equilibrium or not, depending on the constellation of forces
operating in the field.
If it is accepted, however, that the field is structured in part by
professed public principles, to which the activities must give some appearance of conforming, Poulantzas' s second view can be regarded as a gloss on
Mandel's. When we hear of activity by the state, we are to understand
activity within a distinctive field. Moreover, Poulantzas's first view is at one
with Mandel's in implying that some of the policies resulting from the
activity will contravene at least the short-run interests of some members of
the dominating classes (Mandel, 1976; Poulantzas, 1978). Poulantzas does
not say that they will be justified by an appeal to the public interest; but
attempts at such justification may surely be expected. They will be made,
and sometimes succeed, in justifying policies that contravene both the
short-run and the long-run interests of some members of the dominating
classes, though supposedly at least the long-run interests of other members
will be served, along, perhaps, with the interests of people in other
classes. 4
Does autonomy cover the other possibilities of contravening the shortrun interests of all the members of the dominating classes and of contravening their long-run interests? Habermas (1975) seems to allow for the
former; and evidently people active in the state, consciously seeking to
promote the long-run interests of the dominating classes, do sometimes find
it both necessary and feasible to adopt policies contravening the short-run
interests of every member. The concessions made to the welfare of the
working class in '' social consumption'' offer manifold illustrations. Sometimes, however, the short-run interests must be supposed to be contravened inadvertently. People with the power to prevent such mishaps
were not alert enough to head them off; or alert as they may be, they made
mistakes about what to do. Will they not fail in the same ways to forestall
some sacrifices of long-run interests, too? Indeed, these failures will often
be impossible to distinguish in particular instances from the others, since the
proposition that long-run interests are favored, though short-run ones are
sacrificed, will in some instances not be susceptible of conclusive demonstration. Furthermore, if the diversity of the agents and the branches of
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politics is taken into account, as Poulantzas (1978) and others insist, so that
even the dominated classes are recognized as gaining occasional advantages, one will evidently have to allow for the deliberate adoption, in some
branches, of policies at odds with the long-run interests of the dominating
classes. Will those classes then no longer be properly called ''dominating'' ?
But even if they and their agents are not uniformly efficient in detecting such
acts of subversion, correcting them, and recouping any losses, the classes
in question may still, for the time being, dominate by winning most of the
time on most of the issues important to them.
Mandel (1976) writes again and again of "the growing autonomy" of
the state. Certainly he holds that the state has become more active and
more ambitious in carrying out its third function, of establishing the general
conditions of production. It continually provides, through expenditures on
armaments (and space research), on overseas aid, and on infrastructure,
additional opportunities for private hands to increase their holdings of
capital. It has nationalized, in one industry after another, firms that would
otherwise have gone under or has supported them out of the public purse;
sometimes it has nationalized whole industries (Mandel, 1976).
Some of these ventures should, no doubt, also be classified under what
O'Connor (1973) calls "social expenses," since the chief immediate effect
and purpose of them has been, not to increase productivity in any way, but
to soften the impact of the market upon various segments of the labor force.
The increasingly ambitious efforts of the state at '' crisis management'' call
for a similar double classification. The state has thus become more active
and more ambitious in carrying out its second function, social integration,
too. So much is directly evident from the increase in the scope of programs
to maintain, even raise, the standard of living of masses of people who would
otherwise, being continually victimized by the system, be continually
disaffected from it. 0' Connor (1973) maintains that these are chiefly people
who, as they find work, must depend for it on the competitive sector of the
economy, rather than on the state sector or the monopoly sector, where the
workers are much more comfortably treated to begin with. (It is consistent,
of course, with there being more service to victims than previously, both
that not all victims are reached and that the programs mentioned give more
service to people already comfortably treated than to people more victimized.)
Does this greater activity and ambition imply more autonomy? There is
a distinction to make here that Mandel does not attend to. The greater
activity and ambition is common ground for all these writers. However,
Poulantzas, though he insists, "The state's 'economic interventions' ...
have never been so pronounced as in the present phase, nor has the
displacement of dominance in favour of the state'' (1975), also declares,
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''The play of its relative autonomy vis-a-vis the hegemonic fraction,
monopoly capital, takes place within far more confined limits than was the
case in the past" (1975). He offers no evidence for this assertion. Yet
clearly it is possible that the state might intervene more and yet be more
uncompromising in promoting the interests of the dominating classes (or of
the hegemonic fraction of those classes taken together). The state might,
for example, multiply subsidies to agribusinesses while it excludes farm
laborers from social security; or it might subsidize firms like Chrysler only
on condition that workers sacrifice wages.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to believe that the state can have become so
much more active and ambitious without having become more autonomous,
and become this in realizing more frequently and with, on the average,
greater impact all four of the possibilities enumerated earlier of the
contravening interests of the dominating classes. That is to say, the
hypothesis that first suggests itself, given other components of the
description offered by these writers of the increased activity and ambition of
the state, is that over the whole time elapsing since Marx and Engels wrote,
the state has become substantially more autonomous in all those dimensions.
It is admitted that substantial concessions have been made to the
dominated classes; to keep the system going, the dominating classes have
had to accept a smaller return from it than they would have got from a
continuing unmodified system. Pursuing the policies that embody the
concessions, is not the state in a position to bring in more easily further
policies of the same sort? What would have been resisted fiercely as a
radical departure a century ago will now be just one increment among others
to an enormously expanded and continually growing program of state
activity. It may be ampler provision for unemployment insurance; it may be
increased restrictions on the power of employers to hire as they please.
Whatever it is, the increment will increase the size of the program and thus
make even more substantial departures feasible as increments in the future.
In fact, the increments need not be favorable to the dominated class in order
to put the state in a position to act with more substantial autonomy. They
might, in a mixture of policies, have been more unfavorable than otherwise
and still have had the effect of making an increase in '' social expenses'' now
hardly noticeable, given the size of the program.
The hypothesis of increased autonomy (to which, in effect, I have
joined a hypothesis of autonomy still increasing) needs to be tested. The
best evidence of increased autonomy would be evidence of increase in
autonomous activity. Without carefully designed empirical studies-of sorts
conspicuously absent from Marxist writings-one cannot say how far the
activity of the state has changed, compared to various points in the past, far
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and near. Even the extent of autonomy at any given time requires such a
study. I shall try not to beg the empirical questions, but I shall argue that if
autonomy is increasing, the prospects for self-transformation become more
favorable. The state is not going to proceed with self-transformation in any
straightforward way, however, it if proceeds at all. For though the
increased activity and ambition of the state have tended to shift the issues
that self-transformation involves onto the public agenda, the state cannot
easily cope with them there. A second shift, in effect, displaces issues from
the public agenda into the bureaucracy. This is what Mandel calls "reprivatization.'' Most important issues about conflicts of interest are no longer
debated in the public arena, that is to say, in parliament; they are left to be
settled by deals between myriad interests (predominantly, but not exclusively, capitalist interests) and various sets of bureaucrats in myriad
agencies (Mandel, 1976; Poulantzas, 1978). It is, I shall argue, under
''reprivatization'' that autonomy will chiefly be exercised, if it is exercised
to bring about self-transformation, though intermittent resort to the public
agenda may also be required if self-transformation is to succeed.
Attempting to deal with the issues that self-transformation involvesattempting to deal with any of the issues in which it has become entangledincreases the already heavy burden of embarrassments that the state in late
capitalism labors under. The result of its increased activity and ambition has
been, Mandel claims (1976), and Habermas concurs (1975), "hypertrophy. " The state has been trying to do many more things than it can do
effectively. Left agrees with Right on this point, according to Buchanan
(1977). It is locked into many large-indeed automatically increasingexpenditures for specific parts of its program. It is having increasing
difficulty raising the money that it requires (O'Connor, 1973). It is not
bringing effective means to bear upon the tasks that it has undertaken to
perform. Hence it is involved in what Habermas (1974) calls a "rationality
crisis. ' '
Hypertrophy does not, however, produce the crisis all by itself.
Habermas emphasizes, instead, the charge that the state has been compelled to take on new tasks inconsistent with the goals already set up for it.
It cannot foster capital accumulation by large-scale interventions in the
economy without, to some extent, displacing private firms and without
facing the necessity of undertaking large-scale planning. It cannot carry
through consistent large-scale plans without restricting private firms in their
freedom to invest and in other ways. Yet the free-the anarchic-pursuit of
gain by individual private firms is just what, to maintain capitalism, the state
is supposed to promote (Habermas, 1975).
With the assumption of responsibilities for intervention, the basic,
insuperable embarrassment of the capitalistic system comes insistently into
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view. The means of production call for, and to some degree get (as they
must, if the system is to work at all), social planning for social purposes.
Yet, with an anomaly that cannot be explained away, private appropriation of
surplus value continues nevertheless (Habermas, 1975).
This embarrassment is the most important cause of the ''legitimation
crisis" of late capitalism, according to Habermas. Unless the state can
justify both its actions and the social arrangements that it supports as
serving '' generalizable interests, '' which duly embrace and are recognized
as embracing the interests of all its citizens so far as those interests can be
consistently served, it will lose legitimacy (Habermas, 1975). The capitalist
state cannot justify itself in this way. Formerly, it could evade the task of
justification. The economy, with the theory of laissez-faire, had its own
rationale, which provided a show of justification for the whole system
(Habermas, 1975). Now, simultaneously with a shift of responsibilities and
issues that makes evasion on that pattern impossible, the standards of
justification have been raised by a general advance in discussion of such
matters toward "a critical universal morality" (Habermas, 1975). This
directs attention to needs that can be '' communicatively shared'' (Habermas, 1975:108) by agents with fully developed "communicative competence'' and no defensible reason to dissemble their purposes (Habermas,
1970). Thus, the legitimation crisis is aggravated by what Habermas
distinguishes as a "motivation crisis" -a crisis in social integration. Traditional norms, which dictated commitment to roles and practices in the
system, have eroded in the course, of the technological changes that have
eliminated those roles and practices or deprived them of their traditional
meaning. The norms that now apply are the newly universalistic ones
(Habermas, 1975).
The embarrassment about continuing private appropriation of surplus
value is not the only cause of the legitimation crisis. The rationality crisis
itself has powerfully adverse effects upon legitimation. How can people
regard their state as legitimate when it is manifestly incapable of doing what
it undertakes to do, in part because it is trying to do too much for its
organizational capacity, in part because it is trying to do inconsistent things
(Habermas, 1975)? Another cause is reprivatization, which is represented in
Habermas's scheme (1975) by the notion of "depoliticization" (and other
notions). With reprivatization, less and less effort is made by the state to
find and publicize comprehensive legitimating rationales for its policies, or
even to reconcile in public arguments apparent discrepancies between the
policies, taken two or three at a time. Shifted into the bureaucracy, issues
may escape considerations of consistency and other general considerations
that would arise about them in public forums such as parliament. Even if the
diverse branches that now deal with fragments of issues are ready to offer
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rationales of what they do, these will often be technical and limited. They
will typically take the general social arrangements of the society for granted.
Moreover, they will rarely get anything like general attention by whatever
public exists to follow political issues. They will be too specialized; and there
will be too many of them.
Reprivatization, however, has another aspect, in which it can be
regarded as mitigating the legitimation crisis. It may reduce the efforts at
comprehensive justification, so that what demands do arise for justifying the
basic arrangements of capitalism go, embarrassingly, unanswered. At the
same time, however, it may reduce the number and intensity of demands.
Since elections and parliament now make little difference to the myriad
policies pursued by the ever-larger and more complex bureaucracy, people
do not expect genuine efforts at comprehensive justification to be a
prominent feature of electoral politics or of parliamentary debate. (The
business of parliament is as fragmented as the operations of the bureaucracy.) Nor do people expect, any more than they are allowed, to make any
impact on the policies pursued by the state. Formal democracy continues.
From time to time, people are presented at elections with alternatives so
limited that the elections amount to little more than a chance to give an
empty formal assent to the system (Habermas, 1975; Poulantzas, 1978).
People tum away from political ideals (into "civil privatism") and
become absorbed in their families and in their careers- "familial-vocational
privatism,'' something that bourgeois ideology has encouraged all along
(Habermas, 1975). 5 Supplied with enough material comforts, they may be
content enough with this way of life in sufficient numbers to preclude any
successful mass mobilization against the system. Moreover, in spite of
increasing embarrassments about persistent unemployment, persistent
inflation, visible confusion, and manifold inefficiency, the bureaucracy and
the "monopolies" may be able to go on supplying enough material comforts
to keep discontent from turning into militancy.
If Mandel is correct, the bureaucracy will do what it can to keep the
system going. He does not merely, like O'Connor (1973), take every
instance of trying to adjust the system so that it will work a little better as
"class-conscious" in intention, evidently on the ground that while the
system continues, the chief beneficiaries will be the dominating classes
(O'Connor, 1973). He argues that the dominating classes can count upon
the bureaucrats because the structure of the state, when the bureaucracy is
so prominent, is hierarchical. The top positions in the bureaucracy go to
members of the bourgeoisie; and the hierarchy selects conformists for
promotion. Thus the people running the bureaucracy are more than
ordinarily imbued with ideological acceptance of the state; as it stands, it is,
for them, dedicated without serious qualification to serving the public
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interest. The main error of reformists, Mandel (1976) holds, is just their
failure to understand these facts about the structure of the state and the
implied commitment to keep up the present relations of production.
With these observations, Mandel completes the picture of the second
shift of issues-reprivatization-as something that undoes (or forestalls) the
first shift, which brought onto the public agenda issues about the fundamental arrangements of capitalism. Such issues are not going to be confronted
and resolved by the public principles appropriate to the public professions
and responsibilities of the state. They are not going to be dealt with that way
outside the bureaucracy; they are not going to be dealt with that way inside
it. The embarrassing comprehensive questions that they involve will be
continually evaded in favor of fragmented policies, accompanied by fragmented rationales that take the virtues of capitalistic arrangements for
granted.
Is this, however, all that is to be made of reprivatization? Discussion of
the shifts-whether by Habermas or by Mandel-does not really get beyond
the stage of once again formulating plausible hypotheses. Evidence is
lacking for the relative magnitudes of the changes implied. Mandel does not
allow sufficiently for the possibility that reprivatization opens up opportunities for more effective remedial actions than could be undertaken
otherwise, under the full pressure of ''formal-democratic means of legitimation'' as Habermas (1975) envisages them. But if Mandel is correct about
the ideological commitments and conforming behavior of the bureaucrats, he
is in a position to dash cold water on any lingering hopes that Habermas
might have of bringing about an advance toward the transformed society
through fully general debate on the public agenda. Habermas, in holding that
individual sectors of the economy have ''privatized'' the various parts of the
bureaucracy (1975), so far agrees with Mandel's picture of reprivatization
and, perhaps inadvertently, concedes the point.
Yet even if Mandel is correct, Habermas has some grounds for not
conceding-for not abandoning his hopes of fully general debate. What does
it mean to have the bureaucrats imbued with bourgeois ideology? Bourgeois
ideology itself is responsive, as the classic Marxist conception of the state
allows, to the fully generalizable interests that would be invoked in the sort
of debate that Habermas imagines. Consistently with that ideology, the
bureaucrats may be expected to use the sort of autonomy that they enjoy
along with reprivatization, sometimes at least, to attend to interests other
than those of the dominating classes. Poulantzas (1978) argues that in fact,
precisely because they regard the state as charged with defending the public
interest against the monopolies and other favored economic elements, some
bureaucrats will quite readily take up the cause of the dominated classes,
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though not to the extent of encouraging them to form their own organizations outside the hierarchy.
Is even that qualification insurmountable? Habermas, on this point
following Offe, disagrees with Mandel on the ideological complexion of the
bureaucracy. As the state has grown in the number and intricacy of the
functions that it has assumed, it has had to recruit "professionalized"
additions to its civil service. These elements consist of ''concrete'' rather
than ''abstract'' labor; that is to say, of people oriented to the production of
use values rather than exchange values. In other words, they are people
who, through their professional training, in which they are accustomed to
having technology rationally used to achieve purposes defined otherwise
than by profitability in the market, are bound to be impatient with the
irrationality of the capitalistic system. It may be their impatience that will
tum out to be decisive against tolerating the system any longer (Habermas,
1975; Offe, 1972). Autonomy with reprivatization may give them the chance
to act and to seize upon the most promising means, even when these are
new forms of organization outside the bureaucracy. They may be expected
to be ready to defend their actions on general principles, and they may be
called upon to do so in the media and in the parliament, at least on issues
selected for special prominence. So, to some extent, may more conventional bureaucrats, acting though they may be on the supposition that the
received institutions of the state will continue.

THE TASK OF SELF-TRANSFORMATION:
ROUTE AND GOAL

The conventional bureaucrats will thus be making their contributions to
keeping up public debate. The unconventional ones-the new professionals-will be resorting to public debate on occasion to justify what
amounts to significant departures from the status quo. If Habennas and the
other writers are correct, moreover, in their belief that departures can be
more firmly justified by the standards of public debate, the unconventional
ones will have the advantage in the arena. The beginnings of a map for the
most favored route to the transformed society thus emerge.
Under reprivatization, on one side, bureaucrats with the new orientation will be talcing initiatives in policies and organization that may culminate
in transformation. For each initiative they will enlist the support of the
specialized public that keeps abreast of the activity of the branch or agency
in which the initiative comes forward. On the other side, organizations
outside the bureaucracy will be taking initiatives, too, some of them capable
of cumulation in a progressive direction. These organizations will seek the
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support of the branches or agencies concerned with the specialized publics
in which the organizations figure. It is there, for the most part, that the
"masses" will be active-in labor groups, consumer groups, peace groups,
rights groups, environmental groups.
I speak of two sides in order to make sure of a balanced picture. It is
not to be assumed that the new bureaucrats will be able to make cumulative
initiatives stick on their own, without some form of mass support. It is not to
be assumed, on the other hand, that a mass movement fragmented into
specialized publics, overlapping to a degree, no doubt, but not systematically coordinated, can succeed without allies in the bureaucracy (including
the courts and sometimes joining up with members of the legislature).
However, to speak of two sides underrates the extent to which, under
reprivatization, the activities of the branches of the bureaucracy, taken
severally, are intertwined with those of the specialized publics. Overall,
Poulantzas repeatedly insists that the state is best looked at, not as an
apparatus, but as an arena of activity, in which the public takes part along
with the official personnel of the state. Looked at closely, it is a complex of
such arenas. In their multiplicity lies the autonomy of the late capitalist
state.
From time to time the new bureaucrats and their allies will be called
upon to justify their initiatives in public debate, and they will be well placed
to do so. Sometimes, they will find themselves allied with more conventional
forces inside and outside the bureaucracy. Often-very likely most of the
time-a departure toward transformation may equally well be described, to
the satisfaction of almost everybody, as a concession designed to maintain
the system. When a departure does have to be defended as such, it will be
possible to argue that it accords better than the status quo with public
standards.
Many of the initiatives will not be selected for general attention in the
media and in parliament. Indeed, the people taking the initiatives may be
supposed to be occupied normally in putting through incremental changes
too small and too various for the status quo to focus organized attention
upon. Thus the pluralism and fragmentation of policy making in the capitalist
state offers a substantial opportunity for self-transformation. Occasionally,
however, the transforming bureaucrats may themselves wish to resort, at
specially favorable junctures, to the media and to parliament, to consolidate
one series or another of past gains and to establish in general legislation a
more progressive climate for further departures.
I say this is the most favored route to the transformed society. I do not
say it is a reliable route. If it is the most favored route, the prospects of
reaching the transformed society may not be very encouraging. In fact, I do
not think they are. What we are talking about is an outside chance, and it
75

David Braybrooke
may be optimistic to think it is as large as a chance of one in ten. The bias of
political activity in the late capitalist state may run strongly against
cumulative changes in the direction of transformation. The bias may even be
increasing. Poulantzas (1978) claims that a prominent current development
in the late capitalist state is '' authoritarian statism, '' ''marked by the hold of
the summits of the Executive over the upper administration and by the
increased political control of the former over the latter''; the executive itself
has become "personalized" in one man "at the top of the Executive."
Poulantzas may have been thinking too much of France; the evidence
from other capitalist countries (e.g., Canada) would be more mixed.
Moreover, Poulantzas himself qualified "authoritarian statism" as a ''tendency. '' ' 'Underlying the process of concentration are important innerstate contradictions ... growing contradictions.'' ''Contradictions between
monopoly and other fractions of capital, or between the power bloc and the
popular masses, are expressed right at the heart of the State, in its central
regions and summits. Inevitably, therefore, they traverse the focal point
represented by the top man. There is not one president, but several in one''
(Poulantzas, 1978). Given that the representative function of the political
parties has been curtailed because the parties have been shut out of the
''water-tight container'' in which ''the state bureaucracy has shut itself up''
(Poulantzas, 1978), these are the contradictions already allowed for in the
thesis of reprivatization. They do not encourage confidence in the effectiveness of the state, either as an arena in which capitalism will be maintained or
as one in which it will be transformed.
The most likely prospect before the state in late capitalism may be that
it will stagger on indefinitely, not changing enough to satisfy the minimum
conditions for transformation into socialism or changing, so far as it does
change, in an unwelcome direction. My picture of the prospects is,
however, no more inconclusive than the picture offered by Habermas (1975)
or O'Connor. 0 'Connor, who considers only the scope that conventional
politicians and conventional bureaucrats have for action described as
maintaining the system, holds that the state might not only survive but
survive robustly if it succeeded in building up a ''socio-industrial complex.''
There, over the heads and over the opposition of organized labor in both the
state sector and the monopoly sector, it would join with the monopolies in
bringing about an adequate flow of resources to workers in the competitive
sector. He is inclined to think that this will not happen; but the alternative,
one gathers, is not a sure prospect of transformation. It is, as probably as
not, an indefinitely long process of deterioration (O'Connor, 1973).
Mandel (1979), alone among these writers, retains the classical
confidence in transformation by a proletarian revolution. It is difficult,
however, to see what basis he has for thinking any such thing will happen in
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the Western liberal democracies; and even more difficult to understand is
his confidence that if it does happen, the transformation will be to his liking.
Is the labor movement in Westem countries going to be so much more
militant and unified than it has been hitherto? Deteriorating though it will
perhaps be all along, may not the system be able to temporize indefinitely
with any workers' demands that threaten even remotely to tum into armed
revolt? Reprivatization allows at least a good deal of scope for temporization. Would not an attempt at a revolution, even if it got under way, be the
surest means of mobilizing the bourgeoisie with repressive instruments that
are still essentially at their command? Mere approximation to such an
attempt in Spain, Chile, and Guatemala sufficed for such mobilization.
Moreover, anything about the circumstances that improves the
chances of a revolution's succeeding is likely to aggravate the reasons for
apprehending that it will not bring the desired transformation. A revolution
is more likely to succeed amid chaos, in which the courts and the police no
longer function in a regular way. But what then is going to happen, for
example, to civil liberties, which Mandel (1979), along with the other
writers that I have drawn on, fervently champions, both as a feature of the
transformed society and as a condition of the efforts to bring that society
about (Poulantzas, 1978)? Hitherto, civil liberties have flourished only when
they have had special institutional backing from the courts and parliament.
Are they to be left to the discretion of popular feeling in a time of maximum
popular excitement?
Mandel (1979) pictures revolution and its aftermath, the dictatorship of
the proletariat, as a process during which parliament loses power while
soviets-workers' councils-gain it. Poulantzas (1978), equally concerned
with the preservation of representative institutions from the beginning of
transformation and throughout, is more inclined to keep parliament going.
But what, in a revolutionary situation, where the revolutionists' impatience
with dissidents will be maximized, is going to ensure that representaive
institutions, in whatever form or mix of forms they exist, will be genuinely
responsive?
To succeed, the revolution may have to have monolithic organization. If
so, success will be achieved only by sacrificing liberties and representation
on the way, and only by committing the transformation to a form of
organization entirely unsuited to bringing them back and improving on them,
even as they now exist in the late capitalist state. Moreover, even if the
revolution could succeed without monolithic organization, that is, in the
circumstances, the sort of organization that it is likely to get.
Revolution is thus not a promising means of transformation. If we dwell
upon its disadvantages, it will seem less favored than the route that I am
outlining. But does not that route run, fatally, upon the other horn of an all77
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too-familiar dilemma? Does the route amount to anything more than Revisionism, with its fatal tendency to being coopted and assimilated by the
system? I do not think it can be denied that some such dangers will be found
along the route. However, they are much less considerable than the
dangers to which Revisionism has time and again succumbed. The trap that
Revisionism-the social democratic parties of western Europe-fell into was
the trap first of seeking a majority in parliament and then of carrying on a
responsible government on the basis of such a majority. To do these things,
acting as a political party in a parliamentary system, the social democratic
parties have had to commit themselves to compromise programs that
placate widespread fears of radical change and accordingly offer to temporize indefinitely with the entrenched interests received from the past. The
route that I am outlining-plural incremental departures, initiated under
reprivatization by unconventional bureaucrats or by allies active in their
specialized publics, with occasional resort to fully general debate-does not
require any such commitment.
The initiators of these departures need not abate a jot or tittle of the
overall program of transformation to which they have come to subscribe (as
the result of a variety of influences-education, reading, discussion, loose
connections with formal or informal organizations). They may have to accept
it that their initiatives will often be undone or offset by reactionary initiatives
taken elsewhere in the bureaucracy and in other specialized publics. They
do not have to endorse those opposed initiatives or even desist from arguing
against them and trying to get them undone in turn. When they are called
upon to defend the departures that they initiate, they will do so by arguing
that unless current arrangements are modified in the ways implied by these
departures, the arrangements will be beset by increasing difficulties. Unless
the poor are organized to help themselves, their condition and the condition
of the cities will deteriorate; unless community development corporations
are set up, welfare payments will continue to rise, and there will be nothing
to show for them in renovated housing. In general, it will be possible to
argue sincerely on these lines, even with people who will look upon the
departures as concessions that will help maintain the current system. The
initiators can consistently, for their part, look upon these departures as so
many cumulative steps in transforming the system. The initiators are not
even debarred from being frank about their views: their conventional allies
may not take alarm from remarking the disagreement about the significance
of the departures; they may just go on disagreeing.
Will the initiatives that fall into the progressive category cumulate if
they are not coordinated by a party or organized movement, whether or not
it is one that works mainly for victory at elections? I do not know; but
logically, it is no more necessary for the cumulation of progressive initiatives
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that they be coordinated by some overall agency than that they fall into the
progressive category (tending toward transformation) exclusively, and not
simultaneously into the system-maintaining category. Moreover, it accords
with the deterministic side of classical Marxist theory that the initiatives
cumulate as responses in the superstructure to exigencies resulting from
changes in the relations of production, without anyone, or any set of people,
deliberately planning for cumulation. Coordination of a sort, sufficient for
cumulation, might be furnished by one initiative's being conceived to exploit
the opportunity-or at least the example-set by another, and by having
media to publicize, among intersecting audiences in the bureaucracy and
outside, such opportunities and examples.
A prima fade case can thus be made for the route via reprivatization.
We cannot go further in discovering how promising the route may be,
however, without knowing more about the goal to be reached. Are even the
most unconventional, even the most progressive bureaucrats and their allies
in specialized publics directing themselves, so far as they need to in these
early stages, toward the arrangements of the transformed society? It is not
enough, especially in view of the character that known postrevolutionary
societies have actually assumed, to talk broadly about abundance and social
planning in a classless society. It is not enough to justify expecting that the
transformed society will, once installed, be more agreeable than the welfare
state in late capitalism; it is not enough to tell whether social change is
moving in the direction of a society about which one could confidently have
such expectations. To be sure, not everything about the transformed
arrangements can be specified in advance. To a very large extent, as Marx
insisted, it is only reasonable, indeed necessary, to leave the institutions of
the transformed society to be shaped by the perceptions and inventions of
the people who are going to live in it. Their circumstances and their
attitudes are going to be substantially without precedent in our untransformed society. We need, however, to know more about the transformed society than Marx was willing to say to know whether it will be
desirable and whether we are on the way to it.
Reflections by contemporary Marxist writers on the disillusioning
features of postrevolutionary societies help on both points. Mandel (1979),
Poulantzas (1978), and Carrillo (1977), for example, agree that prominent
among those features, besides the suppression of civil liberties and the
extinction of representative institutions, has been the rise of a monolithic
bureaucracy supporting a new privileged elite. One can directly infer that
among the features of the transformed society are to be civil liberties,
effective provisions for representation, and some alternative to an allpowerful central bureaucracy. To these we may add that there must be
some system for matching, indeed surpassing, capitalism in the production
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and distribution of economic benefits. It must be no worse than late
capitalism in providing regular employment, interesting work, and a high
standard of living for everybody. Indeed, in at least one of these categories,
it must do better. Marxists have continually expected that it would do better
in all.
The condition about preserving civil liberties will readily be met on the
route via reprivatization. That route presupposes keeping up parliament
until what effective representation it does give is given by superseding
institutions (e.g., workers' councils), and it presupposes keeping up the
courts at least until they have no useful functions to perform. Currently they
not only serve to protect civil liberties; they are from time to time used to
enlarge them and the rights against discrimination with which they intersect.
Moreover, even in the best-realized of transformed societies, courts are
likely to be needed indefinitely in these and other connections: justice for
persons at odds with various social organizations; resolutions of private
quarrels; family law; some criminal proceedings. Courts are not very soon
going to lose so many functions that they cease to be robust enough and
prominent enough to command respect for civil liberties.
So long as parliament is preserved, moreover, giving some effective
representation, the conditions for representation will be met at least in part.
Will the route be favorable for developing the alternative provisions for
representation that these writers regard either as indispensable complements to parliaments (Poulantzas, 1978) or as devices infinitely superior, by
which parliament will be essentially supplanted (Mandel, 1979)? It is not just
a question of representation. Part of the superiority of these new devices,
such as workers' councils, supposedly consists in their providing for more
participation, through representation and alongside it. Will the bureaucracy-even the unconventional elements in the bureaucracy-be ready to
assist such devices into being? Will the bureaucracy be willing to initiate
cooperation with devices created outside-in the labor movement, in
consumer groups, among environmentalists, in neighborhoods-and to
persist in such cooperation?
Poulantzas (1978), as I have already noted, apprehends that the
answer to both questions would be negative; organizational imperialism and
self-interest would dictate otherwise. However, it is far from evident that
these factors would always outweigh reforming convictions; it is not even
evident that they would work out to negative answers. In Canada and the
United States, the record is full of examples of organizations-ranging from
neighborhood groups and the groups of welfare recipients to national farm
organizations-that the bureaucracies have themselves created to mobilize,
branch by branch, the specialized publics that they need. Moreover, the
very notion of reprivatization implies that a host of specially mobilized
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publics, organized to various degrees, will be present to deal with the
fragmented bureaucracy. There is, of course, ample evidence that the
corresponding organizations exist in abundance and that the bureaucracy is
prepared to cooperate with them (Truman, 1951). Many of them-most of
them-are currently more interested, no doubt, in preserving dubious
privileges accorded them under the present system than in assisting in
departures toward a transformed society; but that is not by itself relevant to
deciding the point about organizational imperialism and self-interest. The
existence, history, and influence of such organizations demonstrate that
those factors do not preclude fostering representative devices outside the
bureaucracy. Among them already are organizations that call for progressive departures, and in important respects (e.g., in making alternative jobs
available) these offer the same basis for cooperation with bureaucrats.
Whatever its disadvantages, a fragmented bureaucracy already offers
some relief from a monolithic one. Will the progressive organizations that it
fosters, among others, furnish a decentralized alternative as well as a
fragmented one? The grand historical alternative to bureaucracy, fragmented or otherwise, has been, of course, the market. Marxists have only
belatedly and reluctantly come to accept the market as a device to be joined
with centralized planning and reduce its difficulties (Lindblom, 1977).
Marxists have perhaps not even yet fully appreciated the virtues of the
market as an alternative to bureaucracy. Even under capitalism, however, it
implies a pluralism of power that helps to protect the liberties of small
groups and individual persons. It is not just the courts and parliament that
make a difference in this respect between late capitalist states and
postrevolutionary societies like the Soviet Union. It is also the pluralism of
employers, based on a pluralism of property holders. Exclusion from
employment, even exclusion from employment suited to one's skills-as in
Czechoslovakia currently-suffices for a good deal of effective repression.
The objective, then, in perfecting an alternative to a monolithic
bureaucracy might be taken to be to decentralize to a pluralism of small~
scale powers without giving those powers the privileges, in personal
enrichment and class distinction, that are objectionable in capitalistic private
property. What form might these powers take? Some of the forms have
already appeared in advance of any general social transformation: consumers' cooperatives; producers' cooperatives; 6 worker-owned firms; nonprofit community-development corporations; firms (like some newspapers)
that have become in effect nonprofit foundations. To these may be added
multiple devices for local government-not just towns, but water districts,
school districts, neighborhood school committees, communes. Some of
these forms-not just the communes-may be small enough to dispense
with hierarchy. With all these organizations in the picture, one can draw81
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quite consistently with Marx's approval (1871), in The Civil War in France,
of the thoroughgoing decentralization of administration envisaged by the
Commune of 1871-on some suggestions brought up within the publicchoice school, chiefly by Vincent Ostrom (1976), as to how all these
organizations are to be related.7
Imagine having organizations of various sorts on the production side of
the economy and other organizations of various sorts on the consumption
side. Those kinds of productive organizations that were considered particularly prone to acquire undue privileges might be excluded, or admitted only
under stringent precautionary regulation. Even producers' cooperatives or
worker-owned firms pose dangers of monopolistic behavior (as has long
been a commonplace; Bernstein, 1961 [1899]). Precautions would have to
be taken against the dangers, and the precautions would be the more
necessary, the larger the scale at which economies of production were
maximized. Forms of provision for some needs might best be produced by
single productive organizations, if they can be restrained from exploiting
their monopoly positions. Whatever the size, an effective precaution might
be the one lately suggested specifically for producers' cooperativesnamely, that the organization not own the capital that it uses but borrow the
capital from other organizations that make a detached evaluation of its
prospects (Vanek, 1977). The lending organizations, set up to act in the
public interest, would have the power to check people in the borrowing
organization from restricting the size of operations or making undue
personal profits. As a last resort, the lending organizations would have the
power to recall the investment, though if the borrowing organizations are to
be independent employers, they, in their tum, will have to be protected
against arbitrary recall.
In general, the efficient size of the productive organizations will vary,
as, independently, will the efficient size of the organizations on the
consumption side. This is so whether we take efficiency in a narrow sense,
analogous to that achieved by a profitable unregulated firm in a competitive
market, or in a more stringent sense, imposing the condition that all
externalities be internalized. (In the first case, we would not be demanding
that all the good externalities that people wish to include in the social
product have been internalized and paid for by the beneficiaries or on their
behalf, as social decision prescribes. An example would be lower transportation costs for everyone, once docks and tracks were built to serve a
particular enterprise or industry. Nor would we be demanding that the costs
minimized in achieving efficiency account for all the bad externalities-for
example, congestion, or pollution-that people are ready to put up with only
if costs overall are minimized. In the second case, we would be demanding
both these things.)
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Some of these organizations, concerned with those forms of provision
for needs that come in the form of private goods, would be organizations for
cooperative purchasing. One might include families (households) among
them. Where larger organizations offered no advantages in purchasing that
families or single persons could not match, the organizations would not, in
circumstances permitting free adaptation to opportunities, appear or persist. On the production side, too , the goods in question would, in some
cases, be produced by single persons and, in others, by small groups,
though if the technology of modern industry is to be kept (as Marxists
assume), many private goods will be produced by rather large organizations.
On the consumption side, there will also be organizations concerned
with the purchase of public goods, for example, education, water-supply
systems, systems of sanitation. Here the member-consumers would join
not just to enjoy the economies of purchasing in bulk; besides buying
together the goods in question, they would consume them together. One
may imagine them choosing between productive organizations specializing in
public goods and capable of supplying those goods on more or less attractive
terms. In some cases, several would be contracted with to join in the
production of the good in question.
Suppose the organizations are bounded both geographically and in
respect to the forms of provision with which they are concerned. Each will
make its own decisions but will respond to the cues given it by the decisions
of other organizations; in other words, the organizations will be coordinated
by something like a market process. But now, trying to imagine how the
economy might be organized without a centralized bureaucracy, have we
not found our way back to laissez faire and all the miseries-as well as the
dubious benefits-of economic competition between organizations and
between persons? Where is the planning and cooperation that Marxists had
hoped for?
In part, the planning and cooperation will devolve upon organizations
small enough to carry on planning for the needs of their members by the
continuous direct participation that Marx treated as one of the basic
remedies for alienation (Braybrooke, 1958; Thayer, 1981). Some of these
organizations might be communes in which production and consumption
were combined; and these communes might, as small-scale societies, come
closer to realizing the hopes for the transformed society than anything else
in it. In part, the planning and cooperation will be found in negotiations
between organizations for the supply of goods private and public. There will
be some competition on both sides, but if the organizations on the
production side are not seeking ever-greater profits, but simply to break
even, the competition need not be so strenuous as to distort personal
relations within the producing organizations or between people on the two
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sides of the transactions. Indeed, the consuming organizations might
normally have members who participate in the planning of the productive
organizations that are dealt with; and vice versa (Thayer, 1981). On the
consumption side, organizations and persons might be seeking to maximize
gains, but they need not do so in rivalry with one another, and the occasions
for rivalry could be diminished by assuring everyone of economic security
and by approximating equality of incomes.
Security and equality are matters that will probably require some
central planning-and a central authority capable of collecting taxes and
regulating market processes. So will environmental matters. Exactly what
tasks the central planning body should have and how it should carry them
out are not subjects that can be explained in detail here. One might infer,
from the apparent difficulty of carrying out the theories of central planning
that have been formally outlined (Milleron, 1972), that economics may not
have advanced to the point of being able to furnish such an explanation
anywhere. What is crucial for present purposes is to say that the central
planning body should have a relatively small role and limited powers and,
even so, be as responsive as effective representation for the whole society
can make it. It will have a relatively small role if it does not attempt much
prescriptive planning. It may confine itself to adjusting the results of market
processes, and even here rely on combinations of taxes (including socialinsurance charges) and subsidies to accomplish its aims, rather than
prescribe, say, safety standards and emission standards (Thurow, 1980).
Presumably, the information that it needs to monitor market processes
throughout the economy and make the required adjustments could be
organized in large-scale computers. The computers would not themselves
pose dangers of repression; they would perhaps help to minimize the corps
of inspectors otherwise required.
Effective representation will demand, besides universal suffrage, some
provisions for identifying, on occasion, alternative slates or representatives
committed to different central-planning policies. No doubt the present
political parties of the liberal democracies in late capitalism are very
imperfect means of identifying such slates and of offering a choice between
them. Contemporary Marxists might nevertheless give some thought about
how, in the transformed society, precautions are to be taken against there
being no means at all. Meanwhile, as I have already said, the continuation of
parliament, with the present parties and some possibility of starting up new
ones, roughly meets the requirement. Moreover, in parliament and in the
parties (whether or not they are parties disciplined enough to have an
identifiable programmatic commitment), there is a corps of politicians who
are to some degree oriented toward making the system responsive.
84

CONTEMPORARY MARXISM OF THE CAPITALIST STATE

How is the central planning body in the transformed society to be made
responsive? If the electorate divides on issues with which the central
planning body is occupied, part of the electorate is going to lose when the
body goes ahead with a certain policy. The people who are thus disappointed, however, might simply swallow their disappointment and wait their
turn for success on future issues. Moreover, people who lose out on one
issue may, more often than not, win on others: No one may belong to a
group that consistently loses, or even loses most of the time.
All of this may happen automatically, without anyone taking any special
care to make it happen. In healthy political systems, however, politicians
make it their business to take special care. Observing the disappointment of
the people outvoted on one issue, some politicians would perhaps move for
an immediate compromise, pressing the central planning body to allocate
part of the resources initially committed to the winning policy to meeting
some of the demands of people who supported the alternatives. If circumstances did not favor an immediate compromise, politicians, mindful of the
present disappointment, would be looking for opportunities to capitalize on it
in winning political support on later issues.
Of course, the process is a fallible one. Opportunities to do quite
different things, serving other people, may continually seem more promising to the politicians than the project of compensating for the disappointment. In the end, nothing may come of the project. Nevertheless, the
process, combined with the process of changing from one issue to another
and automatically reassorting voters, may produce compensations often
enough to make people outvoted on any given question reasonably content
with the system in the long run and to remove any grounds for holding the
system to be persistently unjust to any one group. The answer to keeping
the central planning body responsive lies in making sure that it is controlled
by a system of effective representation in which such a process operates.
In this regard and in regard to the other conditions to be met by the
transformed society, approximations to meeting the conditions already exist
in the late capitalist state; they need not be abandoned even temporarily en
route to the transformation. Moreover, those approximations open up the
possibility of distributing the people who are in outlook prepared to move on
such a route to the transformed society, inside and outside the bureaucracy
(and other parts of the state apparatus) in sufficient numbers and with
sufficient power to set off on the route. Offe (1972) and Habermas (1975)
suggest that such a distribution of activities may already exist. Such
activities have legitimate positions in the capitalist state, and they are in
positions from which greater legitimacy may be attained. It is on them that
efficacious use of the autonomy of the state depends and, as well, progress
toward transformation. Whether they are actually moving on the route that I
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have sketched and how far they can be expected to get on it, if they are, are
matters on which social experiment and observation must speak, rather
than a speculative survey' of possibilities.

NOTES
1. Poulantzas says, ''The (capitalist) State ... is ... the material condensation of ... a relationship of forces among classes and class fractions" (1978:128);
and though he denies that the state is a full-fledged "Subject" on the next page, he
freely writes on the page previous of the state's having a role and in this role
"organizing" the dominant class or classes.
2. Among these currents figure, besides the official Marxism of the Soviet
Union and its satellites as set forth, for example, in the East German writings cited
by Habermas, the thinking of Mandel and other Trotskyists (see Jurgen Habermas,
1973; Mandel, 1979).
3. The Italian Communist Party and its subscription to Eurocommunism are
illuminatingly discussed by Paul Thomas (1979); for the views of the Spanish leader
Santiago Carrillo see his book (1977).
4. The passage just cited from Late Capitalism perhaps covers this possibility
too.
5. Habermas oddly mentions utilitarianism as a characteristic feature of ''familiar-vocational privatism, '' ignoring its remarkabe record of public-spirited reform, in
the first half of the nineteenth century especially.
6. The suitability of producers' cooperatives is somewhat problematic.
7. The public-choice school, of course, could hardly intend anything less than to
supply Marxism with suggestions. However, it is not really surprising that
suggestions should be found there. The public-choice school agrees with contemporary Marxism in deploring the ''hypertrophy'' of the state and the antilibertarian
character of centralized bureaucracy. Moreover, the central, defining preoccupation
of the public-choice school is what Buchanan and Tullock (1962) call ''the constitutional problem'' -the problem of assigning variously to the market, or to voluntary
organization, or to compulsory organization (the state) the production of different
goods, private and public, so that these will be forthcoming in the quantities best
suited to the preferences of the people participating. So defined, the school is not
committed a priori to capitalism at all, even if the market is taken to require, which it
does not, private property with all the features that private property has under
capitalism.

86

4

Public Interest, Private Interest,
and the Democratic Polity
Peter H. Aranson and Peter C. Ordeshook

The outlines of a consensus 1 have emerged concerning the appropriateness
of public-sector activities in representative democracies. 2 This consensus
holds that most public-sector programs in these nations are inappropriate,
or are carried on at an inappropriate level, or are executed in an
inappropriate manner. The evidence underlying this consensus grows out of
four strands of research. First, public-sector size has increased at a rate
that exceeds increases in private-sector size but without an increase in
public-sector productivity (Borcherding, 1977a, 1977b; Meltzer and Richard, 1978; Nutter, 1978). Both theoreticaJ3 and empirical4 evidence suggest
respectively that the public sector cannot be and is not as efficient as the
private sector. Hence, unless there is some unexplored reason for increases in public-sector activity, as additional resources shift from the
private to the public sector, a net decline in the economy's total productivity
occurs, with a resulting erosion of individual welfare. Second, Western
democracies have developed extensive regulations, ostensibly to improve
individual welfare; but the actual statutes often embrace the least effective
and least efficient means to accomplish this end (Commission on Law and
the Economy, 1979; Aranson, 1979; Aranson and Ordeshook, 1981b; Noll,
1971; Breyer, 1979; Poole, 1982). In the United States the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC; Lindsay and Shanor, 1982), the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA; Ackerman and Hassler, 1981;
Aranson, 1982; Maloney and McCormick, 1982; Marcus, 1980; Margolis,
1977), the Pure Food and Drug Administration (FDA; Peltzman, 1973;
Wardell and Lasagna, 1975; Weimer, 1982), the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA; Peltzman, 1975), the Occupational Safety
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and Health Administration (OSHA; Smith, 1982), and the New Deal
agencies (Hawley, 1969) provide examples of this phenomenon. Third,
many public-sector programs redistribute wealth from lower-income to
higher-income persons (Stigler, 1970). Two well-documented examples are
state-supported higher education (Hansen and Weisbrod, 1969; Hansen,
1970) and loan-guarantee programs (Hardin and Denzau, 1981; Lowi,
1979). Fourth, antitrust and antimerger statutes, rather than promoting a
competitive economy, have protected inefficient firms and have further
entrenched inferior management. 5
None of these phenomena rests on a coherent normative theory of the
state, although economists who are not familiar with progress in public
choice often use elements of one such theory, welfare economics, to justify
the adoption of these welfare-degrading programs. 6 Nor is there a constitutional theory that explains why public policy fails to be welfare regarding. 7
But because representative democracies purport to be representative, the
observation that their citizens acquiesce in the ongoing degradation of their
own welfare compels explanation.
This essay reviews a body of research on the general problem of the
failure of representative democracy.8 Section 2 develops some commonly
invoked standards for welfare judgments about public policy and rehearses
the argument that welfare-related justifications for public-sector activities
are often overdrawn. Section 3 develops demand-side models of the political
process in representative democracies. These models consider the political
character of the undifferentiated electorate and the problem of the formation
and maintenance of interest groups, with special attention to the nature of
their public-policy demands. Section 4 explores the supply side of the public
sector by separately considering legislatures, bureaus, and courts. Section
5 then examines alternative formulations of public-sector supply-side characteristics by reporting a general model of candidate and executive decision
making based on the nature of public-sector demand. Section 6 reflects on
future prospects and possible correctives for present failures and offers
some commentary on the limitations inherent in any correctives.

THEORY OF THE STATE
To conclude that most public-sector programs in representative democracies are inappropriate, or are carried on at an inappropriate level, or
are executed in an inappropriate manner, requires an underlying theory of
the state that provides criteria of appropriateness. It would be hyperbole to
claim that such a theory prevails in Westem intellectual communities.
Nevertheless, certain elements of welfare economics have merged to form
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a body of prescriptive sentences about public-sector activity (e.g., see
Baumol, 1965; Buchanan, 1971; Musgrave, 1959). Indeed, some scholars in
modern public finance still regard these sentences as providing the animus
for actual decisions taken in the public sector, 9 although most scholars now
hold that welfare theory is purely normative and cannot explain actual
practice.
Here, we use welfare theory as a tool of criticism of representative
democracies, not as a cynosure for public-sector decision making. Commonly accepted elements of welfare theory provide a convenient set of
standards for judging the appropriateness of various public-sector activities.
While these standards form an intellectual justification for the liberal
democratic state, we find no reason to believe that voters and politicians
actually try to follow them. Indeed, as we report here, both theory and
practice argue persuasively that voters and politicians ignore them, leaving
their fulfillment at best a matter of pure happenstance.
The logical structure (as distinct from the historical development) of
welfare theory has two variants. The first depends on an individualistic
methodology and Pareto optimality .10 In this variant an institutional arrangement, specific statute, or regulation is welfare-preferred if at least one
person is better off, and no one is worse off, under it than under some
alternative institution, statute, or regulation. Using a strict Pareto criterion,
one cannot balance one person's loss against another's gain, nor can one
weight different persons' gains or losses differently. In this sense, the
Pareto criterion is highly individualistic and neutral in deciding among the
conflicting claims of various classes of persons. Therefore, socialist or other
class-related bodies of prescriptions would not rest comfortably beside the
Pareto criterion. 11
A second variant of welfare theory tries to construct a social-welfare
function, either by summing individual utilities or by maximizing the utility of
a "representative" person. This variant loses its individualistic character
and internal consistency. For as the body of knowledge beginning with
Arrow (1963; see also Plott, 1976) demonstrates, the possibility of
constructing an internally consistent social-welfare function that simultaneously satisfies a set of reasonable criteria is logically impossible. In place of
such a function, many scholars, using a ''second best" framework, have
pursued wealth maximization as a standard of action. 12 But wealth maximization, like welfare maximization, remains uninteresting until conflicting
claims force it to make judgments that rest on interpersonal welfare
comparisons, which remain inappropriate under the first variant of welfare
theory.
There is one way to incorporate the judgments made under the second
variant into those made under the first. This method is especially applicable
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at the constitutional level of decision making. Suppose that some people are
choosing a set of rules, a constitution, to govern their subsequent publicsector decisions. One proposal might be to mandate subsequent actions that
maximize wealth, with or without compensation to the losers. 13 Constitution
writers might well choose such an arrangement, even though any one of
them might be a net loser in a particular decision rendered under it. 14 Prior
unanimous consent for a constitutional order thus may signify that the
regime is Pareto preferred, even though subsequent decisions made under
it may be Pareto neutral, and occasionally, myopically, even Pareto inferior.
When we find such an arrangement after the constitution is formed, we may
regard one of its particular derivative policies as Pareto inferior, even
though we would judge the entire constitutional order as Pareto preferred if
we compared it, in toto, to some other arrangements.
Here, we use the first variant of welfare theory, but from time to time
we elliptically intersperse the discussion with this constitutional hybrid,
because we are concerned with outcomes that occur as a consequence of
explicit constitutional arrangements and practices. If representative democracy fails, by not reaching Pareto-preferred states, then we must judge that
failure either on an individualistic basis or on a wealth-maximizing criterion,
with the explicit understanding that the loss of wealth, from a constitutional
perspective, has unacceptably but avoidably eroded individual welfare. With
these qualifications in mind, we identify somewhat arbitrarily the commonly
accepted functions of the state in the view of welfare theory and describe
the often-overlooked boundaries that this theory places on social choice.
WELFARE AND STATE FUNCTIONS

Welfare theory usually begins by recounting the efficiency properties of
pure competitive markets. This beginning in no sense incorporates a
historical or ideological supposition about the superiority of such markets as
compared with other social arrangements. 15 It merely identifies an institution under which people's individual decisions maximize welfare by achieving Pareto optimality and the greatest possible total wealth, and by sending
resources to their subjectively most highly valued uses . 16 The assumptions
that underlie a pure competitive market include many buyers and many
sellers ("many'' means that no single producer or consumer alone can
affect market outcomes), perfect information, zero transactions costs, an
explicit (and efficient) property-rights system (e.g., effortless monitoring
and enforcement of rights and contractual obligations), undifferentiated
goods, long-run free (unimpaired) entry of buyers and firms, and the
absence of collusion among buyers or sellers (see Henderson and Quandt,
1971, chap. 4). If, but certainly not only if, all of these conditions are met,
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then there are no wasted resources, all resources flow to their most highly
valued uses, and wealth is maximized. The allocation of resources that
exists in the presence of such a market is Pareto optimal, because there no
net wealth goes unproduced, and no reallocation could occur without
harming at least one person. 17
There are two classes of departures from the pure competitive model.
To the first class belong those departures that are self-correcting, because
incentives exist for secondary or parallel markets or for integration or other
contractual arrangements, to arise and restore efficiency. For example, in
the absence of perfect information, markets, abstractly considered, may fail
to maximize welfare. This absence may also signal profit opportunities from
creating markets in information, however, such as occur with various
brokerage and agency functions . Whether such markets can operate
successfully may depend in turn on various aspects of the market for
information, such as whether the information bought and sold can remain
divisible (see Ackerlof, 1970; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Hayek, 1945;
Hirshleifer, 1971; Hirshleifer and Riley, 1979; Knight, 1921; Machlup,
1962; Rothschild, 1973; Stigler, 1961). If so, then the imperfect-information
departure from the conditions of the pure competitive model merely induces
the development of a secondary market, requiring no further political
specification of property rights nor other governmental actions .18 Several
other departures from the assumptions of a pure competitive market, most
notably those involving transactions and monitoring costs, can similarly
create private entrepreneurial opportunities for organizational changes that
restore efficiency (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Coase, 1937; Klein and
Leffler, 1981; Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978; Rubin, 1978; Marvel,
1982).
The second class of departures from conditions of pure competition are
those that further market processes cannot easily circumvent. These
traditionally have been identified as instances of "market failure," because
some alternative allocation of resources not theoretically achievable in the
marketplace improves upon the theoretical marketplace allocation (Bator,
1968). Stated differently, voluntary action within the structure of the market
relation cannot reach this theoretically identifiable allocation. Since the
allocation is Pareto superior to the one that the market reaches under
present governmental arrangements, some political alteration of property
rights or statutory or regulatory structure may be advocated to achieve the
Pareto-preferred result. That is, the presence of the alleged market failure
creates a justification for the public sector to perform some new function or
to alter the manner in which it performs an existing one. 19
Public Goods. The resources bought and sold in the pure competitive
market are private goods, because they share two important characteris91
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tics. First, either law or practice or technology has created defensible
property rights to them, which effectively can exclude from ownership or
consumption those who have not produced or paid for them. 20 Second, in
principle it is possible to create such property rights, because the goods that
they circumscribe are not theoretically indivisible. A violation of either
condition makes it possible that those goods to which the violation appliespublic goods-will either be suboptimally produced or not produced at all
(Samuelson, 1954). Classic examples of goods whose divisibility is theoretically impossible (or nearly so) include national defense and public
peace, neither of which can be withheld from nonpayers. Of course, several
goods (e.g., national parks) and services (e.g., education) are at least partly
divisible in principle but have not been totally made so, either because
property-right specifications are incomplete or because political decisions
have been taken to make them free or nearly free to all users. The
paradigmatic example of market failure concerns the inability to supply
public goods or the suboptimal supply of such goods in pure competitive
markets. The concept of a public good has become so ubiquitous and organic
that it has lost much of its analytical power (e.g., see Steiner, 1974; Kahn,
1966). Here, though, we refer to a good as public only if its supply would
create the particular incidence of costs and benefits that classical welfare
theory would contemplate.
The public-goods problem arises in several instances that may or may
not merit public-sector attention. All involve the failure to pay or contribute
to the production of a jointly produced or consumed good or benefit; the
relevant failure is called shirking, chiseling, or free riding, depending on the
conditions under which it occurs.
Shirking arises in joint production processes, most notably those of the
firm or franchise, in the presence of positive monitoring costs. For example,
each worker in a complicated joint production process, in which no single
worker's individual contribution is readily separable, has an incentive to
shirk, thus collecting the benefits of others' efforts. The addition to the
firm's net present value created by monitoring and by appropriate incentive
structures (e.g., creating a market for management and control) goes in
part to those monitored, to induce them not to shirk, and to monitors, who
are themselves monitored by others and are ultimately disciplined by
market forces (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
The addition to joint product consequent to these monitoring activities is the
public good. 21
Chiseling occurs in the presence of cartels. Generally, a cartel
agreement restricts output, thus raising the equilibrium price of each unit of
output to the level that, by assumption, would be the profit-maximizing price
if all cartel members formed a monopoly. A single cartel member chisels on
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the agreement by expanding output to capture the profit opportunity in the
(higher) cartel price. If all cartel members chisel, then the cartel falls apart.
The added profit to the cartel from successfully enforced cartelization is the
public good.
Free riding occurs in several contexts. The term's traditional usage
refers to those who enjoy the putatively higher wage rates and improved
working conditions derived from union striking and bargaining efforts,
without themselves paying union dues or the costs of striking. More recent
usages expand the concept to cover failures to support traditionally
nondivisible governmental services, such as national defense, public safety,
conflict resolution (courts), and a host of other public-sector activities
concerning which some imagination may be required to discover actual
nondivisibility.
Welfare prescriptions related to the public-goods problem may reflect
the context in which it arises. For example, in the case of shirking, all losses
(suboptimal production levels) are internalized to the particular firm.
Furthermore, external market forces discipline firms that fail to resolve
these problems but reward firms that succeed. Hence, public policy should
encourage or at least not hinder a firm's internal ability to monitor, sanction,
and reward, and should encourage or at least not hinder the workings of
external market forces that discipline or reward individual firms.
In the case of chiseling, the formation of cartel-output agreements may
impose a welfare loss on those consuming the cartel's output. In keeping
with welfare theory, public policy should make efforts to cartelize difficult or
at least should not encourage or require cartelization in specific industries,
as commonly occurs with regulation. Stated differently, some public-goods
problems, such as chiseling, may be resolved to the benefit of those affected
by them, but to the detriment of others. Welfare theory tries to distinguish
among such opposed claimants by ascertaining under which conditions
wealth-usually measured as the sum of consumers' and producers'
surplus-will be maximized.
The free-rider problem associated with labor-union activity probably
falls more comfortably under the heading of redistribution, which we
consider momentarily. More generally, public goods, such as national
defense and public peace, or potentially private goods, such as highways and
school systems, which are offered free, and therefore are made nondivisible
by legislative fiat, are created by the usual taxing and spending mechanisms.
Public policy should distinguish the efficient level at which to produce such
goods (provided that they should be produced at all), and should encourage
cost-effective means of production.
Public Bads. Public bads, or external diseconornies (sometimes called
externalities or external costs), are simply the reverse phenomenon of
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public goods. Indeed, a mere linguistic expedient makes them equivalent.
For example, consider a common waterway that adjacent residents pollute
at a constant rate. Their effluent reduces the waterway's suitability for
other uses, such as recreation or as a source of drinking water. If a
particular person unilaterally filtered and purified the water or installed
purification elements on each effluent source, then the waterway's improved quality would be a public good for all adjacent residents. Their
effluents into the waterway are equivalent to the production of a public bad,
an external diseconomy. The failure to specify a property right in the purity
of water, or the technical inability to specify such a right in the case of a
common resource such as a lake, waterway, or ambient air, makes the
formation of a market in suppressing the external diseconomy, or in
producing the condition that occurs in its absence, difficult or impossible.
Philosophers sometimes distinguish between acts of omission and acts
of commission, to point out the differences between positive and negative
acts and obligations. But in the argot of public goods and bads, no such
distinction occurs. A citizen who fails to produce a desirable public good or
fails to contribute to its production is said to produce a public bad, and one
who fails to produce a public bad, even though it would have been
individually beneficial for him to produce that bad, thereby produces a public
good. Thus, srurkers, chiselers, and free riders are equivalent to producers
of public bads.
Properly Rights. The traditional notion of property rights concerns
those situations in which the common law, statute law, or administrative
rule making (regulation) create legally defensible but sometimes limited
rights to acquire and alienate tangible and intangible assets. The propertyrights problem, however, is actually one of public goods and public bads. For
example, one form of property right is the right to be compensated for the
benefits that one's actions or the use of one's assets bestows on others. If
an institutional arrangement could guarantee such a right, then the publicgoods problem would be solved. By a similar reasoning, a property right
may also contemplate the right to be compensated for the damage that
others' actions impose on us, the right to avoid such damage, or the right to
contract explicitly to accept it for a mutually agreeable payment. An
institutional arrangement that incorporated responses to such damage, if
optimally constructed, would solve the public-bads problem.
The logical equivalence of the property-rights problem and the public
goods-public bads problem has not always been explicitly drawn, although it
is now widely recognized. A brief example illustrates the nature of the
identity but also underscores the importance of property rights as a subject
matter sui generis. That example concerns the allocation of rights to
broadcast frequencies, which vest property rights in the recipients (Coase,
94

PUBLIC AND PRNATE INTEREST AND POLITY

1959, 1962). This practice, carried on partially today by administrative rule
making through the Federal Communications Commission, is rationalized by
the expectation that in the absence of legally defensible property rights, a
degradation in the value of a common resource pool-the radio frequency
spectrum-would result. Naturally, a variety of possible patterns of rights to
spectrum use might be adopted, only a subset of which would maximize the
spectrum's value (Coase, 1959; Posner, 1977).
Contemporary property-rights theory 22 now goes far beyond the
traditional concerns of regulation to embrace problems such as job tenure
(Alchian, 1959; de Alessi, 1974b; Martin, 1972, 1977), industrial organization and corporate governance (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Coase, 1937;
de Alessi, 1973; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Klein, Crawford, and Alchian,
1978; Manne, 1965; Williamson, 1964), incentives structures within bureaucracies (Ahlbrandt, 1973a; Davies, 1971; de Alessi, 1974a; Lindsay,
1976; Niskanen, 1971; Tullock, 1965), and common ownership and usufruct
rights with implications for cultural and economic anthropology (Anderson
and Hill, 1975; Clark, 1973; Demsetz, 1967; Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968;
Libecap, 1978; Libecap and Johnson, 1980; Posner, 1980; Smith, 1969;
Trosper, 1978; Umbeck, 1977). In each instance, a property right or
economic practice emerges (or fails to emerge) to resolve a problem of
external economies or diseconomies, given the prior structure of rights.
Redistribution. The goal of wealth or income redistribution as a
welfare-based function of the state is the subject of serious dispute. The
theoretical justification for redistribution partly follows lines identical to
those that support the public production (suppression) of public goods
(bads). For example, in its utilitarian aspects, redistribution is a putative
source of political stability (Brennan, 1973), public peace, and insurance
(Rawls, 1971). But the more traditional theoretical justification for redistribution relies on two less practical and more esoteric grounds.
First, redistribution may rest on the assumption of diminishing marginal
utility for money (Blum and Kalven, 1953; Stuart, 1967). In this view, a
wealthy person loses less utility than a poor person gains by the redistribution from rich to poor. Therefore, an aggregate welfare function would be
maximized if everyone's wealth became equal. This justification accords
with the second variant of welfare theory but not the first. Certain authors,
however, have developed variations on this theme. Their implied constitution would guarantee that a collectivity's least-well-off persons would
benefit from any change in public policy (Rawls, 1971) and that any welfare
gains from redistribution would not be offset by the amount by which total
production falls because of a loss of incentive (Thurow, 1977).
This justification for redistribution may have some positive content
(Meltzer and Richard, 1981, 1983), although in its pure second variant
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(social-welfare function) form the concept has no generally accepted
scientific credentials. Nevertheless, redistribution may have some appeal in
the constitutional variant of welfare theory. That is, behind a "veil of
ignorance," people might unanimously agree ex ante on some kind of
redistribution. Even so, this justification for redistribution is not without
serious problems.
The more general argument supporting redistribution is consonant with
a public-goods claim (Hochman and Rogers, 1969; von Furstenberg and
Mueller, 1971). The outlines of this argument observe the existence of
interdependent utility functions , those in which A's utility depends on B's
consumption (or perhaps on B's utility, if it is believed to be measurable). If
A's utility were solely dependent upon the amount of B's consumption
accounted for by A's contribution, then no problem would emerge, because
the returns to A's philanthropy would be a divisible benefit, flowing entirely
to A. But if A's utility depended on B's consumption generally, including
that part of B's consumption that C contributed, then a problem emerges. If
C contributes to B, thus increasing B's consumption, then that increased
consumption is a public good for A. In a society of such contributors, in
which each gains some positive marginal utility from his own consumption,
the free-rider problem is quite general, and the state might be called upon to
redistribute coercively.
Monopoly. The monopoly issue today is hotly disputed as a scientific
problem. The classic welfare argument concerning monopoly 23 held that by
operating over the entire industry-wide demand schedule, a monopolistic
firm that maximized profits would produce less output and at higher unit cost
than would a competitive firm facing a horizontal demand schedule (i.e., a
fixed competitive price). A deadweight loss was said to result, because the
sum of consumers' and producers' surpluses would be less than would
prevail in a pure competitive market.
Until recently the literature on monopoly and monopolistic practices
displayed a curious intellectual asymmetry. Scholars generally set the pure
competitive market up as an ideal, found small theoretical perturbations
from that ideal, linked those perturbations with real-world practices, and
then recommended public-sector intervention to cure the defect. The same
treatment was never accorded to the pure monopoly model, however, even
though it seems far more susceptible to such a treatment than does the pure
competitive model. For example, a pure monopoly model contemplates
substantial barriers to entry and little product substitution, although those
conditions are almost never met in the real world (Baumol, 1982).
Current scholarship (see note 1 of this chapter) now makes plain that
this model of monopoly is far less robust than the pure competitive model,
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when robustness is measured as the degree to which the assumptions of the
model can be violated by the respective markets without materially changing
the outcomes. Many practices once thought to be monopolistic are now
deemed highly competitive, because they lower unit production costs. For
example, industrial-organization scholars seldom interpret vertical integration today as a respectable subject for antitrust prosecution, because
vertical integration reduces or eliminates certain costs that consumers
otherwise would have to bear (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978).
Similarly, practices such as base-point pricing (Haddock, 1982), once
regarded as indisputable evidence of conspiracies, are now interpreted as
evidence of competitive markets. Theories of predation, likewise, no longer
are regarded as intellectually respectable (Elzinga, 1970; Koller, 1971;
McGee, 1958), and they have joined in the academic dust heap such
outdated justifications for prosecution as administered prices (Alchian,
1970; Stigler, 1962; Stigler and Kindahl, 1970, 1973) and high industry
concentration (Brozen, 1970, 1971b, 1971a; Demsetz, 1973b; McGee,
1971) as per se violations of antitrust laws.
The pure monopoly model has been linked with the public-goods
problem, especially concerning natural monopolies, those firms that dominate a market and enjoy globally diminishing long-run average total cost
curves, such as certain public utilities (Lerner, 1964). The connection
occurs because a correctly designed public policy theoretically will increase
the sum of consumer and producer surplus, and therefore social welfare.
The particular public-goods application to the natural monopoly problem
arises because as additional people consume additional units of the good that
the natural monopoly produces, the average unit cost of production
declines. Hence, new consumers effectively reduce the unit cost to prior
consumers. This interpretation of the monopoly problem as a public-goods
problem is obviously strained and tends to empty both the concept of
monopoly and that of public goods of their assertorial power (Buchanan,
1971).
The principal problem remaining with monopoly and monopolistic
practices concerns whether the problems cited belong to the first class of
departures from the pure competitive model, those that are self-correcting
in the marketplace, or to the second class, those that are not. Contemporary scholarship increasingly assigns these problems to the first class. Of
course, the manner of correction remains in dispute. For example, there is
evidence that price regulation of natural monopolies has no effect (Stigler
and Freidland, 1962). And a better result may derive from auctioning off
monopoly rights to private producers than from regulation (Demsetz, 1968).
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The presence of at least one of these five problems is a necessary
condition for welfare-regarding state action, but none of these five problems
comprehends a sufficient condition for state action, although each is often
treated as sufficient. Some of the most important recent work in public
choice seeks to provide boundaries on social choice by ascertaining under
what conditions each of these problems might find a welfare-regarding
improvement through state action. The general lines of research identify
three broad categories of boundaries. These concern the relative benefits
and costs of state action, the appropriate method, and the appropriate
jurisdiction.
Benefits and Costs. The absence or suboptimal supply of a potential
public good does not by itself compel a public-sector solution in the form of
public production or a subsidy of the production of a public good. There is an
infinite variety of potential public goods or bads that clearly should not
engage public-sector solutions, if only because the opportunity costs of state
action exceed any possible benefits. A national program to eradicate acne is
probably an example of such a public good.
The cost-benefit calculation recommending for or against state action is
far more complex than simple accounting, however, and we can usefully
approach the problem of computation by considering ex ante versus ex post
welfare judgments. The computation problem is especially severe in the
area of regulation. Congressional enactments concerning regulation have
increasingly incorporated the requirements that cost-benefit analyses be
performed and that only those programs whose benefits exceed their costs
be adopted. One problem with such an approach concerns the inherent
inability of a centralized decision mechanism, such as a regulatory commission, to calculate all of the costs and benefits, as well as all of the
postregulatory reactions, that might occur because of a certain regulation.
One useful way to look at this problem is to decide whether or not a
particular '' market failure' ' can be corrected in a secondary market or
whether it is privately irreparable. If we have theoretical reasons to believe
that a secondary market or subsequent producer or consumer choice will
resolve the putative market failure, then we should expect the marketplace
to produce the requisite solution. But suppose that it does not and that the
regulatory commission calculates the benefits of its solution to exceed the
costs. Such a computation does not yet justify public-sector action.
The reasons for this demurrer are complex but worth rehearsing. One
of the earliest criticisms of central economic planning, and one not yet
turned aside, is that decision makers out of the marketplace and in a
centralized information-collection and -processing position cannot calculate
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relative prices and marginal rates of substitution in the manner of the
decentralized marketplace. Such people do not enjoy what Hayek calls the
special knowledge of the circumstances of time and place (1945), nor can
they work out the individual price-quantity ratios based on the individual
utilities and marginal rates of substitution of all producers and consumers in
the marketplace. The market can solve this calculation problem, however,
and therefore, ceteris paribus, the market's allocations will be superior to
those made by central planners.
This result has a direct translation concerning public regulation of the
marketplace to correct a public-good, or public-bad, problem. The legislature or administrative agency cannot possibly replicate each consumer's
marginal rates of substitution and each producer's combinations of production costs and reaction to uncertainty. Therefore, without compelling
evidence that a putative instance of market failure is not correctable in the
market itself, there is no welfare justification for state action. That is, the
information in the marketplace has already judged that its contemplated
market-correcting action has costs that exceed the benefits. Otherwise,
some producer would have undertaken it. But even if the problem is not
correctable in the marketplace, there remains no sufficient condition for a
public-sector response, because its costs still might exceed its benefits.
The problem of ex post versus ex ante calculation of costs and benefits
still remains. That is, we must judge state actions against the constitutional
conditions that made such actions possible. Stated differently, the perceived
costs and benefits of various actions will change, depending on whether
their calculation is made ex ante or ex post. For instance, ex ante we might
judge that the aggregate costs of allowing prior restraints on freedom of the
press exceed the aggregate benefits, although surely, external diseconomies flow from the exercise of that freedom. But ex post we might decide
to ban pornography, or the publication of national defense secrets, or
libelous utterances. Ex ante we might judge that the costs of prohibitions on
religious practices exceed the benefits. But ex post we might decide to ban
polygamy or liquor sales on Sunday. Such a distinction suggests that a state
action taken following a prudential ex post judgment might seriously weaken
a Pareto-preferred general rule adopted ex ante, which must be constantly
protected for it to survive.
Finally, state action must contemplate its object with care. Certain
public-goods problems should not be resolved in the public sector, because
they are collective to a particular group but are not truly ''public.'' That is,
their resolution might benefit a few to the detriment of many. For instance,
in the case of shirking, a clear public-goods problem, all losses are
internalized to the firm experiencing problems (suboptimal monitoring
levels, and therefore, effort). Furthermore, external market forces do
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discipline firms that fail to resolve these problems and reward firms that
succeed. Hence, public policies should encourage, or at least not hinder, a
firm's internal ability to monitor, sanction, and reward, and should encourage, or at least not hinder, the workings of external market forces in
disciplining and rewarding individual firms. That is, agents in the public
sector probably should not concern themselves with the ' 'small' ' publicgoods problem of private-sector shirking, which occurs in every firm. The
problem has a marketplace solution, and the public sector has no way to
collect the requisite information to find it.
In the case of chiseling, the formation of cartel-output agreements may
impose a welfare loss on consumers of the cartel's output. In keeping with
welfare theory, public policies should make efforts to cartelize difficult, or at
least should not encourage or require cartelization in specific industries.
Stated differently, some public-goods problems may be resolved to the
benefit of those affected by them but to the detriment of others. 24 Welfare
theory tries to distinguish among such opposed claimants by ascertaining
under which conditions resources will be most efficiently used.
Methods of State Action. The four principal methods of state action are
governance by common law, by statute, by regulation, and by public
incorporation. The welfare consequences attending each of these methods
differ from the others and from problem to problem, and therefore we
review each method separately.
Social scientists are largely uninformed about governance by common
law. Most economists and political scientists regard a market without formal
statutory or regulatory-agency control as a variety of anarchy. Even the
most laissez-faire economies, however, have gone far beyond anarchical
structures, 25 replacing them with a system of common law, or judge-made
law. The regulatory aspects of the common law are seldom appreciated.
Yet, recent research indicates that common-law processes can create
dynamically efficient rules of liability for governing the areas of contracts,
property, and torts (Posner, 1977; Rubin, 1977; Priest, 1977; Goodman,
1978; journal of Legal Studies, 1979, 1980; Calabressi, 1970). It is not clear
when an economy does (or should) move from anarchic structures to a
system of laws. Property-rights theory (Aranson, 1974; Demsetz, 1967;
Carneiro, 1970) suggests, however, that this change might (or should)
occur when a common resource is overused, provided that the cost of the
legal system itself does not overcome the benefits of divisibility or liability
assignment created in law.
The efficiency of the common law rests on participants' ability to
bargain, to transact, and, at a reasonable cost, to monitor compliance with
the terms of a contract or a legal duty. For example, a rule governing
easements in property law might state the conditions under which one
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person has a right to use or pass over another's property without
committing a trespass. 26 The efficient operation of this rule requires that the
property owner, at low cost, can monitor use of the easement to see that its
terms are not exceeded, can identify trespassers, and can alienate his
property rights, if they are protected by a common-law rule of easements,
in a bilateral negotiation with another party, which enlarges the terms of the
easement. Similar conditions apply to the person owning the easement
right, including his abilit)i to alienate that right back to the property owner. 27
A straightforward application of simple price theory to the nexus of
common-law rules and property rights provides additional boundaries on
social choice. For example, consider a limited externality, such as that
created by a rock group that practices in a residential basement, disturbing a
cellist who practices quietly in a nearby home. The common law gives to the
property owner, in this case the cellist, the right to a "quiet enjoyment" of
his property. So, the cellist can enforce that right against the rock group. If
the rock group wants to continue to practice, it must pay the cellist not to
enforce his right. If it does so, then it must place a higher value on this
arrangement than the cellist places on his quiet; otherwise, not. But if the
common law gives a property right to the rock group to practice at its will,
then the cellist must pay for quiet, which he will do if he values it more than
the group values its right to practice in the basement. With either allocation
of rights, the resource-in this instance the "use" of the "ether" for a
configuration of sound waves-flows to its higher-valued use. That is, with
any initial allocation of rights, with alienability of those rights, and with low
transactions costs, the result is efficient. This much we know from the
Coase Theorem (Coase, 1960).
Two boundaries on social choice grow out of this general principle.
First, neither statute law, nor regulation, nor governance by public
incorporation will resolve such externalities as efficiently as will the common
law. Common-law rules ordinarily will allocate the right to the party to which
it would flow most of the time as a result of explicit negotiations and will
allow for contracting the right away, alienating it, if the parties can mutually
gain from exchange. For reasons identical to those that give decentralized
markets an advantage over central planning, other forms of governance
cannot achieve the common law's level of dynamic efficiency in such cases.
Therefore, governance by common law enjoys a putative superiority over
other forms of governance. Second, legislatures and regulatory agencies
will try constantly to overturn prior contractual agreements made under
common-law rules, but such attempts should be thwarted in the view of
welfare theory, because, inter alia, they make future agreements less
valuable and thus more difficult to transact. 28
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Agreements to accept an external cost eventually may be challenged in
the courts, legislatures, and commissions in cases involving far subtler
arrangements. For instance, a rock quarry may have operated in an
uninhabited area, which is subsequently built up as a residential neighborhood. Presumably, home buyers sorted themselves out, so that those who
did not value dust-free environs quite so highly bought homes in such a place
for the reduced price that sellers usually could demand for their property.
That is, these buyers '' came to the nuisance, '' and courts at law at one time
followed precedent by not recognizing claims that the nuisance must cease
operations, 29 although that doctrine has been breached in recent years. The
successful prosecution of such a suit or its legislative or regulatory
equivalent would bestow a windfall gain on the home owners and a windfall
loss on the quarry owners. The long-run effects of clouding or reversing the
coming-to.. the-nuisance doctrine would be a reduction in both quarrying and
home building in such areas, a Pareto-inferior result.
But suppose that home owners eventually come to value dust-free
environs and would be willing to pay the quarry owners more than the net
present value of the owners' income stream, to suspend or diminish
operations. The common law allows such a result, but transactions costs
brought about by a freewrider problem among the (many) home owners may
make its execution difficult or impossible. Common-law rulings might
facilitate such transactions, but their completion often requires the forn1ation of some kind of sovereign body. 30 That is, in such cases the
assumptions underlying the efficient operation of common-law rules are
materially violated.
There are other instances in which these assumptions cannot be met.
For example, common-law rules might interpret air pollution as a nuisance
or a trespass. But with thousands, perhaps millions, of individual pollution
emitters and receptors in a relevant ''market,'' the calculation problem and
costs inherent in forming transactions and monitoring compliance are
overwhelming. Thus, there may be a welfare justification for moving from a
common-law regime to one of statute law. This justification assumes that
the benefits that such a statute entails exceed the costs. The costs of
statute-law rules, however, may exceed those of common-law rules, even
when they contemplate the same outcomes. In particular, the central
characteristic that separates statute law from common law (although this
characteristic need not apply universally) is that under statute law, those
who enjoy rights cannot alienate them. Statute law solves an extemality
problem by making it impossible for those protected to alienate their rights,
or for those who must bear an obligation to contract out of it.
This characteristic of statute law rides roughshod over individual
preferences and therefore makes it more costly to apply than common law.
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But it is also the reason for its use. Its advantages grow out of the nature of
the externality involved as well as the high level of transactions cost. For
instance, A may sell to a factory the right to pollute the ambient air around
his home and property. But it is difficult to assemble all other home owners
to agree to A's transaction with the factory. The assembly problem cuts in
two directions. First, if A makes such a transaction, then the factory will
almost certainly pollute the ambient air of B and C, whose assembly in large
numbers for purposes of bargaining and transacting is costly. But if A and B
make a transaction with the factory, then C, whose consent may also be
required, might hold out for the entire surplus that the contracting parties
gain from the transaction.
If an exchange involving A, B, C, and the factory were desirable in the
absence of transactions costs, then a statute that specified duties among all
participants might avoid these two problems of transacting. The statutory
result cannot replicate the participants' individual preferences as they would
be worked out in a market for rights that did not have the externalities
involving A's contract with the factory, C's monopoly power, or the high
transactions costs of bargaining and contracting with large numbers of
people. But the statute may work a rough justice among the participants.
The balancing tests involved in choosing between a common-law order and a
statutory regime now seem apparent, although in practice, actual calculations based on a welfare-regarding model may be quite difficult or theoretically impossible to perform in all but the most extremely simple cases.
Governance by regulation, pursuant to statutory authorization, combines elements of both common~law and statutory governance. It is like
governance by statute, because most regulatory agencies function as
legislative bodies. It is like governance by common law, because most
regulatory agencies also perform judicial functions in their specialized areas.
The welfare-related justifications for adopting governance by regulation
involve those that justify governance by statute and in addition rest on the
desirability of flexibility, expertise, permanence, and the perceived inability
of legislatures to engage in administrative tedium. In other words, governance by regulation is justified by amplification of the legislature (Posner,
1982; Aranson, Gellhorn, and Robinson, 1982) and, some would argue, by
an intellectual structure that prefers public administration over political
disposition. 31 We shall find, however, that the animus of governance by
regulation generates out of motives having little or no connection with
improving the legislature's ability to form welfare-regarding statutes.
Within the category of governance by regulation, there are several
possible modalities. The most prominent is command-and-control regulations, under which legislators or regulators set standards that private-sector
producers must satisfy. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency
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may set maximum discharge rates for pollutants from particular factories.
Under a prescriptive election model to be described in the next section, this
method presumably replicates the environmental-quality preferences of the
electorate's median member. An alternative procedure is the use of effluent
charges, which try to "cost" environmental damage by replicating market
forces and the result that would emerge from a common-law process
without transactions costs. While most economists prefer effluent charges
to command-and-control regulation, there is growing interest in marketable
pollution rights and "offset" and "bubble" procedures. These policies
combine the notion of standards and an optimum level of environmental
quality with an entitlement for producers to buy and sell rights to pollute up
to that level, so that for any mandated level of use of the environment as a
sink, rights would flow to their most highly valued uses.
Governance by common law, statute, and regulation all involve situations in which private action remains private, but the incentives and
alternatives that participants face are shaped by rules emanating from the
public sector. Governance by public incorporation involves the public
adoption of the private activities involved to form a public enterprise, such
as the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, or the Post
Office Department.
Welfare economics provides no clear, nonideological theory concerning
the choice between other forms of governance and public incorporation.
Rudiments of such a theory appear from time to time in observations that
the costs of regulating private action may exceed those of a simple
integration of the scrutinized activity into the public sector. For example,
Henry Simons believed that natural monopolies could not be successfully
regulated, and so he proposed to make them collective (Simons, 1935;
Stigler, 1974). Certain other activities, such as national defense and the
police power, appear to require a decision-making finality that only governance by public incorporation can achieve. Other state functions, however,
such as the railroads and postal and lighthouse services (Coase, 1974),
probably can be supplied more efficiently in the private sector. Questions of
public- versus private-sector supply form the core of many public-policy
debates of both an economic and ideological nature . But as we shall see, as
with decisions to regulate, the decisions eventually taken for public
incorporation have very little to do with the positive economic substance of
those debates, inter alia, because they seldom enjoy a complete accounting
of benefits and costs.
These categories of methods of governance need not be exclusive. For
example, public policy may leave a particular economic activity largely
unregulated except for applicable common-law rules of liability. At the same
time, very closely related or identical activities somehow (only) distin104
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guished in the contemplation of law may be subject to statutory constraints,
regulation, and even public incorporation. Mail and package delivery is an
example. The post office delivers first-class mail, packages, bulk mail, and
some express mail. Certain of these functions are carried on in regulated
sectors (e.g., airline package deliveries and Federal Express) and in
unregulated sectors (e.g., local courier services). Supplying public peace is
similarly carried on by public incorporation (e.g., police departments), in
regulated markets (e.g., licensed detectives), and in unregulated ones
(e.g., unlicensed investigators and suppliers of small weapons and burglaralarm systems). The legislature, regulatory agencies, and the courts may
differ concerning the extent to which they will allow this simultaneous
activity or will require that one activity preempt another. 32
Jurisdiction. The final boundary on social choice concerns jurisdiction.
While this is a more substantial decision problem in a federal state such as
the United States than in a unitary state such as Great Britain, nevertheless, to some extent, all polities decentralize both bureaucratic and
legislative decision making. The problem of jurisdictions presents something
of a conceptual muddle. Managerial theory has been developed that
suggests the method and optimal degree of decentralization for privatesector activities (Chandler, 1962; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Coase, 1937;
Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978). Devolution may prevail both as to the
extent of geographical territory covered and the degree of functional
separation and independence within the firm. To some extent, such privatesector models of firm centralization and decentralization carry forward into
public-sector bureaucracies, legislatures, and courts. The problems inherent in producing public goods and suppressing public bads, however, make it
plain that the signaling capacity of price and the market for corporate control
do not operate effectively in the public sector, to give decision makers
appropriate incentives concerning organizational structure. Hence, those
sentences that we might utter about the optimal degree of decentralization
and the appropriate jurisdiction for various public-sector tasks remain
largely precatory.
Abstractly considered, we might ask that the optimal jurisdiction for
internalizing an extemality, say, would be no larger than the area that the
externality affects. For certain kinds of external economies and dis economies, this recommendation seems appropriate. 33 For example, if anyone,
voters in Wisconsin probably should control the environmental quality of
Wisconsin lakes, not voters in Maine or Tennessee. Similarly, chemicalwaste dumps would seem to be an appropriate object of state and local
control, not federal regulation. A limitation of state action and decision
making to the smallest jurisdiction possible (the area over which the
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extemality from a particular source is spread) makes sense, because local
political mechanisms are more sensitive to citizens' preferences than are
regional or national ones34 and because the granting of rights to voters in
state A to regulate some aspect of life in state B raises the possibility of very
serious and untoward strategic consequences. 35
This recommendation has qualifications, however. For example, a
crackdown on burglars in Kansas City, Kansas, will increase the burglary
rate in Kansas City, Missouri. And polluters who face stringent controls in
one state may move to states that exercise less-pervasive environmentalquality regulations. (Indeed, a consideration of market forces would predict
and approve of such a result.) Thus, one state's decision to weaken or
strengthen the costs that it imposes on a particular activity may produce a
public good or a public bad for some other state. While many of these
interactive problems are merely transitional, we must acknowledge their
nature as jurisdictional external economies and diseconomies.
The most intriguing possibility in decentralization concerns the use of
state and local control as a surrogate for marketlike competition. This
notion, explicated most notably by Tiebout, 36 concentrates on the problem
of preference revelation in markets for public goods. Tiebout hypothesized
that competition among a large number of decentralized polities (separate
sovereignties) would lead to an optimal price and supply of public goods,
insofar as scale economies do not constrain decentralization. This result
would solve Samuelson's problem, that a unique producer of public goods
could not identify an optimal price (Samuelson, 1954), as well as Olson's
problem, that such a producer also could not discern a correct level of
supply for such goods (Olson, 1972).
The problem of jurisdictions, like the problem of methods of governance, does not provide for exclusive categories. Various state functions may
be carried on at all levels of government, with a rich menu of combinations
and permutations of jurisdictional control. Furthermore, various levels of
government may use different methods of governance to address the same
problem. For example, the governance of banking is carried on at the
federal level by public incorporation (e.g., Federal Reserve banks), by
regulation (e.g., the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board), and by statute (e.g., the McFadden Act of 1927).
At the same time, only one state (North Dakota) owns a bank, but most
states govern banking by regulatory commission, statute, and certainly by
common law (e.g., the law of contracts and frauds). Each possible
combination and permutation of jurisdictional control and method of governance results in a conceptually different distribution of costs and benefits and
level of productivity.
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ANOMIC ELECTORATES AND ORGANIZED GROUPS
The preceding section reviews justifications for state action, methods
of governance, and problems of optimal jurisdiction. We may summarize the
matter thus. First, any state action must rely for a welfare-theory
justification on the presence of utility interdependencies such as occur with
problems with public goods and bads, property rights, monopoly, and
redistribution.
Second, state action should not contemplate intervention in all cases in
which one or another of these problems is present: (1) costs of state action
may exceed benefits; (2) the problem may elicit the beneficial development
of subsequent markets and other appropriate reactions in the private sector;
(3) a problem may not be truly ''public,'' because its public-sector solution
would aid only a limited collection of persons at the expense of everyone
else; and (4) the situation in which the problem exists may have been the
efficient result of an explicit contract or agreement that anticipated the
problem's persistence in exchange for compensation.
Third, the method of governance should correspond to the nature and
extent of the specific utility interdependence. For the largest numbers of
such interdependencies, involving rules governing ordinary torts, contracts,
and property disputes, governance by common law would seem most
appropriate, and the imposition of other forms of governance would create
welfare-degrading, Pareto-inferior outcomes. Increases in transactions
costs or monitoring costs would signal the possibility that a more nearly
uniform approach, such as governance by statute law, may be desirable.
Governance by administrative agency would seem appropriate in the
presence of a potential decisional tedium. Governance by public incorporation would only occur in those instances in which the external and decision
costs of any private action would seem intolerable.
Finally, with suitable modifications to allow for secondary external
effects, the appropriate extent of jurisdiction should cover no more than the
population over which the utility interdependence prevails. Of course, no
matter which problem is involved or which manner of governance or
jurisdiction is chosen, welfare theory would insist that only cost-effective
(technologically efficient) public policies should be adopted.
THE ELECTORATE AND PUBLIC POLICY

The development of a welfare-regarding theory of public-sector action
takes as its benchmark the operation of a perfectly functioning, competitive
marketplace. It then identifies various classes of situations in which the
allocations in the marketplace seem inferior to those allocations that
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theoretically might be achievable under different institutional arrangements.
Were the analysis to end there, we might suppose that the public sector
effortlessly, costlessly, optimally, and appropriately achieves these putatively superior allocations and therefore the corpus of welfare theory might
find application in the service of political advocacy. Plainly, however, the
analysis cannot end there, because human nature and decision making
remain invariant between the private and public sectors; and therefore, as
the rest of this essay demonstrates, the public sector is subject to all of the
"imperfections" that welfare theory finds operating in the private sector.
The possibility of public-sector failure seems magnified beyond the
limits of private-sector failure, however, because of the larger numbers of
connections that successfully must prevail for the public sector to act in a
welfare-regarding manner. There are at least five major connections. First,
there must be an undistorted link between citizens' welfare and their
political preferences. Second, a similar nexus must hold between those
preferences and election outcomes. Third, election outcomes must bear an
appropriate relationship to legislative outcomes. Fourth, legislative outcomes correctly must direct bureaucratic outcomes in implementation.
Fifth, and to close the circle, bureaucratic outcomes must not contain within
them the kinds of public-policy perversities that diminish citizens' welfare.
We begin our discussion of public-sector failure by concentrating on the
connection between citizens' preferences and election outcomes, assuming
that all of the other connections are correctly drawn. Here, we first describe
the simple underlying model that connects those preferences for the
production of various levels of public goods to election outcomes. Second,
we review the argument that public goods may be undersupplied in the
public sector. Third, we review a parallel argument that such goods may be
oversupplied. Finally, we identify sources of instability in the model, leading
us to doubt the robustness of the electoral process as a method of
converting citizens' preferences into the production of correct levels of
public goods.
Spatial Model in Public Goods. The basic election model for the
provision of public goods found its roots in a spatial location theory,
developed a half-century ago (Hotelling, 1929; Smithies, 1941). Bowen
(1943) first formulated the model in a political context, and Downs (1957)
gave the model its fullest verbal elaboration. Subsequent developments37
since Downs have brought the model to a high level of complexity
susceptible to empirical testing (Enelow and Hinich, 1982; Aldrich and
McKelvey, 1977; Rusk and Weisberg, 1972; Weisberg and Rusk, 1970;
Page and Brody, 1972; Cahoon, Hinich, and Ordeshook, 1978; Hinich,
1978; Rabinowitz, 1978). Here, we consider the model in its simplest form.
Suppose that there is some public good that the public sector might produce
1
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in continuously adjustable levels, from zero to a very high level beyond
anyone's preference. The dimension that measures the level of production
is the "space" over which citizens form preferences and candidates
compete for their votes.
Figure 4.la depicts a possible representation of a citizen's utility
function (evaluation) of different production levels of this public good. In the
figure, the horizontal axis measures x, the level at which the public good will
be produced. The vertical axis measures B(x), the citizen's benefit from
various production levels, and C(x), the citizen's cost for those production
levels. Under the usual microeconomic assumptions, B(x) is marginally
diminishing and C(x), marginally increasing, with x. The citizen's most
preferred level of production occurs at x*, which is simultaneously the point
at which the difference between costs and benefits is greatest, the slopes of
the two curves, C(x) and B(x), are equal, and marginal cost equals marginal
benefit. Figure 4.lb depicts another way to illustrate the same properties.
Here, we define a new variable, U(x) = B(x)- C(x), measured on the
vertical axis, which is the citizen's utility for various levels of production of
FIGURE 4.la
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the public good. Again, x* identifies the citizen's most preferred production
level for this public good.
The basic spatial model's problem is to identify the position on the
dimension that a candidate will adopt as a platform (strategy) and that will
subsequently win the election. To motivate the discussion, suppose that
there are: (1) the citizen who most prefers x*; (2) a citizen like the one
whose utility function is shown in figure 4.lb, but whose benefit and cost
curves are such that he prefers a lower production level of this public good;
and (3) a similar citizen who prefers a higher level than x*. If these three
citizens make up the entire electorate, if all of them will vote in an election
on this issue alone, and if two candidates compete by advocating various
positions along this issue space, then the median citizen's most preferred
position, x*, defeats all other positions. Therefore, we expect candidates to
converge to this position.
Today, this model finds its principal use to describe real election
processes. But the model also enjoys a normative aspect. For instance,
Bowen (1943) shows that under conditions similar to those offered here,
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such an election would produce the public good at a level that maximized
economic welfare. Similarly, Hinich and Ordeshook (1969) have used a fairly
weak form of welfare comparisons, imposing symmetry, to demonstrate
that this election process might also maximize social welfare.
Simple Elections and Social Imbalance. Eventually, we shall reject
many aspects of this model as a description of public-policy formation.
Several scholars have developed extensions and criticisms of the model,
however, which accept it on its own terms but find sources of public~sector
failure within its structure. The first of these criticisms, which Galbraith
(1958) advanced in a different connection than the model contemplates,
holds that citizens underestimate the benefits of public-sector action,
leading to an underproduction of public goods. Galbraith views this underproduction as a consequence of a '' social imbalance. '' In his view, tastes for
private goods, such as automobiles and sporting goods, will accurately
reflect consumers' real costs and benefits. But the derived demand for
parallel public goods, really quasi-public goods, such as highways and public
parks, will be understated, inter alia because agents in the public sector lack
the ability and incentive to advertise. Galbraith explains:
Advertising operates exclusively ... on behalf of privately produced goods and services . . . . Automobile demand which is
expensively synthesized will inevitably have a much larger claim
on income than parks or public health or even roads where no such influence operates. The engines of mass communication . . . assail the
. . . community on behalf of more beer but not more schools. . . .
The competition is especially unequal for new products and
services. Every corner of the public psyche is canvassed by some
of the nation's most talented citizens to see if the desire for some
merchantable product can be cultivated. No similar process
operates on behalf of the nonmerchantable services of the state.
Indeed, while we take the cultivation of new private wants for
granted we would be measurably shocked to see it applied to
public services. The scientist or engineer or advertising man who
devotes himself to developing a new carburetor, cleaner, or
depilatory for which the public recognizes no need and will feel
none until an advertizing campaign arouses it, is one of the valued
members of our society. A politician or a public servant who
dreams up a new public service is a wastrel. Few public offenses
are more reprehensible. (1958:205)
Galbraith's explanation for the public-sector undersupply of public
goods actually is a special case of a more general explanation, which Downs
provides (1960). Downs argues that the benefits of many public goods ''are
remote from those who receive them, either in time, space, or comprehen111
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sibility" (1960:551). For example, foreign aid "may prevent a hostile
revolution . . . and save millions of dollars and even the lives of American
troops, but because the situation is so remote, the average citizen-living in
rational political ignorance-will not realize he is benefitting at all'' (1960:
551). Downs believes that other governmental programs, such as water
purification and various kinds of regulations, share the same problem of
remoteness, and therefore they will be undersupplied. Furthermore, in
Downs' s view, the benefits of many governmental actions seem uncertain,
because they ensure against the ravages of complex problems, which
themselves might never become manifest (1960:554). While Downs acknowledges that forces such as logrolling might create a tendency for the
public sector to grow too large, nevertheless he believes that, on balance,
the forces that lead to a suboptimal public-sector size probably predominate.
Figure 4.2a illustrates the effect of underestimating the benefits that
flow from the production of a given level of a public good. C(x) remains
unchanged in figure 4.2a from that depicted in figure 4.la. The benefit
curve, B(x), shifts downward, though, to B'(x), so that at every level
FIGURE 4.2a
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except zero, the citizen associates a lower benefit from the production of
this public good. The citizen's new most preferred position under this
downward revision is at x', which is to the left of and lower than x* .
Figure 4.2b shows the resulting utility function from the downward
shift of the benefit curve. Notice that the net benefits of producing the public
good are everywhere lower in figure 4.2b, compared with what they were in
figure 4.lb, and the citizen's most preferred level of production, compared
with that in figure 4.2a, has shifted to a lower level in figure 4.2b. If all three
citizens in the hypothetical election described earlier share in this reduced
perception of the benefits of this public good, so that the citizen whose
utility function is depicted in figure 4.2b remains the electorate's median
member, then the dominant election strategy-the equilibrium public policy
that candidates will advocate-similarly shifts to a lower level of public-good
production.
The social-imbalance hypothesis exhibits two fundamental weaknesses. The first is theoretical. Surely, a particular public good occasionally
might get lost in the confusion of complex elections, so that citizens
FIGURE 4.2b
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systematically underestimate its benefits. But the social-imbalance hypothesis must rest on the claim that large numbers of important public goods
share in this reduced estimation of benefits. Yet, this eventuality would be
such a large political imperfection that we would expect some counterforce
to arise. In particular, social-imbalance theorists fail to explain why some
candidate does not identify for the citizenry the full extent of its loss and
thereby win the election. And as we shall see, a more general theory
explains this failure; it similarly explains the nature of political advertising
that now exists.
The second weakness is empirical. The public sector probably generates as much advertising as does the private sector, and perhaps more.
First, political campaigning contains a large amount of advertising for
particular public-sector programs (Demsetz, 1970). Candidates wish to
identify themselves with their programs, and therefore campaigning and
public-policy advocacy often occur simultaneously. Second, particular governmental agencies, in their lobbying activities with respect to congressional
oversight, expend large amounts of money in preparing "information,"
which is really a public-sector form of advertising. Indeed, several executive-branch agencies have designated assistant secretaries or undersecretaries for congressional liaison who actually maintain offices on Capitol Hill.
The direct "consumers" of the agencies' products are agents of the
citizenry, but that observation in no way diminishes our estimates of the
extent of lobbying as advertising that actually occurs. Third, most government agencies do expend large amounts on advertising in that term's more
common usage (Clarkson and Tollison, 1979). The more general theoretical
perspective that we shall offer will explain both the presence of high levels
of public-sector advertising and the absence of advertising in favor of an
enlarged production of public goods.
The Fiscal Illusion and Public-sector Size. An alternative approach to
the problem of public-goods production concludes that such goods will be
oversupplied because of a fiscal illusion (Goetz, 1977; Wagner, 1976). The
fiscal-illusion hypothesis parallels the social-imbalance hypothesis, except
that with a fiscal illusion people fail to perceive the full cost of all public
programs, the real cost of particular programs, and the actual magnitude of
their total tax burden.
The mechanism for inducing an illusion may take many forms. For
example, many tax sources may be used, such as an income tax, a property
tax, a sales tax, and an excise tax, all of which are held at fairly low levels,
even though the total of taxes paid may represent a substantial proportion of
a citizen's income. Alternatively, a particular tax may be collected in several
small payments, as with periodic withholding of income taxes 0/an Wagstaff,
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1965) or payment of sales taxes at the time each purchase is made, again
leading the citizen to underestimate his total taxes. Levies such as the
corporate income tax are the most "hidden" taxes of all, because their
incidences are obscure and their payers exist only ''in the contemplation of
law" (Aranson, 1977).
The creation of a fiscal illusion has an inherent political logic. For
example, suppose that two election candidates are advocating identical
public-policy programs with identical benefits. The costs of the programs
may also be identical; but suppose that one candidate offers a tax plan based
on a fiscal illusion to finance the program, while the other candidate does
not. Presumably, the candidate who successfully induces the fiscal illusion
will defeat the candidate who is more forthright about tax costs .
Figure 4.3a illustrates the nature of the fiscal illusion. In the figure the
benefits from producing various levels of a public good are identical to those
shown in figure 4.la. Except at a zero level of production, however, the
costs of producing various levels of the public good are everywhere lower
than the associated costs in figure 4.la. Hence, the citizen's most preferred
FIGURE 4.3a
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position on the issue of producing this public good is higher than it would be
in figure 4.la. Figure 4.3b shows the resulting utility function from this
lowered-cost estimate. Again, the argument that prevailed in figure 4.2a
concerning underproduction prevails here concerning overproduction. The
citizen's utility function has shifted upward, and if the fiscal illusion similarly
affects all citizens, so that the citizen whose utility function is represented in
figure 4.3b remains the median voter, then the election's equilibrium
strategy shifts to a higher production level.
Social-imbalance theorists rest their claims concerning public-sector
spending, inter alia, on an argument that compares advertising in the public
and private sectors. Fiscal-illusion theorists make no such comparisons, and
therefore it is neither surprising nor evidently counterfactual to find that
private-sector producers also try to create something like a ' 'fiscal illusion' '
by such artifices as installment payments and layaway agreements. There
are few external costs to the use of such artifices in the private sector,
however, but the public sector encourages the production of external costs
to the extent that fiscal illusions occur.
FIGURE 4.3b
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The fiscal-illusion hypothesis nevertheless shares the same theoretical
weakness that afflicts the social-imbalance hypothesis. The pervasive use of
fiscal illusions to generate a greater-than-optimal level of public revenues
should call forth an election candidate to make the ruse plain. The failure of
such a candidate to emerge requires some explanation, especially since the
fiscal-illusion hypothesis enjoys more empirical validity than does the socialimbalance hypothesis. Both hypotheses point to an important governmental
failure, and later we shall explain that failure more generally, as well as its
particular applications to these hypotheses.
Absence of Electoral Equilibria. The final criticism of the simple model
of elections with public goods as issues concerns the absence of equilibrium
strategies that candidates might adopt. The absence of an electoral
equilibrium is not a criticism of the model itself. It merely indicates that in
certain situations the model might not predict what candidates will do, and
therefore it will fail to predict the actual public policies that emerge from the
electoral process. The absence of a prediction is itself a prediction, but we
cannot discern the welfare consequences of an inherently unstable political
mechanism, so judgments about the welfare properties of those mechanisms remain uncertain.
A simple example demonstrates the absence of an electoral equilibrium. 38 Suppose that three citizens, 1, 2, and 3, must vote on publicpolicy proposals x, y, and z. Citizen 1 prefers x toy and y to z; 2 prefers y to
z and z to x; and 3 prefers z to x and x toy. In pairwise majority voting, x
defeats y, y defeats z, and z defeats x, leading to a cyclical majority. Clearly,
if either candidate in a two-candidate election chooses any particular
strategy (x, or y, or z), then his opponent can always choose a strategy that
will defeat him.
The theoretical absence of equilibria has generated several hypotheses
concerning political responses. One hypothesis is that candidates avoid
advocating specific proposals by using a strategy of ambiguity (Shepsle,
1972b, 1972a; Page, 1976; Enelow and Hinich, 1981). But knowledge about
ambiguity in political platforms gains us nothlng for making judgments about
the welfare effects of the public sector. 39 Indeed, in itself, ambiguity
represents a breakdown in the connection between citizens' preferences
and candidates' election platforms.
A second alternative, but one that intervenes at the legislative stage,
concerns the possibility that lawmakers use the presence of intransitivities,
such as are found with cyclical majorities, to manipulate agendas to their
advantage (Gibbard, 1973; Levine and Plott, 1977; McKelvey, 1976; Riker,
1980, 1958). For example, in the pairwise voting example just described,
two pairwise votes are required. The motion presented for the first time in
the second vote will always emerge the winner. Knowing this property of
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intransitivities, the agenda controller can determine the election's outcome.
Again, however, the presence of agenda control can tell us nothing about
the welfare properties of the public policies that emerge from such
processes, unless we can identify the preferences of those in control.
We have no specific response to the problem of intransitivities within
the framework of this essay and its concerns. 40 Nevertheless, the general
problem of disequilibria in elections and in other political processes remains
troublesome for democratic theorists. We cannot comment on the virtues of
that which we cannot predict, and therefore, to the extent that intransitivities or indeterminacies remain in the electoral process, to that extent
social commentators at least stand mute.
PUBLIC POLICY AND POLITICAL GROUPS

The spatial theory of elections seeks to explain and predict the
existence and location of equilibria in publicly supplied public goods,
interpreted as election issues. Claims about the theory's empirical verisimilitude, though, must also confront the paradox: that most public-sector
programs in a representative democracy are inappropriate, or are carried on
at an inappropriate level, or are executed in an inappropriate manner. The
problems of social imbalance and fiscal illusion merely represent two special
cases of this larger paradox. Another way to state the matter is that the
public sector should supply an optimal level of particular public goods in the
correct jurisdiction using the proper production method. The spatial theory
of elections with public goods as issues contemplates such a result, at least
through the electoral process, and, by implication, through legislative,
executive, bureaucratic, and judicial actions consequent to preferences
revealed in elections. That such a result does not occur seems evident. That
particular or generalized movements toward such a result would themselves
represent the production of a public good also seems apparent. The failure
to create such movements in their general or particular manifestations
stands not simply as an indictment of representative democracy but also as a
potential claim that this explanatory model of representative democracy,
spatial-election theory, at least requires substantial modification and probably has omitted large portions of political reality that might otherwise
account for the perceived inadequacies.
The Political Advantage of Organized Groups. The central inadequacy
of the model and of earlier conceptions of representative democracy as cast
in welfare theory is that in the model, and in earlier conceptions, political
action and public policy derive exclusively from the preferences (and by
implication, welfare-related concerns) of the members of an undifferentiated
electorate. The omission of organized groups from this accounting of the
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political process, and indeed a lack of appreciation of the political dominance
of group members' preferences over those of the general electorate,
requires correction. 41
We begin the model's reconstruction by comparing the political efficacy
of an organized group within an electorate to that of the unorganized
members of the electorate in general. To cast the problem in familiar terms,
consider a congressional district of about 500,000 persons, and suppose that
5,000 of them belong to an organized group. The existence of such a group
connotes a superiority over the preferences of the general electorate in at
least four activities.
First, the structuring of most organized groups allows for superior
communications in two directions. Membership lists, mailings, and other
ways of communicating with members, such as telephone pools and regular
publications, enable the group's leaders to direct a remarkable amount of
political and public-policy information about various officeholders and publicpolicy proposals to the group's members. This information often is extremely refined, addressing the particular interests of the group's members. The existence of an organized group also may enable leaders to
communicate quickly and accurately to officeholders the members' preferences on a public-policy issue.
This aspect of communication deserves further elaboration. Concerning preferences on longstanding public-policy issues, an organized group's
superiority over the general electorate may be somewhat diminished. On
such issues candidates already may have taken positions, the citizenry's
preferences already may have been revealed in elections, and some kind of
public-policy equilibrium already may have been reached. There is little that
is new about such issues, and organized groups may enjoy only a mild
advantage over the unorganized electorate in communicating members'
preferences to officeholders on such issues, and vice versa. On new and
unanticipated issues, those that may never have been on the public sector's
agenda, the matter is entirely different, however. At the margin of decision,
group organization can make a difference concerning such issues. Group
leaders do not simply summarize the members' preferences on new issues;
they often ''synthesize'' those preferences by interpreting for members
and for officeholders what impact the new issues will have on the members'
welfare. Therefore, at the margins of public policy, in the creation of
change, an organized group's superiority over the general electorate in
communicating with officeholders and their challengers cannot be doubted.
No such capacity exists for the general electorate.
An organized group's second advantage concerns public-policy transactions with officeholders. In the civics-book model, the electorate as an
undifferentiated collection of persons makes a ''contract'' with an election
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candidate concerning his public-policy decisions during his tenure in office.
Performance under the contract is reviewed periodically, and the electorate
may substitute new ''suppliers'' of public-sector services if superior
possibilities emerge. This contract model has been subject to severe
criticism concerning both its empirical reality (Ordeshook, 1970) and its
desirability (Ranney, 1962; Wilson, 1925a, 1925b). But the relevant
comparison is not between the ideal contract and the actual (implicit)
contract that occurs, or its absence. Rather, the relevant comparison is
between that actual contract and other kinds of contracts, namely those
bargained out between elected officeholders, candidates, and organized
groups.
The principal difference between these contracts lies in the costs of
bargaining and transacting. Suppose that organized groups had no communications superiority in either direction. Even so, group leaders, as agents
forming transactions, enjoy an enormous superiority over the unaggregated
electorate. If an incumbent officeholder or challenger sought to bargain and
make transactions with each and every member of the electorate, or even
with a majority of them, the costs would be enormous, and each contract
would have to be renegotiated in the light of each contract subsequently
made, because positions on public goods, or external effects in general,
might be involved. Assembling citizens into a group eliminates virtually all of
these transactions costs and extraordinarily simplifies the officeholder's or
the challenger's tasks. Therefore, at the margin the officeholder would
always prefer to transact with leaders of organized groups rather than with
individual citizens. The communication superiority that the organized group
enjoys reinforces this advantage.
The third basis for superiority resides in the group's capacity to
monitor compliance with the terms of any contract arrived at. Like
communication, and indeed like transactions, monitoring goes in two
directions. First, the group's leaders can monitor the actions of individual
group members to see that they comply with the terms of any contract with
public-sector agents. For example, group leaders might ascertain whether
individual members had made campaign contributions to officeholders
directly, and not to their opponents, or indirectly through the group's
Political Action Committee (PAC); whether members had worked in the
agent's campaign; and whether members had engaged in other supportive
activities that were part of the bargain struck. In the other direction, the
group enjoys an advantage in monitoring the officeholder's compliance with
contract terms. Especially in labyrinthine legislative processes, it is difficult
to find out whether a particular legislator acted favorably or unfavorably
toward any given legislative proposal. Organized groups can develop
expertise in learning about such matters, and they can monitor more easily
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than can an individual citizen the quality of the legislator's intercession with
the bureaucracy.42
Finally, the organized group is superior in assuring compliance and in
sanctioning noncompliance with the contract's terms. Of course, groups
differ in their ability to sanction their members ' noncompliance. For
example, in earlier times, membership in county medical societies was
required to practice medicine in certain areas and to have privileges in
certain hospitals; and membership often accompanied enforced political
support (Kessel, 1958). Today, medical societies have a greatly diminished
capacity to ensure compliance with organizational directives. But an organized group's ability to sanction an officeholder's noncompliance with the
contract's terms is clearly superior to that of unorganized citizens. Endorsements can be quickly withdrawn, and condemnations can just as quickly be
applied.
The Nature of Interest-group Demands. In considering the putative
political superiority of organized groups over unorganized members of the
electorate, we must next inquire about the character of the public-policy
demands that such groups might make. Again, the "civics book" model
provides one interpretation of group action: groups form to pursue the
public good. Indeed, some group political action appears superficially to
correspond to this model. For example, the League of Women Voters
increasingly has taken positions on large public-policy issues; the Nader
groups and Common Cause similarly attack alleged inadequacies of public
policy; and specialized groups , such as the Sierra Club, Friends of the
Earth, and the Izaak Walton League, advocate their interpretations of what
the public interest requires . Elsewhere, we discern in such groups' actions
a clear diversion from welfare-maximizing policies (Aranson and Ordeshook,
1981b; see also Berry, 1977); and we discuss this diversion in the section of
this essay devoted to bureaucracies. For the moment, we rely mainly on the
common observation that most groups do not seem to devote their political
resources to the pursuit of public goods, collectively supplied. Here, we
wish to model the group decision-making process to explain this phenomenon.
We begin with a simple model of two interest groups, which between
them share a positive preference for the production of a particular public
good (it is public because the members of both groups would benefit from its
production) but which individually prefer the collective production of
different private goods. Furthermore, each group has a political budget,
allowing it to lobby either for the public good or for its particular divisible,
private good. Finally, assume that both the private-goods and public-goods
programs are indistinguishable in the benefits that they would create as well
as in their costs. Let B represent the benefit to each group of supplying
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either program, and let C represent its cost. Table 4.1 shows the resulting
two-person game between the two interest groups, assuming that members
of these two groups make up the entire society (Aranson, 1981). The
table 's entries assume that each group is pivotal or decisive for the program
that it seeks, so that lobbying for a program is tantamount to its publicsector supply. If each group lobbies for the program that creates a public
good between them, then each receives a benefit, B, and the costs of this
program are shared equally, so that each pays a cost of
for a net benefit
to each group of B - %. If each group lobbies for its respective privatebenefit program, then each receives that program and receives a benefit, B.
By virtue of such a program's supply to one group, however, the cost is
collectively imposed on both groups. The resulting net payoff for each group
is B- <%)-(%), or B- C. If one group seeks the collective supply of the
public good, while the other seeks the collective supply of its private good,
then the group that seeks the public good receives a benefit, B, but it pays a
cost of % for its share of the public good and % for its share of the other
group's private good, for a net payoff of B - C. But the other group receives
a benefit, B, from the public good that the first group pursued and an equal
benefit, B, from its own private-goods program; it pays a tax share of% for
each program, yielding a total net benefit of B + B - (%) - (~), or 2B - C.
To analyze this game, consider the payoffs from group
perspective,
and suppose that group 2 decides to seek its private-benefit program. If so,
then group 1 receives B- C no matter what it does, so that it is indifferent

%,

d,

TABLE 4.1
POLICY GAME BETWEEN Two INTEREST GROUPS

GROUP 2'S STRATEGIES
GROUP l's STRATEGIES

Seek public good

B-C, 2B-C

Seek public good

See private good

Seek private good

2B-C, B-C

B-C, B-C

SOURCE: Peter H. Aranson, American Government: Strategy and Choice (Boston, Little,
Brown, 1982) , p. 237.
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between these two strategies. Suppose, however, that group 2 seeks the
public good. Under these conditions, group 1 will receive a net payoff of B - ~
for pursuing the public good and 2B- C for pursuing its private-benefit
program. Hence, for group 1 to pursue its private-benefit program, 2B - C
must exceed B - ~, which reduces to the condition that B exceeds
That
is, the group's benefit from either program must exceed its tax share, onehalf of the program's cost. Since the game is symmetric-both groups share
the same payoff structure-this is a general condition leading to the
collective supply of two private-benefit programs and the nonsupply of a
public-goods program. Furthermore, notice that if B is less than ~, then
both groups will refrain from making any public-sector demands, because
either program would have a negative net benefit.
This game is a prisoners' dilemma. Assuming that B exceeds ~ , each
group will seek its private-benefit program; it receives B - C rather than
B - ~ , for a net loss in this process of for each group. If we add up the
net payoffs if each group seeks a public good, as compared with the case in
which each group seeks its respective private benefit, we find that the social
cost of this process is C.
This simple two-person game illustrates a disturbing result, namely
that the structure of payoffs to groups in a representative democracy leads
each group to seek the collective supply of private benefits for itself, rather
than a jointly consumed public good. Hence, if public-policy outcomes bear
some relationship to the demands placed on elected officeholders, and if
organized groups enjoy a political advantage over unorganized collections of
citizens, then we must reject the notion that representative democracies
can easily produce public goods, as a welfare-regarding model of the public
sector would predict. Unless we can find some way out of this dilemma, we
must conclude that these polities, in the main, produce private benefits at
collective cost. 43
The situation that table 4 .1 models seems highly abstract and devoid of
political or economic content, however, and a slightly more complicated
model might provide further insight into the process of group-demand
formation (Aranson and Ordeshook, 1978). Accordingly, suppose that each
group has a political budget, exogenously determined, which it can spend to
lobby for either a public-sector program that produces a public good or one
that creates a private good, which only members of the group consume. But
suppose that there are now n groups of equal size. Furthermore, assume
that the benefits and costs of the private and public goods might be different,
so that B and C represent the benefit and cost of the public good, while B'
and C' represent the benefit and cost of each private good. Assume that the
n groups bear equal tax shares. Finally, suppose that before any group

-¥.
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political action occurs, there are underlying expectations or probabilities of
P and P' associated with the respective public-sector supply of the publicand private-benefits programs. The decision to allocate resources in pursuit
of one program or another raises these probabilities by incremental amounts
of dP and dP', respectively. In this n-group setting, an interest group
lobbies for the public-benefits program if,

(B' - C)
dP/dP' >

(1)

n •
(B-..C)
n

To analyze inequality (1), we shall hold all other variables constant, to
trace out the effects that changes in each variable would have on the
choice between lobbying for a private-benefits program or a publicbenefits program. First, suppose that dP = dP'. That is, a change in
lobbying or other related activities produces an equal change in either P (dP)
or P' (dP'). The left-hand side of inequality (1) now becomes 1, and
therefore a group will lobby for the publicly supplied public good if (B - .Q)
exceeds (B' - Q).
n
Now if C ~ C', then the relevant decision is one of comparing benefits
(B and B ') from each program (assuming that in each instance a benefit will
exceed the tax share; otherwise, no public-sector lobbying will occur). This
comparison of benefits without reference to cost is not entirely revealing,
since it raises purely empirical questions about the perceived benefits of
public-sector programs. If the social-imbalance hypothesis holds true,
however, then public-goods programs that are objectively worth as much as
private-goods programs nevertheless will not experience full valuation by
the citizenry, and therefore organized groups will lobby instead for their
private-benefit programs.
Beyond the application of the social-imbalance hypothesis, though, we
can say little. Both empirically and theoretically, public-goods programs are
inherently neither more nor less valued than are private-goods programs,
especially if programs are considered at the margin. For instance, the most
general finding concerning public-sector budgeting is that the base budget of
the previous year's allocation remains more or less untouchable, and
political action concentrates on increments to this base (Davis, Dempster,
and Wildavsky, 1966). Hence, organized groups seldom need to concern
themselves with the value to them of the entire annual allocation for a public
good such as national defense. Rather, such conflict as exists concerns
increments to the previous year's budget. And in this decision setting, a 5
or 10 percent increase in national-defense expenditures, say, may not have
an appreciably greater benefit (and probably will have a smaller benefit) than
the absolute value of a similar increase in a particular group's private benefit
(holding costs constant).
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Now, suppose that dP = dP', but B = B'. A group's decision reduces to
one of comparing costs of private- and public-benefits legislation. Here we
can say more empirically, although not necessarily theoretically, than we
could in comparing benefits. Public-sector action commonly finds justification in the size or cost of the programs undertaken. Beyond the free-rider
problem, it is often argued that if very large expenditures are involved,
capital markets may not operate as efficiently as they do with smaller
programs, in which an investment in one program, even by a private-sector
lender, represents but a small portion of that lender's loan portfolio. Thus,
because of the very large cost of public-sector programs such as highway
systems, national defense, and educational plants, the central government,
as a' 'perfect insurer'' (risk-spreader), is called upon to finance the relevant
program.
If real public-goods programs are exceedingly large and ''lumpy,''
however, then that would imply that C is greater than C'. Therefore, at the
margin of decision, no organized group would lobby for the more expensive
public-goods program. Hence, the central economic characteristics of such
programs-largeness and lumpiness-which provide a justification for their
public-sector creation, simultaneously provide the conditions under which
we cannot expect them to find political support among organized groups. 44
Finally, consider the relevant increments to probability, dP and dP',
and let B equal B' and C equal C'. Inequality (1) thus reduces to dP > dP': a
group will lobby for a public-goods program if that choice contributes more
to the probability of enactment than does the alternative choice of lobbying
for a private-benefits program. Except for this probability calculation, the
model represented in inequality (1) is identical to the model represented in
table 4.1, in the game between two organized groups. In table 4.1 the
decision situation represents a game with decision making under conditions
of uncertainty concerning the other player's choice. Here, the others'
choices are taken as given, because the underlying probabilities represent
estimates of what other groups are going to do and how the agents in the
public sector will respond. That is, the decision situation that inequality (1)
represents concerns decision making under conditions of risk. Differently
stated, the game in table 4.1 represents a two-person free-rider problem,
while the situation in inequality (1) represents an n-person free-rider
problem.
While several formulations of P, dP, P', and dP' are possible, one way
to look at the problem is to assume that dP and dP' are both functionally
identical increments to probability whose values depend upon their underlying probabilities P and P'. The most common assumption is that there is
saturation: as P, say, grows larger, dP declines as a consequence of
applying equal units of political resources. Under this hypothesis, important
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inferences emerge. For instance, the decision makers of any particular
group would usually believe that no other group would lobby for the private
benefits that their group wishes to have supplied. Hence, P' equals zero. P,
however, is bounded by zero but may take on a larger subjectively
estimated value if a group's decision makers believe that there is any chance
at all that some other group (or perhaps a median preference in the general
electorate) would demand the public supply of the public good. If so, then
the group in question would find P greater than P', and dP' greater than dP;
and thus the group would lobby for its private-benefits legislation.
Even if P equals P' , so that dP equals dP' , the same result pertains.
With this equality of probabilities, the situation as inequality (1) describes it
is then-person version of the prisoners' dilemma in table 4.1. Hence, given
our findings in that situation, we have no reason to expect that organized
groups will pursue public-benefits legislation.
The discussion thus far assumes that groups allocate their political
resources to pursue either a public good or a private, divisible benefit. But
groups might oppose each others' demands for private benefits, and a full
accounting of interest-group decision making must expand groups' opportunity sets to include this possibility. First, if the structure of costs and
payoffs associated with a particular program represents a direct transfer
from one group to another, with no other groups being directly concerned,
then the resulting game is zero-sum-like, and we can expect opposition from
the disadvantaged group. These cases characteristically occur in certain
regulatory situations in which competing producers of substitutable goods
and services would alternatively be favored or disadvantaged by regulation. 45 These cases stand outside of the analytical framework constructed
here, because they contain no prior assumption about cost spreading. Thus,
we can say little about the welfare properties of the resulting public policies.
Presumably, one group or the other might win, but we cannot be sure that a
market process, whether or not devoid of imperfections, would have
selected that particular winner.
Second, in the presence of cost spreading, but in the absence of a zerosum structure, there remains the possibility that interest groups will oppose
each others' demands for private benefits. Nevertheless, we might reject
this possibility, because if a single group decides to mount opposition to
another group's demands, then all other groups will benefit that would
otherwise bear the tax share for supplying that program. That is, the supply
of opposition would be tantamount to the supply of a public good for all other
groups. And according to the analysis just reported, such opposition should
not occur.
If a small number of groups are involved, however, then tax shares
may be sufficiently large to generate opposition. We have constructed a
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three-person game in normal form to examine this possibility (Aranson and
Ordeshook, 1978). This game, which allows no coalitions among groups,
partitions the set of likely situations into two categories. First, suppose that
B' exceeds C'. In this situation, all groups will pursue the public-sector
supply of their private benefits. Second, if B' is less than or equal to C', then
the possibility of opposition depends on the relative magnitudes of the
probabilities, benefits, and costs. While no general results emerge from this
inquiry, some reasonable constructions of these variables suggest that
benefits need only represent some fraction of costs for opposition not to
occur. In particular, if B' exceeds two-thirds of the cost of each program,
then independent action in pursuit of each group's private-benefit program
will occur, but not opposition.
Extending this three-person game to a more nearly general n-person
form requires greater specificity about the probabilities of legislative
success. Nevertheless, the results deduced reveal more about underlying
political processes. For example, suppose that P x is the probability that a
group will successfully secure B' in the public sector and that x is the
number of groups lobbying for their respective benefits. Let P x = Px - 1 +
dPx _ 1 • The group prefers to lobby for the public-sector supply of its own
private benefit rather than against the public-sector supply of all other
groups' benefits if
Px-1[B' -QJ
+ dPx-1[B' -xQJ
>0.
n
n

(2)

Suppose that the probability that a group succeeds in securing the
public-sector supply of B' equals the proportion of groups not opposing that
supply. One formulation of this probability is that P x = x. Inequality (2)
becomes under this formulation,
n
,
>
(
C')(2x
+
1)
~
2
Q
B
nTx+_l)_ n'
for large values of x. Hence, if B' exceeds only twice the amount of each
group's tax share for each program, then all groups will lobby for their
respective private-benefits legislation. This is a remarkably weak condition.
Each group's net payoff becomes B' - C', which by assumption may be
negative.
Px may also reflect a majority-rule variant. Suppose that n is odd and
that Px = 0 if x is less than a majority but equals 1 otherwise. In such a
situation, the group will pursue its private-benefit legislation, and not
oppose the demands of other groups, if,

B'>C' (n+l)=Q
2n

2'

for large values of n.
We have also investigated a more general noncooperative n-person
model, allowing for continuous adjustments in the amounts of resources
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allocated to support and opposition (Aranson and Ordeshook) . Let Pi
represent the probability that group i's private-benefit program passes; Xu is
the level of resources that group i allocates for this purpose; and Xji are the
levels of resources that it allocates to defeat group j's bill, for all j. If there is
a budget constraint, if equal tax shares prevail, and if the various x/s are
arguments in a function determining Pi, then group i's payoff, Vi, becomes

£ C' -P -.
(3)
i=l J J
By placing additional restrictions on Pi, a general result emerges from
equation (3). In particular, suppose that Pi is monotonically increasing and
marginally diminishing in xii, strictly convex and monotonically decreasing in
xii • and that benefits, costs, and budget constraints are equal for all groups.
In equilibrium, the P/s are equal, and each group's payoff becomes
P/B' - C') . This result is invariant with respect to the relationships of
benefits to costs and the level of resources expended in opposition. In
equilibrium, except in those peculiar instances of comer solutions, Pi
exceeds zero, and the public sector grows , at some net cost if C' exceeds
B'.
There remains the possibility that groups will organize among themselves in a cooperative-game context to form coalitions opposed to the
private-interest process. This possibility seems reasonable, because cooperative decision making is one way in which players may extricate themselves from prisoners ' dilemmas. Yet, the possibility also remains that a
majority of groups will form a coalition to secure their respective privatebenefits legislation, to the detriment of the remaining minority.
Using a three-person cooperative game, the findings in this regard are
thus. First, if one group, for whatever reason, decides to oppose the other
two groups' public-sector demands, then those two groups will form a
coalition in pursuit of their benefits, the only limit being that B' exceeds twothirds of C'. Second, if one group pursues its own private benefit, then the
other two groups will form an opposing coalition. Once that coalition forms,
however, it is individually rational for each of its members to defect. That is,
the opposing coalition is unstable , and in the end all three groups will seek
their respective private benefits. Third, if a grand coalition opposed to this
private-benefit process does form, then each member of the coalition will
defect and pursue its own private benefits, if B' exceeds merely one-third of
C'. Finally, if a group stands alone to oppose the other groups' demands,
then it can do better for itself by joining the other two groups in politically
pursuing its own private benefit. In sum, under very reasonable conditions,
all coalitions in opposition to the private-benefit process are inherently
unstable.
V, =(B' --~)P.-( 1.)
'

n

,

n
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Efficiency and Inefficiency. The preceding discussion raises the possibility that each program's costs, although spread across all groups, will
exceed its benefits, thus producing a Pareto-inferior result. Indeed, in our
two-person prisoners' dilemma formulation, this inefficiency is embedded in
the process, because the groups fail to pursue a jointly preferred public
good, and thus produce a social cost of C. Hence, from an opportunity-cost
perspective, we already know that the process is inefficient: the groups
could not achieve a mutually preferred public-policy outcome.
Second, welfare theory provides no justification for these kinds of
public-sector activities. That is, economists give no welfare-related credence to this variety of simple redistribution, absent an eleemosynary
motive. Moreover, in the absence of specific forms of market failure, these
programs would be welfare-inferior. If this were not so, then the groups
presumably could purchase these programs in the private sector, where, in
the absence of market failure, their production would be more efficient.
Furthermore, there remains an additional cost of simple politically sanctioned transfers, which is the cost of the political action itself, a source of
rents for politicians (see McCormick and Tollison, 1981; Aranson and
Shepsle, 1983).
The only remaining justification for these transfers of benefits from the
fisc-and ultimately, from other taxpayers, consumers, and producers-to
private, divisible interest groups is that of political pluralism. For example,
Dahl identifies one particular mechanism of political competition underlying
this process but judges its effects as benign, and perhaps desirable (1961).
In his study of New Haven politics, Dahl documents the manner in which the
political parties alternated competitively in bringing one group of new
immigrants after another into the political process. Presumably, each group
received an identifiable benefit from this activity, and because the benefits
ostensibly exceeded the costs, in Dahl's view, the resulting pluralism
appeared to him to be appropriate.
The second variant of welfare theory might approve of such a result.
Behind a veil of ignorance, people might choose a political order that
sequentially produced programs for identifiable groups, provided that the
benefits of each program exceeded the costs. Since the probability of being
in such a group is very high, everyone benefits from this arrangement. Even
in political theory, however, this benign judgment of pluralism has received
substantial challenge, most notably from Lowi (1979).
We have sought to find general tendencies toward efficiency or
inefficiency in the private demands that interest groups place on the public
sector. But general sentences have been difficult to utter. Presumably, with
scarce political resources the possibility of purchasing efficient (benefits in
excess of costs) programs in the private sector will temper the number of
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such programs sought in the public sector. As an empirical matter, our
inability to find patently efficient public-sector programs gives us some
confidence in this conclusion. The literature suggests a fairly substantial
cost differential in favor of private-sector production (Borcherding, 1981;
Borcherding, Pommerehne, and Schneider, 1981), while the lure of cost
spreading provides the animus for the public-sector production of inefficient
programs. Furthermore, the cost of foregoing the public pursuit of public
goods in all of their manifestations must represent a social cost exactly
analogous to the alleged costs of market failure. That is, groups use the fisc
in the manner of an overgrazed commons (Shepsle, 1983; Aranson, 1983).
Beyond these observations, we have tried to construct examples in
which groups have a choice of purchasing various goods and services in the
public or private sectors (Aranson and Ordeshook, 1977). The preceding
discussion indicates that in the large-number case there are virtually no
constraints on the relationship of benefits to costs. Explicit examples
reinforce this conclusion. We can construct situations in which interest
groups will pursue both inefficient and efficient programs in the public
sector, but we cannot construct situations in which interest groups will
purchase inefficient programs in the private sector. Therefore, at best the
relationship of efficiency to interest-group public-sector activities is random.
Yet, when we overlay all of the considerations just mentioned, including the
findings of empirical work, we rest comfortably with the presumption that
the public sector remains an explicit source of divisible benefits for
identifiable groups, with corresponding programs whose costs exceed their
benefits.
A final perspective on interest-group public-policy demands sets aside
the costs and benefits of particular programs and looks instead to the nature
of political action. This approach concentrates on expenditures for securing
public policies, including money and other resources allocated to lobbying,
campaigning, and more obscure payments for buying public policies. We use
the term ''political services'' to capture all of these activities and ask what is
the economic nature of these services? In particular, we wish to know if
such services are normal economic goods, in the sense that expenditures on
them increase proportionately with increases in wealth, or whether they are
inferior goods, because expenditures on them decline proportionately with
increases in wealth.
To get at this problem, we construct each group's decision structure
so that it must allocate a proportion of its budget to buying goods and
services in the private sector or to buying political services in the public
sector. Assuming that investments in political services exhibit diminishing
marginal returns, we find that political services are inferior goods (Aranson
and Ordeshook, 1981a). That is, they are much like hamburgers and hot
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dogs, in that as people grow wealthier, they begin to substitute other foods,
such as steaks and lobsters. Of course, if the interest-group public-policy
demands identified here are satisfied sequentially over time, and if they
reduce aggregate and individual wealth, then that datum alone will lead
interest groups to purchase proportionately greater amounts of political
services. 46

THE INSTITUTIONAL MATRIX

The preceding discussion assumes implicitly that the institutions of
government-legislatures, bureaus, courts, and executive administrations-are responsive to the underlying public-sector demands of interest
groups for private, divisible benefits. Each model reviewed assumes that
public-sector satisfaction of these demands is either a step function or a
monotone increasing function of the political resources allocated to pursuing
the associated programs. If we could rely on this assumption, then our
analysis would draw to a close, because we can find no way to aggregate
demands for public goods, including the public good of opposition to
inefficient private-interest legislation. A full analysis, though, requires that
we examine the institutions of government, to ascertain how they respond
to demands for the collective supply of private goods. This section attends
to the reactions of legislatures, bureaus, and courts. The next section
closes the circle by interpreting executive-branch (presidential) and legislative decision making, using a more general election model in which
candidates build platforms out of the satisfaction or denial of demands for
private-benefits legislation.
LEGISLATURES

Traditional Antecedents. Before proceeding to a formal modeling of
legislative decision making with regard to interest groups' private-benefit
demands, we can best make sense out of, and reinforce our eventual
findings about, legislative responses to such demands by rehearsing
Mayhew's partition of congressional action (1974). Mayhew divides congressional activity into three categories: position taking, advertising, and
credit claiming.
Position taking seems analytically equivalent to the adoption of election
strategies concerning public goods. It consists of voting on roll calls and of
announcing one's position on larger public-policy issues. The problems with
position taking thus resemble those that candidates encounter in traditional
spatial election models. First, because the voter identifies the strategy
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chosen with the production of a particular level of a public good (unless it is
the precise level that the voter most prefers), the candidate is susceptible to
his opponent's opportunistic criticism and the formation of coalitions of
intense minorities (see Downs, 1957; Oppenheimer, 1972). Hence, legislators try to avoid recorded roll-call votes, to bury politically damaging
legislation in committees, and otherwise to utter innocuous platitudes.
Second, position taking falls prey to the larger problem of absence of
electoral equilibria in a legislator's district, which allows a potential opponent to defeat the incumbent legislator on any position that he might take.
Accordingly, a strategy of ambiguity may prevail.
In sum, only when there is a clear majority in a legislator's district (and
perhaps not even then) will the legislator take a forthright position on a
legislative issue. Otherwise, position taking may tum out to be a politically
destructive activity. Mayhew's discussion is revealing:
A solid consensus in the constituency calls for ringing declarations;
for years the late Senator James K. Vardaman (D. , Miss.)
campaigned on a proposal to repeal the Fifteenth Amendment.
Division or uncertainty in the constituency call for waffling; in the
late 1960s a congressman had to be a poor politician indeed not to
be able to come up with an inoffensive statement on Vietnam
("We must have peace with honor at the earliest possible moment
consistent with the national interest"). On a controversial issue a
Capitol Hill office normally prepares two form letters to send out
to constituent letter writers-one for the pros and one (not
directly contradictory) for the antis . (1974:64)
Advertising, the second form of legislative activity, merely seeks to
give legislators public recognition, much as a brand name does for privatesector firms. Advertising is noncontroversial and has most of the benefits of
position taking with few of its political liabilities. Advertising seems
superfluous to the legislative process, however, because no necessary
public-policy consequences flow from it, except that it allocates scarce
resources away from the job of legislating and toward securing reelection.
As a consequence, it represents a deadweight social loss, sustaining political
rents for the private-interest group that we call the legislature. It would
seem neither possible, nor socially desirable, nor even constitutional,
though, to do away with legislative advertising.
Credit claiming is the most complex and interesting of legislative
activities. The key aspect of credit claiming is credibility. Voters understand
that a single member of the House is but one out of 435, and of the Senate,
but one out of 100. They also understand that the president and the
administrative agencies have a strong hand in public-policy decision making.
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This understanding limits the extent to which individual legislators can claim
credit for even small macroeconomic changes or foreign-policy successes.
For instance, no single legislator could believably claim credit for reducing
the rates of inflation, unemployment, or interest. Nor could any legislator
credibly claim to have brought about peace in the Middle East, reduced
armaments, or increased defense preparedness. Thus, while legislators
may announce their support for various measures, believable credit claiming
excludes entire categories of public-policy decision making: namely, the kind
that ordinarily is associated with the production of nationwide public goods
or the suppression of national public bads.
By the same reasoning, legislators will not claim credit for producing
private benefits for those who do not affect their electoral fortunes. But
they do claim credit for public policies that directly affect those who can
advance their reelection or defeat. The associated programs are most
closely identified with pork-barrel legislation, creating private, divisible
benefits for individual legislative constituencies (Shepsle and Weingast,
1981; Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen, 1981). This form of legislation finds
constant reference in the scholarly literature as the centerpiece of legislative activity (Ferejohn, 1974; Fiorina, 1977; Froman, 1967; Lowi, 1964;
Manley, 1970; Mayhew, 1974; Plott, 1968; Schattschneider, 1935;
Schwartz, 1981; Shepsle and Weingast, 1981; Stem, 1973; Stockman,
1975; Weingast, 1979; Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen, 1981). But the flow
of political resources across state and district lines through the development
of political-action committees and other artifices has also made it possible for
widely dispersed but divisible interests to have an impact on public-policy
decision making.
Credit claiming is hardly new, and it has long been the staple of
scholarly analysis. Indeed, the language used to describe pork-barrel
legislation and its close cousins is strongly reminiscent of the public
goods-private goods distinction. For example, Lowi refers to "distributive
benefits," which seem very much like private goods (1964); Key refers to
"particularism" and "particularistic causes" (1964); Mayhew speaks about
"particularized benefits" versus ''universalistic benefits" (1974); and
Fiorina distinguishes between "the pork barrel" and "case work," on the
one hand, and "programmatic activities," on the other (1977:45-46). In
each of these juxtapositions, in regard to the legislator's allocation of scarce
political resources, private-benefit legislation takes precedence over the
development of more universalistic, public-goods legislation. Hence, the
traditional and more recent literature on the Congress concludes that the
legislative process responds to and encourages interest-group demands for
private, divisible benefits.
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Recent literature on congressional committee structure reinforces this
conclusion. Committees provide a decentralized decision-making process
that encourages the uncoordinated granting of benefits that the traditional
literature identifies. Legislators in committees grant reciprocity to each
other by not challenging other committees' jurisdictions, and they practice
universalism by which most demands finding a voice in the Congress are
eventually heard and satisfied by the appropriate substantive committees
(Weingast, 1979; Fiorina, forthcoming; Aranson, 1981).
Formal Analysis. Formal theories of legislative decision making concerning the choice between private- and public-goods legislation and the
decision to oppose or delete existing programs have been hampered by
attention to the legislative technology of logrolling. Economists have
evinced an interest in logrolling, because it appeared to make majority rule
in legislatures more nearly marketlike, rather than simply redistributive.
That is, logrolling allows for public policies to reflect the working out of
differences in valuations (intensities of preferences) (Buchanan and Tullock,
1962). More recent studies argue, however, that logrolling might be a
source of degradation in legislators' welfare (Riker and Brams, 1973). If we
interpret legislative activity as presenting no principal-agent problems
between legislators and their constituents, then the degradation of welfare
consequent to logrolling paradoxically extends as well to constituents
(Aranson, 1981, chap. 9). The resulting configuration of public policies with
divisible, district-level incidents had been documented as early as the works
of Woodrow Wilson (1956:89). It is also theoretically possible for logrolls to
eliminate all private-benefits legislation (Schwartz, 1981), although a generalized analysis of pork-barrel decision making suggests that legislators will
adopt logrolling technologies to produce, not deny, such programs (Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen, 1981).
A more general analysis, which transcends the narrow technology of
logrolling, constructs a parallel between interest-group decision making, as
reported in the third section of this chapter, and legislative decision making
itself. Legislators clearly enjoy incentives that differ materially from those of
their constituencies and of identifiable groups. Yet, it proves useful to
assume initially that legislators are merely instructed delegates for those
who aggregate demands in their districts, organized interest groups.
Accordingly, suppose that a constituency is an interest group and that
legislators face decision-making problems much like those of the interest
groups discussed previously. That is, to follow the structure of analysis in
the third section, legislators must either support their constituents' programs or oppose all other legislators' constituents' programs in a noncooperative context. Continuing the parallel, we find that for a three-person
legislature using majority rule, all bills pass if B' exceeds two-thirds of C'.
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For n-person legislatures, assuming the formulation of inequality (2) concerning Px, all bills pass if B' exceeds one-half of C', for large values of n.
If coalitions are possible, and if the benefits of each program are less
than two-thirds of its cost, then a grand coalition fails to enact all three
proposals. But if B' exceeds two-thirds of C', then a two-person coalition
will form to grant at least two of the benefits and to deny the third. Total
payoffs equal 2(B' - C '), and if C' exceeds B', then inefficiency prevails.
The possibility of legislatively deleting existing programs requires a
formulation outside of the model, because it adds a time dimension to both
legislators' and interest groups' decision problems. Once a program is
established, it is continuously subject to legislative recision. Therefore, both
interest groups and legislators must calculate the net present values of
programs that in the absence of recision would run in perpetuity. It is more
convenient for us to analyze this possibility under the discussion of the
judiciary, so we postpone it until that time.
A Disgression on Interest Groups. Throughout the preceding discussion, while acknowledging the political superiority of interest groups over
the members of an anomic electorate, we nevertheless assume, with
traditional group theorists, that the costs of organizing and maintaining
interest groups remain inconsequential. Interest groups in this model are
taken as given (Truman, 1951). The analysis surrounding this assumption,
however, plainly recognizes that free-rider problems and associated prisoners' dilemmas pervade most aspects of political life. For example, the
production of public goods and the suppression of public bads is said to
require governmental action precisely because of free-rider problems. And
when groups lobby for the public-sector supply of inefficient private
benefits, they are engaged in an n-person prisoners' dilemma. As Olson has
pointed out, if members of a group share a common goal, whose accomplishment for them would be equivalent to the production of a collective good,
those persons, too, experience free-rider problems (Olson, 1971). Unless
we can accommodate Olson's important insight, our analysis remains
incomplete. 4 7 We must nevertheless account for the formation of interest
groups and explain certain regularities in existing legislation with regard to
such groups.
To develop this explanation we divide groups into three categories.
The first category contains those groups whose existence is assured by a
parallel purpose. Large, dominant firms in concentrated industries are
pertinent examples, as are governmental agencies and state and local
governments, which act as interest groups with respect to their congressional lobbying activities. These groups already have been formed and
maintained for other purposes, the returns from which are sufficient to
sustain them. 48 For such groups and their leaders, the decision to pursue
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private benefits merely concerns the relevant private costs and benefits of
lobbying activities. Such organizations experience no real free-rider problems, although smaller groups may take advantage of the political penumbra
that they supply if legislatures find it difficult or impossible to fashlon
perfectly divisible programs and benefits that exclude such smaller groups.
A second category contains groups organized pursuant to statutes or
regulations. These groups form among otherwise large-number or competitive firms in the same industry or in parallel social structures. Precisely
because such groups would find it difficult to form and prevail, the
respective statutes are passed and regulations promulgated. Considering
labor unions, this situation is explicitly recognized, as evidenced by the labor
origins of the term ''free-rider.'' It is important to understand exactly what
the legislature accomplishes by governmentally enforcing membership and
contribution to such groups. Certainly, such activities overcome the freerider problem inherent in competitive markets. But legally enforced membership also makes it far simpler for the legislator to fashion a divisible
benefit and to extract a rent from the group in return. Large, dominant firms
in concentrated industries require no such services, and therefore they
bargain with legislators in a bilateral-monopoly context. But firms or
persons in competitive economic situations require the additional legislative
service of group formation and maintenance through statutory enactments
and regulatory ukases. Thus, legislative services hold value to participants
in competitive processes beyond the value to dominant, preexisting groups.
The third category of groups encompasses those that face pervasive
free-rider problems that know no clear legislative solution. These groups
include the more recently developed "public interest" organizations, such
as the Nader groups and various environmental lobbies. Concerning such
organizations, scholars have developed a large number of ad hoc explanations for their formation. Selective incentives may encourage contributions,
and tangential product lines and services supplied only to members may also
be of help. Such groups are at a competitive disadvantage in creating these
selective benefits, however, if a competing firm could produce them without
producing the public good as well (Stigler, 1974). Even so, in recent years,
legislators have found ways to funnel benefits to such groups in the form of
research grants and intervener fees (Berry, 1977; Downing and Brady,
1979).
The costs of legislative action with respect to this hierarchy of groups
is the opposite of the order that welfare theory would contemplate. First,
there is no sense in which groups whose prior organization is assured should
be the easiest to satisfy, because their demands are solely for divisible
benefits, simple redistributions from the many to the few. Second, the
supply of the prerequisites of organization to groups such as labor unions
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perforce converts them into members of the first category of groups, but
they have been "captured" by their dependence on the legislature. Third,
''public interest'' groups are in reality demanders of supraoptimal levels of
public goods, as well as private goods. To the extent that these groups
form, a median preference in the electorate remains unsatisfied.
But in legislative allocations the central aspect of interest-group politics
is divisibility itself. Legislators must ensure that programs are divisible
among groups, because otherwise they could not secure payment for their
enactments. That is why groups truly concerned with the public interest can
seldom operate successfully. They cannot assemble adequate payments to
legislators for their enactments. Were a legislator to create a pure public
good, then, to pay him for his actions, a voter or group would be producing a
public good for all other voters and groups. Legislators can create no such
benefits unless somehow they develop a way to withhold payments in the
form of programs to voters and groups that do not offer payment in return.
That is, divisibility reasserts itself in political exchange, much as it does in
private choice, to generate marketlike properties. Without such divisibility
the legislative marketplace could not operate, or at least would not operate
as it presently does. Yet, the external costs of this process, explicitly
brought about through a cost-spreading arrangement that treats the fisc as a
common resource, work a degradation of public welfare.
BUREAUCRACY

It was precisely the recognition that the political process could be
subverted to the interests of discrete groups that provided the intellectual
animus for the regulatory state. As early as the writings of Woodrow Wilson
(1887), and later in the works of Herbert A. Simon (1947), scholars divided
politics and administration, asserting that the president and the legislature,
through a political process, should decide large matters of public policy but
that administration should be carried out in depoliticized bureaus. The view
of bureaucracy that emerged from this conception was that of a set of
organizations with large powers and wide discretion, which would scientifically and nonpolitically produce the appropriate goods and services. A
secondary aspect of this argument invoked the desideratum of centralization, a practice whose theoretical and empirical justifications have been
seriously weakened. 49
Regulation, one important aspect of bureau activity, is an explicit
mechanism for producing private benefits at collective cost. For example,
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the earliest of the federal
commissions, may have been an instrument for aiding the railroads or the
farmers; but in either case the public at large had little voice in the
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commission's public policies (e.g., see Kolko, 1963, 1965; Hilton, 1966;
Fiorina, 1982a; Martin, 1972). Later, the ICC would protect railroads
against truckers and then switch its support to truckers, in a never-ending
regulatory battle. 50 The Federal Trade Commission emerged as a protector
of high-cost products against cost-cutting competition. The alphabet agencies of the New Deal era were similarly constructed (Hawley, 1966). The
Securities and Exchange Commission protected underwriters of blue-chip
securities against the competition of wholesale underwriters and today
protects the interests of the securities bar (Manne and Solomon, 1974;
Mackay and Reid, 1979). The Civil Aeronautics Board, which is not yet
entirely dismembered, protected the airlines against competitive entry, in a
classic regulatory pattern (Breyer and Stein, 1974; Douglas and Miller,
1974). The Federal Communications Commission resolved the dispute
between the navy and commercial broadcasters, but in the process it
controlled entry and competition in the interests of the networks and local
ownership.
The more recent ''social'' regulatory agencies seem no less interested
in private-interest regulation. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
favors some coal producers to the detriment of others and to the detriment
of the public at large (Ackerman and Hassler, 1981). The EPA's regulations
also protect existing industries in the Northeast against competitive entry
from nascent southwestern producers (Maloney and McCormick, 1982;
Pashigian, 1982). More important, the EPA administers a large pork-barrel
program of grants to state and local governments for sewer construction
and related projects. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration
makes it extremely costly for smaller, nonunionized firms to compete with
their larger, unionized counterparts. There is no discernible evidence of
improved worker safety (Smith, 1982). The litany of regulation in favor of
private interests seems endless, and we repeat this list merely to provide
examples. Any welfare-regarding purposes or achievements that emerge
from these regulatory regimes are largely epiphenomena of private-interest
motivations.
Many traditional bureaucracies, such as the Department of Defense,
the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department of
Agriculture, are involved less with regulation and more with the direct
production of goods, services, and subsidies. These executive departments, while explicitly or arguably engaged in the production of welfareregarding programs (such as national defense and some forms of resource
redistribution), nevertheless are fecund sources of private, divisible benefits. For example, during 1983 Senate hearings on defense appropriations,
Senator Donald Riegle of Michigan and Secretary of Defense Casper
Weinberger had a heated exchange concerning the Reagan administration's
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proposed defense build-up. Riegle charged that Weinberger was an inflexible ideologue, whose proposals for increasing defense expenditures would
actually diminish the amount of national defense produced. Weinberger
responded to Riegle' s charges by saying that Michigan voters would be
interested to learn that the lower levels of defense spending that Riegle
preferred would cost the Michigan economy $150 million.
Plainly, in welfare terms, such considerations are irrelevant. For
example, these reduced expenditures in Michigan would also translate into
diminished tax liabilities for all taxpayers and a reduced crowding out of
private borrowers from credit markets, because of diminished government
borrowing. Pecuniary externalities, such as Weinberger described, also
should have no consequence for the optimal level and distribution of defense
spending. Legislative tactics such as those that Weinberger used appear to
stand at the core of expenditure decisions for the production of many public
goods besides national defense. As argued earlier, the actual level of
national defense produced seems to be an epiphenomenon of these porkbarrel decisions.
Bureaucracy and the Principal-agent Problem. For many researchers
the central problem of bureaucratic and regulatory decision making is the
divergence between the interests of the principal (the legislature) and the
agent (the bureau or agency). This problem is common to many relationships, not merely those that occur in the public sector. As Jensen and
Meckling obsenre,
the problem of inducing an "agent" to behave as if he were
maximizing the ''principal' s'' welfare is quite general. It exists in
all organizations and in all cooperative efforts-at every level of
management in firms, in universities, in mutual companies, in
cooperatives, in governmental authorities and bureaus, in unions,
and in the relationships normally classified as agency relationships
such as are common in the performing arts and the market for real
estate. (1976:309)
The principal-agent problem in governmental bureaus differs substantially from its private-sector manifestations, however. In a competitive
marketplace, market forces discipline the extent to which principals can
allow agents' actions to diverge from those that principals intend, and they
discipline agents in their divergence from principals' wishes (Alchian and
Demsetz, 1972; Manne, 1965). But in the public sector, certain additional
monitoring problems diminish both the principal' s and agent's ability to
reduce the scope of agency costs. First, to the extent that bureaus do
produce public goods or suppress public bads, the usual problems of correct
pricing and output apply (Samuelson, 1954; Olson, 1972). As Mises points
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out, in the classical welfare model of the public sector, government
produces (suppresses) precisely those goods (bads) that have no natural
market price (1944). Accordingly, it may be impossible to identify optimum
production levels and prices.
Second, because of these price and output indeterminacies, legislative
principals, encouraged by bureaucratic agents, use surrogate measures of
output and price, which may bear little or no relationship to measures that
would adequately monitor bureau production and costs. For example,
Tullock argues that State Department officials gain more from providing
benefits to specific American citizens and firms than from developing a full
knowledge and understanding of the particular countries in which they serve
(Tullock, 1965). Military officers gain promotion by virtue of their bridgeplaying abilities, social skills, and relationships with superiors, defense
contractors, and congressmen, not by virtue of their ability to provide for
the common defense. Lindsay argues that bureaus often supply goods and
services at zero price to users, without having any clear measures of
quality. Hence, because output is readily measurable, bureaus maximize itfor example, the number of patient days in Veterans Administration
hospitals-rather than provide an optimum mix of quality and quantity
(Lindsay, 1976). Similarly, police create speeding traps, to maximize
revenues from speeding tickets, rather than allocate forces to minimize
highway accidents.
All of these divergences between the principal's theoretical welfareregarding preference and the agent's actual allocations represent not
merely agency costs but also the construction of private benefits for the
agency. In short, the agencies really stand as private, divisible groups,
facing a perverse set of incentives and rationally producing goods and
services for themselves at collective cost.
Niskanen (1971) explicitly models the principal-agent problem in the
public sector as a bilateral-monopoly situation between the agency and the
legislature. In his model the bureau produces twice the output of an
analogous private-sector firm, with an accompanying welfare loss. Niskanen
assumes that the motivation for these high production levels, which derive
from the demand schedules that bureaucrats face, takes the form of private
benefits, perquisites of office, and the like, for agency personnel. While
Niskanen's assumption of agency budget maximizing has been subject to
substantial reworking, his insights remain the benchmark for the study of
bureaucracy.
Groups, Legislators, and Bureaus. Research on the divergence between legislative and bureaucratic interests and incentives serves to
demythologize bureaucracies as giving undiverted attention to legislative
goals and larger public purposes. But its lack of specificity about the nature
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of the divergence remains problematic. For example, one could argue that
legislatures tend to require by statute the underproduction of public goods
and the overproduction of private, divisible benefits at collective cost, but
that welfare-regarding bureaus redress the balance. Of course, this conjecture contradicts a very large number of studies that conclude that many
bureaus, and especially the regulatory agencies, are captives of the
industries that they were intended to regulate (Bernstein, 1955).
Furthermore, recent work on the relationships among legislatures,
interest groups, and bureaus comes to a different conclusion: bureaus senre
as explicit agents in the production of private benefits agreed to in bargains
struck between legislators and interest groups (Moran and Weingast, 1982;
Weingast, 1981). In the traditional regulatory-capture literature, the agency
monitors industry practices, to enforce a cartel among firms. Cartel
formation and maintenance is very difficult to achieve using statutory
instruments. The unit price of the good or service must be raised to the
level that a monopoly would impose, but to prevent other firms from
entering the market and dissipating the rents that the cartel price creates,
there also must be entry control. Because demand and factor-cost characteristics facing such an industry will change over time, there must be a
constant adjustment of both price and entry rules. Hence, flexible regulation
is preferred to specific statutory enactments.
The traditional model of a cartel induced by regulation suggests the
presence of a concentrated benefit for regulated firms at the collective cost
of users. The metaphor applied to the supporting political structure is one of
' 'iron triangles, '' with a congressional oversight committee, an agency, and
a regulated industry at the respective vertices. Of course, while economists
can sometimes think up welfare-regarding justifications for this form of
regulation (e.g., see Kahn, 1966), the actual regulatory regime imposed
commonly bears no relationship to a welfare-regarding model's dictates.
More recent research suggests that this single-industry-versus-dispersed-public model of regulatory origins may be misleading, because most
agencies were born in conflict among contending groups (Aranson, Gellhorn, and Robinson, 1982). One model of this process argues that the
legislature delegates legislative authority to the agency and thereby creates
a regulatory lottery for the competing groups and firms. Because of riskpreference characteristics, these competing groups and firms prefer the
lottery to the equivalent statutory certainty. After the agency has been
established, it either resolves conflict in favor of one of the groups or shifts
support back and forth between them. But the agency and Congress
continue to exact payments for the changing cartel protection thereby
established. These recent models of regulatory and bureau processes, while
not settling the principal-agent problem or the congressional versus bureau141
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dominance debate, nevertheless establish bureaus and regulatory agencies
as important contributors to the collective production of private benefits
(see Posner, 1971, 1974; see also Peltzman, 1976; Aranson and Ordeshook, 1981b).
THE JUDICIARY

The judiciary ordinarily has had no place in accounts of the welfaredegrading tendencies of representative democracies. Most scholars set
courts aside, believing that they are either sufficiently depoliticized or that
the judiciary' s concerns remain orthogonal to the principal political issues in
public-policy debates. The Supreme Court is sometimes said to follow
election returns; and in civil and criminal cases, lower courts, presided over
by upper-middle-class or upper-class judges, are alleged to favor wealthy
litigants. Whatever the merits of such claims, here we transcend them to
consider other matters-namely, common-law efficiency and the interestgroup basis of Supreme Court decision making.
The Efficiency of the Common Law. Earlier, we discuss governance by
common law and conclude that common-law processes tend to adopt rules of
liability that allocate resources to their highest-valued uses. Although the
outcomes of suits at law and in equity will disadvantage particular litigants,
the results are efficient in the hybrid sense of welfare theory, because
behind a veil of ignorance, constitution makers would adopt such a process
for large classes of disputes.
The common law's efficiency does not depend on judges' decisions,
per se. Indeed, judges might even decide cases at random, with a slight bias
toward not upsetting precedent, and the efficiency result would still hold.
Following Rubin (1977) the demonstration of common-law efficiency proceeds thus. Suppose that the problem under study is accident liability in tort
law. 51 Let A be the tortfeasor-defendant and B, the victim-plaintiff. The
court must decide whether liability for an accident is to fall on A or B. If A is
liable, then he will spend (for him) an optimal amount, SA, to avoid
accidents, and with this expenditure, NA future accidents will occur. An
opposite holding, placing liability on B, will result in SB being spent on
avoidance, leading to NB future accidents. Let X equal the cost of the
present accident and of each future accident that occurs, and let TA and TB
represent, respectively, the total costs of future accident avoidance and
accident costs for A and B, if each is held liable under the different rules. An
efficient rule would place liability on B, say, if
TB=SB+NBX<SA +NAX=TA142
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Let R be the probability that B will prevail in court if an accident occurs
and litigation ensues. If precedent favors B, then R exceeds .5, but if it
favors A, then R is less than .5. We now define additional variables, VA and
VB, the expected values to the litigants of going to trial, and C, each party's
litigation cost. The expected values to the litigants of going to trial are
respectively:
VA=R(-X) + (1-R)TA -C,
and
VB =R(X) + (1-R)(-TB)-C.
Here, TA and TB represent future costs of different liability rules, the net
present values of precedents that the court affirms or overturns . The
litigants settle before trial if - VA exceeds VB· But they litigate if
(1- R)(TA-TB)> 2C.
(4)
The important term in inequality (4) is the expression (TA- TB).
Suppose that the liability rule is inefficient and should hold B liable, not A.
Notice that, reflecting this inefficiency, as the difference in the stream of
costs, TA - TB• increases, the defendant has an increased likelihood of
challenging the inefficient precedent, even though R, by assumption, is less
than one-half. Once continually challenged, precedent, perhaps randomly,
switches liability from A to B. Ceteris paribus, the parties no longer have as
great an incentive to litigate and therefore to challenge the newly established efficient precedent. Similarly, notice that expression (4) is independent of the judge's particular motives.52
Inequality (4) shows the robustness of common-law processes in
producing efficient rules of liability for certain classes of social disputes,
private disagreements whose resolutions govern larger questions about
social resource allocation. The inequality also demonstrates those situations
in which common-law processes may be random concerning efficiency.
First, with the inclusion of TA and TB• the inequality assumes that the
litigants have a future interest in precedent. This condition may hold true for
important classes of litigants. For example, insurance companies might be
intensely interested in liability rules governing tort actions arising from
automobile accidents. Therefore, in rear-end collisions, say, the following
driver will be held liable, not the leading driver, who stopped short.
Technologically, the following driver is the least-cost accident avoider,
because if the leading driver must keep a constant watch in his rear-view
mirror, he might have an increased chance of hitting an object in front of
him.
The presence of litigants with precedential interests, such as insurance
companies, will drive common-law processes to adopt efficient rules, which
in turn will govern some cases involving litigants with no interest in
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precedent. Precedentially uninterested persons will thus receive an external benefit from the litigating activities of larger firms, which bear part of the
social costs and benefits of their activities. If no such precedentially
interested participants are available for particular classes of disputes,
however, and absent an interest in efficiency by judges, we might be less
confident that common-law processes will produce correct results. Of
course, judges experienced in following arguments concerning the publicpolicy consequences of their decisions, as expressed in litigants' briefs and
arguments, might reflect the pleadings of the cases before them and adopt
efficient rules.
A second problem emerges, because of rules of judicial economy. For
example, many such rules concern "standing to sue," meaning that a
''party has sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain
judicial resolution of that controversy" (Black's Law Dictionary, 1979:
1260). Rules of standing may remove some potential plaintiffs from access
to the courts and their otherwise efficient rules and results. Similarly,
narrow judicial construings of what constitutes a "cause of action" may
produce the same effect. For example, before the 1950s, most courts held
that a trespass required a physical invasion and derivatively ruled that air
pollution by unseen chemicals would not constitute such an invasion. Such
rulings stymied a common-law resolution of air-pollution problems. This
narrow interpretation, which seemed reasonable in an earlier age, in which
air pollution was less severe and the superior good of environmental quality
was less highly valued at the margin, grew increasingly unreasonable in later
years. Judges began to abandon the rule in the 1950s, but before the
common law could work out new liability rules, federal legislation preempted
common-law processes.
Finally, inequality (4) reveals the larger problem in depending upon
individual litigants to drive common-law processes to efficient rules.
Litigation costs might exceed the expected benefits to any particular
plaintiff, but because of scale economies in litigation, all damaged persons
would receive a benefit from litigation in excess of their share of the costs,
were it possible to aggregate their interests. Public-goods problems thus
emerge, and unless judges will accept class actions to assemble those
dispersed interests, the cost of litigation, C, might undermine the robustness of the judicial process in correcting large-scale externalities. Hence, in
certain situations in which welfare theory calls for governmental amelioration, the common law may find it difficult to achieve welfare-regarding
results. This problem seems especially acute when disaggregated victims
confront a monopolist, who internalizes the full benefits and costs of his
litigation decisions.
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Not surprisingly, when statute law preempts common-law rules, there
is no guarantee that the result is efficient. Indeed, in many instances of
conscious preemption, the result is inefficient, because of the private,
divisible interests served in the legislative process. For example, in the case
of industrial accidents, workers are usually the least-cost avoiders, although
there are substantial grounds in the common law for holding firms liable for
patently negligent conduct. Workmen's compensation statutes, though,
often eliminate considerations of contributory negligence, imposing a regime
of strict liability on firms. Arguably, the result is a greater number of
accidents and a greater social cost (Chelius, 1977, 1976; Smith, 1982).
Organized unions, having been guaranteed formation and maintenance by
statute, lobbied for such a result; but individual firms, which enjoyed no
practical way to assemble their interests, seemed equally disadvantaged in
the legislative process. Thus, the monopoly problem just cited in commonlaw litigation carries forward into the legislature. And higher consumer costs
are an additional result.
Supreme Court Jurisprudence. It seems more difficult to discern
welfare-relevant considerations in Supreme Court decisions than in the
decisions of state courts. Large classes of Supreme Court cases involve
disputes in which welfare theorists must stand mute, or nearly so. For
example, we can trace out the economic consequences of decisions
concerning racial integration, abortion, prayer in the public schools, and
pornography. But the original litigation in such cases often aligned the
parties in zero-sum conflict. Many of the attendant costs and benefits seem
symbolic, and therefore an analysis of such cases, using the tools of welfare
theory, while they might often be instructive, might unduly size this body of
law to a Procrustean bed. Such an analysis can clarify many of the issues
involved. The resulting opinions and rules, however, might not be easily
susceptible of interpretation using the tools that find application elsewhere
in this essay.
The Supreme Court does affect the private-goods basis of legislation,
though, and we can trace out the relationship between Supreme Court
decision making and this character of legislation. Examining this relationship
also illuminates the dynamic time dimension to private-interest legislation.
The principal work is by Landes and Posner (1975), who find a connection
between two characteristics of the federal government. The first is the
persistence of an independent judiciary, '' one that does not make decisions
on the sorts of political factors (for example, the electoral strength of the
people affected by the decision) that would influence and in most cases
control the decision were it made by a legislative body, such as the U.S.
Congress" (Landes and Posner, 1975:875). The second is an "interestgroup theory" of government, such as this essay develops.

145

Peter H. Aranson and Peter C. Ordeshook

To explain this connection requires a recognition of the time dimension
in the private-goods bargains that the legislatures generate. For instance, a
particular subsidy program or entry control in a regulated industry might last
for a year, ten years, or in perpetuity. Ceteris paribus, an interest group
would prefer programs that last for longer periods than for shorter ones,
and this preference holds important consequences for legislators. A congressman who expects to be in office for a limited time enjoys two important
benefits from passing private-goods legislation in perpetuity. First, he need
only once bear the costs of the initial legislative process. Incremental
reappropriations and reauthorizations seem far simpler and less costly than
initial ones, and he can immediately capitalize his share of a program's net
present value, even if he only intends to remain briefly in Congress.
Furthermore, this arrangement's single-payment feature circumvents his
difficult contractual problem of enforcing payments in perpetuity.
Potential threats to this arrangement appear substantial. Legislators in
future Congresses continuously might demand renegotiation of the original
agreement and compensation for themselves. Legislative abrogation is a
distinct possibility, which would reduce the net present value of the income
stream to the interest group, thus simultaneously diminishing the price that
the group is willing to pay to its original sponsor.
The possibility of abrogation also holds serious consequences for the
abrogators, the incumbent legislators. If the members of Congress rescind
agreements struck in earlier Congresses, they simultaneously reduce
expectations of a long-term benefit flow among interest groups presently
engaged in de novo bargaining with congressmen. Hence, with each
abrogation of a prior agreement, an incumbent congressman reduces his
expected payment from a present bargain. The entire Congress faces this
problem, and it represents an institutional prisoners' dilemma for its
members.
The congressional solution to this problem is institutional. Congressional procedures, such as the filibuster, bicameralism, and the capacity of
committees to kill legislation, preserve the status quo by making it very
difficult to terminate prior private-interest bargains. These procedures also
make new legislation more costly. But Landes and Posner believe that the
net benefit to the members of Congress from having status-quo-preserving
procedures is greater than it would be without them. 53 Stated differently,
the additional permanence of the reduced number of bills that succeed is
greater than the opportunity costs of those that fail.
This assumption about the relative costs and benefits of making
legislation more difficult to pass is susceptible to a different interpretation,
however, one that pervades our earlier analysis of interest-group and
legislative decision making in regard to a choice to pursue a private benefit
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or to oppose one. That analysis showed that interest groups have an
incentive to seek, and congressmen have an incentive to pass, privatebenefits legislation, but neither has an incentive to oppose such legislation.
Landes and Posner incorporate the incentive to pass private-benefits
legislation, but they worry about incentives to delete existing legislation.
Yet, our earlier analysis explains that incentives to delete such legislation
are equivalent to incentives to produce collective goods. We found no such
incentives present. Hence, prior private-benefits legislation enjoys a presumptive permanence, even though a majority of the members of subsequent Congresses might oppose it.
The judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, represents a second
threat to the long-run flow of private benefits from single enactments.
Suppose that the judiciary were not independent, but instead were responsive to legislative changes in preferences, thus canceling certain long-term
legislative contracts with interest groups. Judicial nullification may even be a
preferred way for legislators to eliminate these prior bargains, because it
would avoid the legislative gauntlet. Thus,
suppose that Congress in year one ''sells' ' the dairy industry a
heavy tax on margarine, but the next year the producers of
margarine offer Congress generous inducements to remove the
tax. Congress is unlikely to respond to this demand by enacting
repealing legislation, due to the impediments to swift legislative
action .... But if the judges are the perfect agents of the current
Congress, they will refuse to enforce the margarine tax, and the
effects will be the same as legislative repeal. (Landes and Posner,
1975:879)
Hence, members of present Congresses share an incentive not merely
to structure their decision-making process, to avoid legislative nullification
of earlier agreements, but also to avoid compromising the independence of
the judiciary. 54 To avoid conflicts with the Congress, the Court also has an
incentive to affirm earlier private-interest legislation, and indeed the
Supreme Court seldom overturns such legislation. Rather, the Court
acquiesces in these enactments, thus reinforcing its own ''independence.''
The Supreme Court's activity is thus notable, not for what it does, but
for what it does not do: namely, interfere with the private-interest bargains
struck in the legislature. One can even sense in the Court's decisions the
operation of implicit rules requiring the preservation of prior legislation. The
Supreme Court goes beyond not tampering with prior enactments to finding
ways to enhance their survival. For example, in statutory interpretation, the
Court often examines the original congressional hearings and speeches, to
discern the intent of the originating legislators. While this activity some-
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times results in peculiar readings of the legislative record, nevertheless,
statutory construction is a common judicial practice. Indeed, even when the
Court confronts an otherwise unconstitutional statute, it usually tries to
narrow the scope of the statute or otherwise interpret its terms so that it
will pass constitutional muster, to preserve as much of the original bargain's
intent as possible. 55

ELECTIONS IN PRIVATE GOODS

We have come full circle from an analysis of electorates and the place of
interest groups in them through the decision-making processes of the
institutions of government. Our central conclusion is that most participants
in the political process engage in the supply and demand of private benefits
at collective cost, with scant regard for welfare-related criteria. Four tasks
remain. First, we must reconcile the social-imbalance and fiscal-illusion
hypotheses, which predict different public policies, with the private-goods
view maintained here. Second, we must explain why the public sector does
not yet account for the total gross national product. Third, we must revise
our election models by departing from that of public goods as issues and
moving to the notion of private goods, supplied at collective cost, as issues.
Fourth, we must explain how issues cast as explicit public-goods decisions
transcend that form to become decisions about private benefits, supplied at
collective cost.
The accomplishment of the first of these tasks appears simple. Both
the social-imbalance and fiscal-illusion hypotheses seem correct, because
they do not predict mutually exclusive decisions. The social-imbalance
hypothesis asserts that public goods will be underproduced. Our analysis
does not predict whether such goods will be underproduced or overproduced, because the actual level of production seems epiphenomena} to
the political process. For instance, we argue that the animus for nationaldefense production rests largely with the demands of divisible constituencies and firms, as well as with members of the military and the Department
of Defense. Whether those interests coincide with the production of a
proper level of national defense, or with a level of defense that is either too
small or too large, we cannot say. We can merely indicate that there is too
large an expenditure on private, divisible benefits, and we can identify
sources of inefficiency. This means that at present expenditure levels, by
making reallocations of spending, we could produce much more of the public
good of national defense than we have today; or we could produce the same
level of national defense at a greatly reduced cost, if we eliminated the
entire private-goods nexus, and provided that there were another way to
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assemble a demand for an optimal production of this particular public goodnational defense.
The fiscal-illusion hypothesis is a close cousin to the kinds of cost
spreading identified earlier. We have indicated how an effective political
demand for a private, highly concentrated benefit might be formed, to the
detriment of dispersed taxpayers. The inducement of a fiscal illusion merely
reinforces this tendency. The social-imbalance and fiscal-illusion hypotheses
thus refer to separate decision contexts. The first predicts the public•sector
undersupply of public goods, and the second predicts its oversupply of
private goods. Because any sensible model of electoral processes must
incorporate illusions symmetrically, we construct our election model with
that desideratum in mind.
Second, we must account for the public sector's failure to account for
the total gross national product. To some extent an explanation for this
datum rests with the simple observation that private benefits may be more
easily produced collectively by having the public sector leave certain
activities private. For example, regulation and the divisible benefits that
flow from it could not exist without a private sector. Similarly, in many of the
tax code's adumbrations, the ability to grant loopholes allows for the further
production of private benefits, sometimes at the collective cost of privatesector inefficiencies pursuant to tax avoidance and the enhanced taxation of
"unprivileged" activities. But these explanations probably remain less
important than the more significant limitation, that there are macrolevel
sources of inertia, preventing the public sector from growing at a faster rate
than at present. Like social imbalances and fiscal illusions, the causes of this
inertia should be an explicit deduction from a model of electoral processes
with private benefits as issues.
AN ELECTORAL PROCESS IN PRIVATE GOODS

The private-goods-election model is constructed out of assumptions
concerning voters' thresholds of perception and candidates' decision procedures (Aranson and Ordeshook, 1978 and forthcoming). We assume that
voters may differ systematically in their ability or willingness to perceive the
net costs or benefits of alternative public policies and that candidates differ
in their decision procedures between variants of global and incremental
decision making. Interest groups in this model are price takers, which
merely observe candidates' platforms and assess their expected welfare
under each contestant's incumbency.
Voters. The discussion of the political superiority of groups over the
members of an anomic electorate concentrated on the group's superior
ability to monitor and enforce compliance with bargains and on its related
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capacity to convey political information. This process is bound to be
imperfect, and therefore group members will vary in the amount of political
information that they can and do absorb. The opportunity costs of collecting
political information also vary systematically across the entire electorate,
and these costs affect the amount of public-policy information that any
particular citizen might have. 56 Here, we characterize information in each
group by a distribution of thresholds of perception concerning net benefits
or costs of public-policy programs. Figures 4.4a, 4.4b, and 4.4c illustrate
three of the many possible general functional forms. The horizontal axis in
each figure measures net benefits or costs, while the vertical axis depicts
the threshold distribution's rate of change for alternative values of net
benefits and costs, labeled here as ~.
To interpret these figures, suppose that they represent the distribution
of thresholds for the members of a particular group, and that an election
candidate proposes a program of private benefits supplied at collective cost,
which would create a net benefit or cost of Xi for each group member. The
entire area under each threshold function is one. The shaded area to the left
FIGURE 4.4a

net benefits
or costs
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of ~ shows the proportion of members that would perceive the net benefit
or cost and act on it. Members with thresholds to the right of Xi would
perceive no net change in their welfare. The distribution's skew and its
general shape will affect the proportion of members that perceives a net
welfare change. In figure 4.4a the members tend to be highly sensitive to
small changes, while those in figure 4.4c appear largely insensitive.
It is tempting though speculative to provide interpretations of these
figures. One possible interpretation is that the group whose threshold is
depicted in figure 4 .4a has excellent communications with its members, or
that the group is small and closely knit, providing instant communications
about political knowledge; by contrast, the group in figure 4.4c is only
loosely constructed, with poor communications. Figure 4 .4c may even
represent the threshold distribution of the entire electorate.
An alternative interpretation allows for dynamic changes in thresholds
as the result of changing economic and political conditions. For example, if
tax shares increase rapidly because of increasing federal expenditures for
various public programs, thresholds might soon pile up near zero, as citizens

FIGURE 4.4b

net benefits
or costs
151

Peter H. Aranson and Peter C. Ordeshook

become highly sensitive to small changes in aggregate public-sector spending. Alternatively, during periods of economic expansion, citizens might be
less aware of small changes in their tax shares and in regulatory welfare
losses. While we may infer these two observations from diminishing
marginal utility for wealth, they also suggest the presence of forces
operating at cross-purposes. For example, if citizens become extremely
sensitive to small tax-cost increases, they may also begin to demand
proportionately more private, divisible benefits from the public sector, a
result that the preceding analysis of political service as an inferior good
would suggest. Figures 4.5a, 4.5b, and 4.5c show the respective cumulative
densities of these threshold functions, f(IXi I). In these figures the vertical
axis depicts the area under the threshold function, which translates into an
election candidate's plurality gains or losses generated in each group from
advocating a policy associated with IXi ICandidates ' Strategies. This model was originally constructed to
explain the decisions of an incumbent chief executive seeking to be
reelected and the decisions of his challenger. Later, though, we generalize
FIGURE 4.4c

net benefits
or costs
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the model to include legislative decisions . The present characterization of
executive decision making concerns whether such persons pass on various
private-benefit programs incrementally, one at a time, or globally, all at
once. The actual decision variable involved concerns the number of
programs to be added, deleted, or left unchanged.
Most of the time we expect presidents and their challengers to decide
incrementally, choosing to add, delete, or leave unchanged particular
programs one at a time. This procedure seems attractive, first , because
interest-group demands probably are pressed serially rather than all at
once. Second, as noted in the discussion of the judiciary, legislators are
constrained to leave most programs untouched, making changes only at the
margin. Third, executives and their challengers seem physically and
informationally constrained to accept what has gone before and to operate at
the margin by adding or deleting programs one or a few at a time.
Information costs alone preclude a "zero-base" scheme. Fourth, the
strategy of ambiguity likewise restricts the number of programs on which
candidates will take forthright positions.

plurality

FIGURE 4.5a

/Xd
net benefits

153

Peter H. Aranson and Peter C. Ordeshook

Global decision making-the simultaneous considering of all present
federal programs as well as those demanded or under review-may exist in
an ideological space, but it is hardly realistic to believe that it prevails in dayto-day deliberations and in the private promises that candidates make to
individual interest groups. Candidates who sometimes adopt global strategies or global approaches to public-policy decisions usually achieve the
label of "radical." We assume that such a strategy is possible, however, if
only to round out the analysis.
We also assume that each group has at most one program that can be
added or deleted and that groups are of equal size. We let x equal the
number of groups having programs added, and let y equal the number having
programs deleted, such that x + y is less than or equal ton, the total number
of groups. A candidate associates a plurality with each group, which depends
on that group's net benefits or costs, ~. and the group's distribution of
thresholds. For instance, if a candidate advocates adding a benefit, B, at
collective cost C for some group, if B and C are common for all of the
groups' programs, and if tax shares are equal across groups, then compared

plurality

FIGURE 4.5b

net benefits
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to the status quo of no net changes, the candidate's net plurality gain

from the benefited group is f (B - x ~ YC). The expression [ (x ~-Yl] C represents the net addition to or subtraction from the tax or regulatory cost for
each group, associated with a program addition or deletion. Since x groups
have programs added, the total addition to the candidate's plurality,
compared with his plurality in the status quo, is xf (B - x~YC). Similarly, for
they groups whose programs are deleted, the candidate receives a plurality
change (probably a loss) of yf(-B-x~y C). And for the n-x-y groups
whose programs or status remain unchanged, the candidate's plurality
change becomes (n - x - y) f ( - x ~ Y C). The candidate must choose a value
of x and y to maximize his plurality, V (x,y). In terms of the preceding
formulations, we can state V (x,y) as
V(x,y) = xf(B- x~y C) +yf( -B- x~y C) + (n-x-y)f( - x~y C). (4)
Incremental decision making requires candidates to adjust x and y by
adding or deleting programs one at a time, as an election campaign or a
legislative session progresses. Global decision procedures allow x and y to

plurality

FIGURE 4.Sc

net benefits
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take on any values up to an including n. An intermediate, hybrid form of
global decision procedure assumes that the number of groups affected will
be greater than one and less than n. That is, certain preexisting programs
will not be deleted.
ELECTIONS WITH GLOBAL DECISION PROCEDURES

In earlier work, we report on the results of global candidate decision
making, assuming the absence of thresholds or the presence of a uniform
distribution of thresholds (1978 and forthcoming). That analysis provided
few surprises, except that if the benefit of each program equals its cost in
the presence of zero thresholds, then the net number of programs added or
deleted may be ambiguous. The most important conclusion from examining
electoral processes under these two very highly specialized assumptions is
that maximum redistributive expropriations fail to occur. There is some
inertia, even in these highly stylized electorates. Here, we analyze the more
general cases of thresholds as depicted in figures 4.4a and 4.4c.
Sensitive Electorates. Suppose that thresholds are distributed as in
figure 4.4a: citizens are sensitive to relatively small changes in their
welfare. Using global decision procedures, candidates will find a strategic
optimum in which each and every group's program must either be added or
deleted. At an optimum strategy, however, x cannot equal y. And
surprisingly, x exceeds y: more programs will be added than deleted. This
last finding is independent of the relative values of benefits and costs.
Insensitive Electorates. If thresholds are distributed as in figure 4.4c,
under global decision procedures, then more programs are deleted than
added, provided that costs exceed benefits. If benefits exceed costs, then
the actual configuration of outcomes depends on the parameters and the
actual functional form off.
ELECTIONS WITH INCREMENTAL DECISION PROCEDURES

Incrementalism seldom finds explicit definition in the literature, but our
analysis requires specificity. Accordingly, we include analyses of three
separate forms of incremental decision making: nai've incremental decision
making and two forms of local optimization.
Na'ive lncrementalism. Under naive incremental decision making, the
candidate or officeholder decides at the margin whether to add or delete
some group's program. If citizens are relatively sensitive to small changes
in their welfare, then the candidate adds programs one at a time only if each
program's benefits exceed its costs. Otherwise, he deletes them. But if
citizens are relatively insensitive, then the opposite configuration holds.
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Depending on functional forms and parameters, adding programs dominates
over deletion as an inverse function of the level of costs, as a direct function
of the level of thresholds (insensitivity), and as a direct function of the size
and support of the group that benefits.
Opportunity-cost Local Optimum. In the second incremental decision
procedure, candidates serially adjust x and y to find a local optimum. For
instance, suppose that a candidate's first decision is to add a program.
Under an opportunity-cost local optimum, he will continue to add programs
one at a time until one of two events occur. Either the marginal plurality
from these additions would equal zero, or the marginal plurality from
deleting a program would exceed that of adding one. When this second
condition prevails, the candidate will then delete programs serially until a
parallel change occurs. This decision procedure allows for recontracting of
prior commitments, and it continues until the election is held or until there
are no further gains as a result of additions or deletions.
Non-opportunity-cost Local Optimum. A third incremental strategy has
the candidate use the same considerations as under the opportunity-cost
optimum, except that he would not compare the marginal returns from
additions and deletions, but would simply add programs serially until the
marginal additions to plurality became zero or negative, and then he would
delete programs until the same condition obtained. This procedure does not
require the candidate to compare the opportunity costs of his full strategy
set, and it depicts a decision maker who allows the public sector to grow
until taxpayers become angry, after which he joins the tax-cutting bandwagon. Former Governor Jerry Brown of California used such a strategy in
the face of Proposition 13's success in his state.
Under this decision procedure or the opportunity-cost variant, invoking
the threshold distributions in either figures 4.4b or 4.4c, and allowing for
recontracting of previously advocated policies, there will be a net addition of
programs. That is, candidates set x greater than y. 57 Under a nonopportunity cost, local-optimum strategy, if thresholds are distributed near zero,
the previously identified pattern with nai've incrementalism probably prevails, in that y exceeds x, and more programs are deleted than added. If
thresholds are distributed far from zero, then under the same decision
procedure, candidates add more programs than they delete.
HYBRID GLOBAL DECISION-MAKING

If candidates can operate in a greater than incremental fashion but are
limited in the number of programs they can affect, then a hybrid global
decision procedure prevails. For example, each of the political parties may
regard a different set of programs as belonging to its traditional constitu-
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ency, so that such programs cannot be deleted. If program benefits equal
costs, and if thresholds are symmetrically distributed, as in figure 4.4b, then
a candidate who is limited to considering only one-half of the programs under
review will add more than he deletes. In a special case of figure 4.4c, using a
quadratic payoff function, if a candidate adds no new programs, then he must
be able to delete more than one-half of the programs under consideration, to
achieve a net plurality increase. As public-sector size then grows by the
accretion of more programs, the number of groups whose programs the
candidate must deny, to increase his plurality, will decline. If the candidate's
payoff function is concave, then these results are reversed. Accordingly,
under a hybrid global decision procedure, welfare-sensitive electorates will
produce a smaller public sector. The opposite result holds with thresholds
distributed far from zero, the case of convex payoffs.
LEGISLATIVE DECISION MAKING

Constituency as Interest Group. To make sense out of legislative
decision making by using the preceding election model in private benefits,
suppose that a constituency is an interest group, so that a pure pork-barrel
relationship prevails. Furthermore, suppose that separate threshold distributions describe each constituency. This formulation of the legislator's
problem allows for the deletion of programs as well as their addition.
The analysis of the legislator's decision becomes more difficult than
that for chief executives and their opponents, because legislative coalitions
become possible. But suppose that a winning coalition has formed and that it
will add or delete programs under a generalized incremental decision
procedure. Because legislative coalitions may be unstable, winners and
losers can change places quickly. We assume that all winning legislative
coalitions will adopt identical decision rules, and that if the number of groups
with programs added is less than a majority, then the coalition will delete
only the programs that members of the losing coalition support. Let P(W)
represent the probability that a legislator belongs to a coalition of w
legislators, and suppose that all coalitions are equally likely to form. Under
this assumption, a legislator's expected payoff becomes,
V(x y) =P(W) [~] (B _x-y C) + w-xf( _x-y C)
'

w

n

w

n

+ [1-P(W)][_ Y
_ f(-B-x-y C) +n-W-Yf( _x-y C)].
(5)
n- w
n
n-w
n
Because P (W) =
equation (5) becomes equation (4), and the earlier findings of this election model remain invariant between executive and legislative decision making, if constituencies are equivalent to interest groups.

*,
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Nonconstituency Interest Groups. If constituencies are not the fundamental interest groups, but if interest groups are national, finding representation in most or all constituencies, then there is bound to be no real publicpolicy conflicts among legislators. If this condition prevails, then each
legislator is equivalent to an executive or his challenger, and the results
from the election model carry over unchanged.
Heterogeneous Constituencies. Some interest groups may have members in certain constituencies but not in others. There may be neither
rhyme nor reason to the actual distribution of groups in constituencies, and
therefore there are no general findings from the election model in private
goods. If payments from interest groups to legislators are politically fungible
and transferrable across district boundaries, however, so that legislators
share in the rents from added programs or in the marginal plurality from
deleted ones, then the preceding election model again finds use.
IMPLICATIONS FROM THE MODEL

Table 4.2 summarizes certain of the findings from the election model.
While these results are overgeneralized and do not contain many of the
caveats in the original research, for purposes of speculation we discuss
them here somewhat more liberally than a closer reading might allow.
Strategic Premises. Most conjectures about this election model require
an empirical interpretation of the kinds of conditions in the electorate or in

TABLE 4.2
SUMMARY OF DECISION PROCEDURE AND THRESHOLD EFFECTS
ON PUBLIC-SECTOR GROWTH

THRESHOLD DISTRIBUTION

Near zero

Far from zero

DECISION PROCEDURE

Global

Net growth

Qualified net reduction

Nonopportunity cost
incremental

Net reduction

Net growth

Adapted from Peter H. Aranson and Peter C. Ordeshook, "Alternative Theories
of the Growth of Government and Their Implications for Constitutional Tax and Spending
Limits," in Tax and Expenditure Limitations, ed. Helen Ladd and Nicholas Tideman
(Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 1981), p. 161.

SOURCE:
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political competition that would lead a given threshold condition or decision
procedure to apply. For example, ceteris paribus, the distribution of
thresholds may reflect the electorate's size. Larger electorates may be
insensitive, with threshold distributions far from zero, as in figure 4.4c;
smaller electorates might be sensitive, as in figure 4.4a. Using incremental
decision procedures, candidates in smaller electorates would therefore
create a leaner public sector, but as the electorate grows, the public sector
might increase at a proportionately greater rate. Hence, those candidates or
interest groups favoring (their share of) public-sector expansion should
prefer centralized decision making in larger constituencies, annexations, and
federalization of public-policy decision making. Devolution would be a
preferred strategy for those who prefer a smaller public sector.
For those groups that find themselves in small electorates of unchanging size, but that wish to improve their chances of receiving private benefits
at collective cost, an alternative strategy is to urge the agents of government to adopt global decision procedures, because this departure from
incremental processes would result in a net public-sector expansion.
Alternatively, if global procedures are already in place in a large electorate,
such officeholders or interest groups might prefer a devolution of political
authority to smaller units, because in the presence of global procedures and
of citizens who are sensitive to small welfare changes that result from
public-policy alterations, a net increase in public-sector size will again result.
Dynamic Aspects. Dynamic considerations invoke the possibility that
thresholds and decision procedures are not merely exogenous to the
political process but are also subject to manipulation. For example, as noted
earlier, rapid increases in public-sector size, and the accompanying higher
tax and interest rates occasioned by additional programs, might make
citizens more sensitive to small changes in their welfare as their wealth
declines. Alternatively, a robust economy might make citizens relatively
more insensitive to public-policy-related changes in their welfare. The first
possibility, of a government's growing under incrementalism in the presence of an insensitive electorate, may have characterized the development
of public policies before the Reagan administration. At least in its official
announcements, the Carter administration sought to use global decision
procedures in the presence of an only partially sensitive electorate. As
predicted, that result led to a net growth in public-sector size and, by a
reasonable interpretation, the incorporation of a large number of publicspending programs into the category of "entitlements," with automatic
cost-of-living adjustments, perhaps as a protective strategy, or as a
legislative attempt to capitalize immediately on long-term spending programs.
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The Reagan administration, faced with a greatly reduced distribution of
thresholds of its own making, tried a mix of global and incremental decision
procedures: global with respect to the entire body of defense programs, and
incremental with regard to each reauthorization of social programs. It ended
up with a net growth in public-sector size but with a concommitant shift of
spending from domestic to defense categories.
One interesting aspect of the model's dynamic implications concerns
the shift from cell to cell in table 4.2. We might begin with a condition of
incremental decision making and an insensitive electorate, realizing net
growth. As the citizenry grows poorer because of the resulting inefficiencies
and higher tax costs, people will become relatively more sensitive to publicpolicy-related changes in their welfare. Hence, conditions will move from
the right-hand to the left-hand column of table 4.2. But it remains unclear
what public-policy change this shift will create, because we cannot predict
the candidates' or officeholders' responses. Those who continue to decide
incrementally will support a net reduction in public-sector size, but those
who take a global view will advocate additions to the number of private
benefits, collectively supplied. To the extent that "cost cutters" try to
depart from the status quo, they will often defeat themselves by adopting
global decision procedures as part of a larger public-policy attitude.
Perhaps we can best describe the experience of the United States and
other representative democracies during much of the nineteenth century as
a limited public sector, declining in size, in which officeholders could use
global decision procedures in the presence of an electorate with thresholds
distributed far from zero. That speculation gains force from the observation
that in the United .States and Great Britain, public-sector size relative to
national product declined throughout most of the nineteenth century.
MACROECONOMIC POLICY

The preceding discussion demonstrates that under certain conditions
the public sector will actually shrink. Thus, the election process itself
provides a method for constraining the accretion of private•benefit programs. While this observation answers our third question about limitations
to public-sector size, the conditions that prevail in most instancesincremental decision procedures with insensitive electorates-provide the
theoretical assumptions necessary for net increases in public-sector size
over time. Even so, we have provided an additional partial explanation of
why the public sector does not yet account for the total gross national
product, by beginning the theoretical construction necessary to complete
the third task-namely, developing an election model in private goods. The
final task is to explain how issues cast as explicit public-goods decisions
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transcend that form to become decisions about private benefits, supplied at
collective cost.
For certain of these public-goods issues, we have already explained
their transformation. Public goods-such as national defense, public peace,
and environmental protection-remain at least partially public in consumption. But in their production the incidence of expenditures creates a set of
private-benefit programs for individual firms and constituencies. Yet, for
larger macroeconomic issues, the political engines of transformation seem
less apparent. Issues such as inflation, unemployment, interest rates, and
overall tax policy seem less readily susceptible to the private-benefit
interpretation suggested here. Macroeconomic policies do exist, and politicians do manipulate them. The result for our analysis is thus a confrontation
of two views. The first adheres to a microlevel model about the political
pursuit of individual public-sector programs. The second observes the
presence of macrolevel phenomena concerning these larger economic
measures. Indeed, micro- and macrolevel policies may conflict, for example,
because increases in private-benefit programs may occasion higher taxes
and a lower gross national product.
The reconciliation of these conflicting views begins with the observation that politicians enjoy a wide variety of strategic responses to those
macroeconomic outcomes that threaten or enhance the chances of election
or reelection. Under a theory that we have criticized here, they may attend
solely to larger macroeconomic considerations, either to gain reelection
(Tufte, 1978; Nordhaus, 1975) or to develop truly welfare-regarding
macroeconomic policies. But that conclusion rejects the notion that elected
officeholders and challengers respond principally to organized groups,
rather than to the entire anomic electorate. A closer examination of specific
policies suggests that even when macroeconomic problems do occur, the
demands of particular groups prevail in the fashioning of public-sector
responses. Unemployment, interest rates, taxes, and deficits provide four
examples (Aranson, 1983).
Unemployment. The traditional analysis of unemployment distinguishes
between its cyclical and structural variants. Cyclical unemployment (and
employment) occurs with the ebb and flow of the economy, as a result of
changes in demand brought about by economic recession and expansion.
Structural unemployment occurs as the result of a mismatch between the
skills of the affected labor-market sector and the skills demanded in both the
private and public sectors. The commonly suggested set of programs to
reduce each form of unemployment depends upon its cause. Many economists, adopting a rational-expectations view, believe that cyclical unemployment requires no public-sector solution, because workers in cyclical
industries receive a wage premium to compensate them for periods of
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unemployment. The high hourly wages of auto workers provide one
example. Retraining programs or a negative income tax may be the most
efficient solutions for structural unemployment.
Enacted solutions to unemployment problems contain few of these
elements or considerations. Rather, as in other areas of political life, here,
too, legislators respond to the demands of the organized, who tend to be
unionized workers in cyclical industries, seeking additional public-sector
support to compensate them for periods of unemployment over and above
the compensation that they receive in their wage differential. For example,
these groups constantly demand and sometimes receive government
protection from foreign competition, even when it would be more sensible
to do nothing or to relocate these workers temporarily, or even permanently, in other industries. This protection hardens investments and makes
relocation more costly. Elaborate unemployment-compensation schemes,
which do little for the structurally unemployed, exacerbate unemployment in
cyclical industries. The hard-core and the structurally unemployed, who
remain largely unorganized, only receive benefits from programs demanded
by their organized sponsors-members of the welfare establishment, whose
jobs are secure. These programs are not designed to"reduce case loads or
to allocate benefits efficiently.
Hence, the private-benefit pattern prevails in unemployment policies.
The unorganized go unserved. But the organized receive divisible benefits
at collective cost, with the additional problem that these benefits provide
incentives for the cyclically unemployed to remain so. These programs also
indirectly subsidize cyclical industries. It is estimated that the addition of
these private-benefit programs to the public sector has contributed to the
increase from 4 to 6 percent in long-term unemployment rates since World
War II (Feldstein, 1982).
Interest Rates. Economists may disagree over policies that determine
interest rates. Nevertheless, interest rates appear to generate from public
policies more nearly concerned with public-goods production than is the
case, say, with unemployment. Yet, even here, particular policies and
general macroeconomic decisions are responsive to organized-group demands, not to the service of a larger public purpose. Specific policies include
bailouts for banking institutions, construction-industry subsidies, and occasionally usury laws, which work the greatest hardship on lower-income
citizens, who may not be sufficiently credit worthy to secure loans at lower,
statutorily regulated rates. More commonly, the larger macroeconomic
policies themselves are designed to respond to the demands of large,
organized groups, such as labor unions, the construction and real-estate
industries, and cyclical industries in consumer-product lines.
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Taxes. We describe earlier the manner in which tax legislation is
responsive to private-interest demands. Each new ''tax reform" or "taxreduction'' bill contains a laundry list of exceptions and loopholes to benefit
particular classes of firms or individual taxpayers. Sometimes, statutes are
written to benefit a particular firm. The inefficiencies that tax-avoidance
strategies-such as the purchase of economically unprofitable tax shelterscreate, the implicit subsidies of tax loopholes and their distorting effects on
the economy, as well as the high cost of tax preparation, must be counted as
deadweight losses for the entire economy. Hence, these programs, too,
represent private benefits supplied at collective cost.
Deficits. As a political issue, deficits during the Reagan administration
attracted bipartisan appeal. Deficits are troublesome to politicians, inter
alia, because they require debt servicing, and therefore they act as a ''tax''
on future public spending, thereby reducing the public sector's ability to
supply future private benefits. Here again, the response to increasing
deficits is consistent with the public-policy patterns described earlier. Those
least well organized are affected first. For example, reductions in Social
Security payments are enacted to the detriment of future recipients, not
present ones. These recipients, who also bear the present burden of the
program's cost, remain largely unorganized. By contrast, present recipients
are organized. Similarly, student-loan programs-a benefit for a largely
unorganized group of recipients-are cut from the budget, but not particularized benefits for tobacco growers, a well organized group.
In sum, concerning unemployment, interest rates, taxes, and federal
deficits, public-policy decisions reflect less a coherent macroeconomic policy
process, and more the demands of the organized for private-benefit
legislation.

THEORY AND REFORM
Our analysis here finds grounds for rejecting the descriptive and
conditionally normative conclusions of two bodies of scholarship. The first is
welfare economics. Despite its theoretical elegance-asserting that the
state should produce public goods, suppress public bads, establish property
rights, control monopolies, and optimally redistribute wealth-we can find
no real political or economic incentives, aside from constitutional strictures,
for the actual accomplishment of these objectives. Furthermore, among
economists and some political scientists, welfare theory has become
something of an ideology. The discernment of a welfare-regarding task finds
use in justifying governmental activity whose real motives concern the
development of private, divisible programs at collective cost, which com-
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manly are inefficient in their jurisdictional structures, methods of governance, allocations, and production levels. Scholars commonly brush aside the
necessary theoretical limitations of welfare-related prescriptions, with
regard to costs and benefits, jurisdictions, and methods of governance.
Therefore, in its most practical form, welfare theory has become a body of
scholarship in the service of advocating the addition of private-benefit
programs in the democratic polity.
The second body of knowledge that finds criticism here, if only
indirectly, is the Madisonian view of representative democracy, as formulated in "Federalist Paper Number 10" (1961) and in the works of more
recent pluralist scholars (Dahl, 1961). Madison acknowledges economic and
other causes of political divisions and the resulting demands for public
policies that would work a hardship on the citizenry at large. Nevertheless,
he believes that a republican form of government will oppose large interests
adverse to the electorate's welfare and will disperse smaller interests that
would unduly impose on the fisc. Our analysis suggests that when large
interests collide, one or the other may prevail, but a larger public purpose
goes unserved. More important, precisely the dispersion of smaller interests in a large republic, which Madison regarded as a solution to the privateinterest problem of ''factions,'' is the precondition for cost spreading that
our models identify as a potent source of public-sector inappropriateness.
INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS

Attempts to reform political processes in representative democracies
either seek directly to limit public-sector growth or to rearrange institutions, to affect expected costs and benefits of private-goods production.
These reforms accept motivations as they exist but try to constrain the
resulting decisions. As we shall see, motivational changes at the level of
fundamental incentives seem more nearly speculative.
Tax and Spending Limitations. The most prominent of institutional
reforms are various constitutional amendments that would require a
balanced budget and a limit to spending increases as some function of
growth in the gross national product, with the provision for an emergency
override by an extraordinary congressional majority. The several variants of
this proposal contain details susceptible of political manipulation. Under
these proposals, the political branches would find an immediate constraint
on their ability to create some private benefits at collective cost. Four
beneficial, and not necessarily contradictory, tendencies would result.
First, the private-goods nexus of legislation might continue, and
programs would be sorted out according to their political profitability, much
as they are today. At the margin, however, the addition of a new program
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would require the elimination of an old one, and new programs would
compete with each other for passage. This competition might reduce the
political attractiveness of such programs. First, the eliminated program's
supporters would constitute a natural opposition to favored measures,
because they would bear the greatest cost. Second, the expectation that
programs might run in perpetuity would be substantially reduced, because
all programs would be subject to recision if politically superior substitutes
emerged. Hence, interest groups would be willing to pay less to have such
programs enacted. Third, because of the higher political costs associated
with enacting such programs, consequent to the expected opposition,
interest groups would demand a smaller number of them. In short, the tax
and spending limit might work a serious mischief with the present structure
of interest-group politics.
Considering the now increased costs and reduced benefits flowing from
the balanced-budget spending limit, a fourth tendency might emerge, in that
legislators, at the margin, might search for truly public-regarding legislation.
Certainly, the private-interest basis of legislation would continue; but to the
extent that it became less profitable and more costly, legislators might find
real optimum arrangements of public-goods production relatively more
profitable. Interest groups might then discern that legislatively created
rents would be lower under budget limits, but the payoff in public welfare
might be commensurately greater.
Three problems emerge from attacking the private-interest problem
with balanced-budget and spending constraints. First, the provision for
larger budgets consequent to votes by extraordinary congressional majorities makes it possible that such majorities will indeed emerge, perhaps
increasing public-sector size and the number of groups whose demands find
public satisfaction. Hence, upon the artificial creation or recognition of an
"emergency," a larger coalition will form, whose members pursue yet
more private programs at collective cost. The likelihood and dimensions of
this possibility may be suspect, however, because in the absence of such a
limit, much omnibus legislation now finds support by more than the
constitutionally required supermajority. Whether such coalitions would take
a different form under an amendment to balance the budget and limit
revenue, we cannot say.
Second, the proposal to balance the budget and limit revenue does not
directly assault the fundamental motivations underlying the private-goods
problem. Instead, it merely seeks to constrain the resulting legislative
outcomes. Of course, as just noted, certain changes in motivations and
incentives will occur, perhaps improving the nature of legislation, and
perhaps not. The approach of balancing the budget and limiting revenue ,
however, would deny what valid lessons might be gained from welfare
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theory. Stated differently, under the dictates of welfare theory the public
sector should embrace programs whose opportunity costs are less than the
opportunity costs associated with alternative public programs and potentially foregone private-sector activities. That is, public programs should
pass welfare-regarding tests of their fitness. Even under such tests,
however, it is plausible that the public sector might grow larger. Yet, the
macrolevel constraints of a balanced-budget approach would prevent welfare-regarding expansions and thus diminish welfare. Hence, were the
president and legislators suddenly converted into sincere trustees for a
larger public interest, they might find themselves constrained by an
approach of balancing the budget and limiting revenue, in a manner that
might deny their newly found regard for the citizenry.
The third problem may seem more technical, but it is no less acute for
being so. Public-sector spending represents merely one technology for
producing private goods at collective cost. Other technologies include loan
guarantees, tax preferences 0oopholes), and regulation. If for both legislators and their clients, direct spending suddenly should became politically
more costly and less certain, then a partial shift out of direct-spending
activities and into these less-hampered technologies might occur. For
example, the federal government might issue a greater number of loan
guarantees, reducing interest rates for the benefited classes of borrowers,
while carrying the implicit subsidy off the books. Or tax-code provisions
might increase in their exceptions and loopholes, to benefit particular
groups, thus imposing more inefficiencies and greater tax shares on those
not benefited, taxpayers at large. Or the federal government might issue a
greater abundance of regulations to produce a relatively larger number of
private benefits through that technology. For example, if the Social Security
system found itself with mounting financial problems, the members of
Congress, constrained not to increase spending, might require private
employers to create highly regulated private pension funds, to siphon off
part of the system's fiscal problems. Again, this activity would be carried
"off the books," thus evading the constraint of balancing the budget and
imposing a limit on spending. In sum, a solution by parts may turn out to be
no solution at all.
Regulatory Reform. Problems of tax preferences and loan guarantees
might find partial solutions in a better accounting of federal liabilities,
although off-budget manipulation will remain a serious problem for any
balanced-budget requirement or spending limit. The collective costs of
regulation, however, remain entirely off the books, and therefore it might
represent a preferred method of governance in the face of tax and spending
limits. Like the public production of private benefits by spending, tax
preferences, and loan guarantees, the regulatory creation of private benefits
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finds broad and nonideological recognition as a problem of representative
democracy. Solutions to this problem are varied and contradictory (Breyer,
1982; Commission on Law and the Economy, 1979; Noll, 1971; Poole,
1982).
Direct assaults on regulatory processes seem much like balancedbudget and revenue-limit constraints, because they seek to alter regulatory
legislation by constraining it rather than by changing fundamental motivations. For example, in the literature and in legislative proposals, one finds
recommendations for and opposition to legislative vetoes (Bruff and Gellhorn, 1977), 58 cost-benefit analyses, and sunset laws, which would automatically eliminate regulatory statutes after a fixed time period. Under a
legislative-dominance view of the regulatory process (Moran and Weingast,
1982), however, a legislative veto would merely tighten the control that
Congress exercises over regulatory-agency activities, without breaking the
fundamental interest-group nexus of regulation. Cost-benefit studies are
subject to serious manipulation and may serve merely to increase the
amount of documentation required before regulations are promulgated. And
sunset legislation allows Congress to renegotiate basic agreements with
interest groups. This possibility may affect the interest group's expectations about future income streams from regulation. Yet, because Congress
can influence the direction of regulation under present arrangements
without renewing the legislation, that effect may be slight for the case of
regulation (Ehrlich and Posner, 1974). More important, periodic renewal
may allow Congress to perfect the production of private benefits through
regulation by bringing a larger number of firms and industries under the
purview of a single agency.
A proposed proximate solution to the regulatory problem is the
reinvigoration of the delegation doctrine in constitutional law (Aranson,
Gellhorn, and Robinson, 1982). This doctrine, an ancient rule of agency law,
would constrain the further delegation of delegated powers, such as those
that the electorate delegates to the members of Congress. It would require
the members of Congress to pass fundamental regulatory statutes and to
settle political questions rather than to delegate this task to an agency, with
the vague directive to regulate ''in the public interest, safety, and
convenience." By requiring the explicit settlement of political questions,
Congress could no longer create a regulatory lottery, as it now does by
establishing regulatory regimes in the presence of conflict. The resulting
specificity would encourage disadvantaged firms or industries to oppose the
regulatory production of private benefits for their competitors. Were
opposition absent, because regulation occurred pursuant to the traditional
model of a single industry's using regulation for cartel formation, then
transient regulatory agencies might result. Nevertheless, the umbrella of
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price and entry protection that regulation would afford to such an industry
would invite competition from suppliers of substitute goods and services. In
the absence of specific legislation, the delegation doctrine would forbid the
extension of regulatory purview to these new competitors, and therefore
the entire regulatory structure as a producer of divisible benefits at
collective cost might fall of its own weight.
Decentralization. A third set of reform proposals concerns the locus of
political control. As noted earlier, the production of public goods evinces
problems of choosing price and output levels. Tiebout (1956) argued that
radical decentralization of competing jurisdictions might create a marketlike
condition in which more nearly optimal decisions might prevail. For our
purposes, however, three other aspects of decentralization loom large.
First, decentralization of all governmental functions to the jurisdictions
in which material effects occur would eliminate or substantially reduce the
opportunity for cost spreading. That is, the costs of programs for dams,
highways, schools, and other public services and regulations in state or city
A would be borne in that jurisdiction, not spread to state or city B. At the
margin, this reduction in cost spreading might promote an enhanced
attention to the relative costs and benefits of alternative programs. 59
Second, decentralization might create more nearly homogeneous
jurisdictions, in which constituents would be more difficult to isolate as
divisible recipients of goods and services. Certainly, even in small modern
jurisdictions, a fairly heterogeneous electorate provides opportunities for
legislating divisible programs. But at the margin, decentralization would
increase homogeneity, and thus opposition might be raised to the legislative
creation of private-benefit programs .
Finally, if welfare models of the political process enjoy any prescriptive
robustness, then a variant of Tiebout's interpolity-competition hypothesis
might prevail. That is, we might rely on the original purpose of a federalism
to generate experiments in governance. Those jurisdictions that succeed in
limiting governance to the production of public goods at optimal levels and
prices perforce will leave their citizenry better off than those that fail in
these tasks. Hence, we need not prejudge the exact form of local
governance. We need merely allow jurisdictions to compete not only in the
public and private goods and services that they create but also in the manner
of creating them.
POLITICAL INCENTIVES AND REFORM

All of these reforms, while partially constraining underlying motivations
to produce private benefits at collective cost, do little to change the
incentives of politicians and their clients. Nor have we described strategies
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of enactment: first, because we are less than entirely sanguine about the
effectiveness of any of these reforms and, second, because we are less
certain about the enactment strategies that might be effective or appropriate. Surely, the underlying instability of political processes, as reflected in
the absence of equilibria in electorates and legislatures, might itself aid in
the adoption of one or more of these reforms in a political world in which
'' anything is possible. ''
While none of these reforms attacks the underlying motivations of
political persons, they do change the rules enough to divert efforts partially
away from the collective production of private benefits. Whether these
changes are sufficient to create a substantial impact we cannot say. If they
do succeed in suppressing the collective production of private benefits,
however, then the payoff structures in legislatures and among interest
groups will change. These structures probably create at least a modest selfselection among political persons, .especially in light of the competitive
nature of politics. Politicians also gain personal capital by practicing their
skills under current incentives. But those who, under reform, no longer
could succeed at the collective production of private benefits may find
politics to be an unappealing vocation, in which their human capital has lost
value. Those who remain or those who enter into politics to fill the vacuum
may be differently motivated, producing yet further changes in the rules to
accelerate the de privatization of politics. In the absence of such a change,
we cannot discern a set of reforms that would fulfill the requirement that
''the citizen has a constitutional right to demand that public law be publicregarding" (Mashaw, 1981:28).

NOTES
1. For example, economists of the left, center, and right now seem to agree, to
an extent that they have not before, that present antitrust policies in the United
States erode economic welfare. Chicago economists long have opposed current
antitrust activities. See Brozen, 1970; Demsetz, 1973a, 1973b, 1968; Posner, 1975,
1976; Stigler, 1966. More recent developments have buttressed this view. See
Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978. Baumol (1982), in the political center, has
recently summarized the Chicago School's objections to antitrust policy, and he, too,
finds that policy to be destructive of welfare. Scholars on the left, such as Thurow
(1980), have also joined in condemning antitrust policy. In Thurow' s view, present
policies ignore competition from larger and (because of scale economies) more
efficient firms in other industrial nations, which are not saddled by antitrust
constraints. An attack on antitrust with regard to mergers and tender offers has also
developed. See Easterbrook and Fischel, 1981; and Fischel, 1978.
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2. Here, we concentrate on public policy in the United States, because we are
familiar with it. But our knowledge of public policy in other democracies persuades
us that the problems in those nations are not unlike those experienced in the United
States. See, generally, Olson, 1982; and Benjamin, 1980. For a comparison of
public-sector growth rates see Nutter, 1978.
3. For example, see Lindsay, 1976; Mises, 1944; and Niskanen, 1971. For an
alternative view see Baumol, 1967.
4. Classic works include Ahlbrandt, 1973b; Davies, 1971; Lindsay, 1976; and
Spann, 1977. A general survey of literature comparing the efficiency of private and
public production is available in Borcherding, 1981; and Borcherding, Pommerehne,
and Schneider, 1981.
5. See works cited supra in note 1; Bork, 1978; and Long, Schramm, and
Tollison, 1973.
6. For example, ''Governmental provision of public goods is required precisely
because each individual in uncoordinated [sic] pursuit of his self-interest must act in a
manner designed to frustrate the provision of these items" (Baumol, 1965:21).
7. ' 'The Constitution presumes that private activities will be constrained only
to promote public purposes. The recognition first, that there is a wide range of such
purposes, and second, that democratic, collective choice may pursue any or all of
them in a complex and eclectic body of regulatory statutes, in no way reduces the
force of the basic principle. The citizen has a constitutional right to demand that public
law be public~regarding. Otherwise, his private harm is constitutionally inexplicable''
(Mashaw, 1981:28; emphasis added).
8. Specific works include Aranson and Ordeshook, 1981a, 1977, 1981b; and
Goldin, 1975. On legislative contributions to the problem see Aranson and Ordeshook, 1978; Fiorina, 1977; Mayhew, 1974; Shepsle and Weingast, 1981; and
Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen, 1981. On bureaucracies see Fiorina, 1977, and
works cited supra in note 3. On the judiciary see Landes and Posner, 1975. On the
regulatory nexus see Aranson and Ordeshook, 1981b; Jordan, 1972; Posner, 1971,
1972a, 1974; and Stigler, 1971.
9. See supra, note 6.
10. In its pure form, welfare economics contemplates as Pareto optimal those
changes that would exhaust the possible universe of alternatives and make at least
one person better off while making no one worse off. Here, we forego the
intellectual conceit of Pareto optimality and instead adopt the lesser conceit of
Pareto-preferred changes, which do not necessarily exhaust the possible universe of
alternatives but are consistent with present knowledge.
11. This claim seems to be true of Marxist social and political analysis. It may
not have been true of Marx's thought itself, for he noted, ''What is to be avoided
above all is the re-establishment of 'Society' as an abstraction vis-a-vis the
individual" (1959:104), as quoted in Sen, 1970:1 n.l.
12. This approach is implicit in most cost-benefit analysis, which has therefore
been justly criticized. See Mishan, 1971. More recently, Posner (1979) resurrects
wealth maximization in law and economics. See also two symposium issues of
Hofstra Law Review: ''Efficiency as a Legal Concern," vol. 8 (Spring 1980), and
"Response to the Efficiency Symposium," vol. 8 (Summer 1980). For a general
theoretical discussion see Davis and Winston, 1965.
13. In welfare theory, a test for Pareto optimality under wealth maximization is
the compensation principal. In general, state A is Pareto preferred to state B, first, if
those who prefer a change from B to A could compensate those who lose from the
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change, secure their consent, and still be better off in A than in B and, second, if
those who lose could not compensate those who gain to get them to forego the
change. See Kaldor, 1939; Hicks, 1939; and Scitovsky, 1941. Whether or not ex
post compensation must be paid is strenuously debated. See Scitovsky (1941), which
views the payment of compensation as a ''political question,'' about which
economists have no special expertise. The opposite view, requiring compensation, is
argued in Buchanan (1959).
14. The mechanism of consent is ignorance of one's state after the constitution
is enacted. The idea is first developed in Buchanan and Tullock (1962), and applied as
a "veil of ignorance" in Rawls (1971). In essence, those who consent to a
constitutional order under such conditions are choosing a particular lottery over
alternative outcomes, whose selection the constitution will eventually govern.
15. Historical and anthropological evidence suggests that tribal, communitarian
arrangements predate the kind of market contemplated in the pure competitive
model and precede it in economic development. See Posner, 1980. Hayek argues
that market relations developmentally have followed centralized community (collective) control. This process resembles the chronological order that Marx contemplated in historical dialectic, but whereas Marx would view the reimposition of
collective control as the next step in economic development, Hayek would view it as
social retrogression.
16. Returns in "payoffs" other than wealth find a place in recent work in
economic theory. The more nearly inclusive term ''welfare'' may be substituted into
this discussion, so that economic theory, as applied to the public (or private) sector
refers to decision making in the presence of any kind of scarcity. The method is
entirely general, incorporating nonmonetary concerns.
17. A large class of Pareto-optimal allocations may be produced in a pure
competitive market. Once one such allocation is arrived at, however, it is Pareto
optimal. A change from that allocation to another, without compensation, will harm at
least one person. Hence, the primacy of the initial distribution of resources figures
importantly in the final Pareto-optimal outcome chosen under the prescriptive,
welfare-regarding regime described here.
18. Further political specifications of property rights to information may be
appropriate, to make information private. This purpose appears to be the function of
patent and copyright laws as well as of various common-law protections of trade
secrets. The principal argument here is that creating more extensive property rights
to information may be desirable, but regulating the primary market, because of an
alleged market failure created by information inadequacies, may be undesirable.
19. The particular governmental program carrying out this function may
(rarely) be strictly Pareto-preferred, based on the first variant of welfare theory.
More commonly, it may require explicit ex post redistributions from a few to a few,
from a few to many, from many to a few, or from many to many. If the enacted
program requires redistribution, then to be Pareto-efficient, the program would have
been unanimously preferred behind the veil of ignorance had it been chosen there
(had the participants not known their subsequent postconstitutional and legislative
roles). For example, the entire citizenry-all potential plaintiffs and defendantsmight agree ex ante to an active common-law process (see Rubin, 1977). Under the
actual operation of such a system, however, there will be losers who would not
consent ex post to specific results.
While not objecting to the existence of winners and losers as a particular statute
or regulation is worked out and applied, some scholars do object to changes in the
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law or the constitution that may be adopted with less than unanimous or nearunanimous consent. Therefore, they reject the second variant of welfare theory and
require a strict application of unanimity standards, which themselves imply Pareto
optimality. For example, Buchanan (1959) argues that the political economist's task
is to formulate hypotheses about public-policy changes that would garner unanimous
consent. Anything less than unanimity (applying a rule of reason to exclude madmen)
would vitiate the persuasiveness of the policies adopted and introduce several other
problems inherent in the political system, some of which we consider in this essay.
Hence, the political economist not merely must operate on the principal vectors of
public policy but also must develop compensation arrangements to secure the
consent of those who otherwise might be harmed by policy changes.
20. Rarely are property rights certain. More commonly they are probabilistic
and more or less complete. Only in unusual polar cases can we expect them to be
entirely unassailable. This complication, while analytically interesting, is not damaging to the concept of a private good.
21. The good is ''public'' only for the collection of persons who own the firm,
not for those outside of it. Presumably, there is a unanimous ex ante social interest
in finding optimal monitoring arrangements and incentive structures within the firm,
those that would equate the marginal cost of these arrangements and structures
(adding monitoring costs, for example) with the marginal return (the value of the last
unit of the public good added). That is, ex ante, a worker whose earnings reflect
productivity, a consumer whose prices reflect the costs of production, and an owner
whose returns reflect profit-all would prefer such an arrangement. To the extent
that a competitive market process generates efficient levels of monitoring, say, to
that extent a monitoring problem within firms belongs to the first class of departures
from the pure competitive model: it is self-correcting within the structure of the
market itself, and it merely requires political neutrality or common-law (contractual)
enforcement.
22. Excellent reviews are available in de Alessi (1980) and Furubotn and
Pejovich (1972).
23. The theory is developed in an expository but careful manner in Posner
(1972b); see also Kamerschen (1976).
24. The original narrative of the prisoners' dilemma, which also models the
cartel problem, was a dilemma whose failure of resolution at the prisoners' expense
served a public purpose: the imposition of a "correct" sentence (see Luce and
Raiffa, 1967).
25. The properties of an anarchy in operation may differ, depending on various
conditions such as shared values, the size and population of the community, and the
nature and location of scarcity (see Tullock, 1972; Buchanan, 1975; and Demsetz,
1967).
26. Easements may be created by specific contractual arrangements, by
adverse use (e.g., A "openly and notoriously" passes over B's land for a given
period of years), or by such common-law doctrines as '' easement by necessity,''
which prevents the formation of "land-locked" parcels of property, those without
access to a common roadway.
27. These conditions are restatements and applications to the law of easement
of the famous Coase theorem (see Coase, 1960).
28. An excellent example of this phenomenon concerns the legislative disposition of "due-on-sale" clauses in home-mortgage contracts. These clauses allow
mortgagees, usually banks, to require the full payment of a mortgage-loan balance at
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the time that title to the mortgaged property is transferred from a seller to a buyer.

In periods without interest-rate inflation, buyers usually would refinance a home at
the time of purchase, rather than assume an existing mortgage, if their ability to pay
the seller his full equity was limited. In times of rapid increases in home-mortgage
interest rates, however, it pays the buyer to do whatever he can to assume the
seller's mortgage. Under conditions of stable interest rates, the actuarial life of a
mortgage was about seven years. But with an increase in the interest rates, the
actuarial life grew to approximately eleven years, leaving the mortgagee with a low
rate of return on its loan. When this situation grew acute during the 1970s, most
banks changed their standard mortgage contracts to incorporate the due-on-sale
clause in future transactions . Several state legislatures then outlawed due-on-sale
clauses, but the Supreme Court has overturned such actions insofar as federally
chartered banks are concerned, in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association v. de
la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. 3014 (1982) (see Haddock and Hall, 1983).
At first blush it might appear that a legislative reversal of the due-on-sale clause
would merely create a transfer of wealth from the mortgagee to the mortgagor.
Home sellers and real-estate agents, however, also claim that maintaining the
assumability of mortgages would allow them to sell homes at a lower price, thereby
benefiting buyers, sellers, and real-estate agents. This proposition is dubious,
because it assumes that the market is not already at equilibrium and that sellers
would not beneficially absorb the full value of the reduced mortgage interest rate.
Furthermore, in the wake of statutes invalidating due-on-sale clauses, banks will
increase their interest rates and as well might tum to short-term mortgage
instruments.
The due-on-sale clause essentially transfers the risk of unanticipated changes in
the interest rate from mortgagees to mortgagors. If it were more efficient, mutually
beneficial, for mortgagees to bear that risk, then that result would have occurred in
the market, as it did during the period of relative price stability before the 1970s.
Individual borrowers and lenders could negotiate such terms themselves, or such
terms might become standard contract features.
29. Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke and Coal Co., 236 App. Div. 37, 258 N.Y.S.
229 (1932).
30. Such a government might redistribute wealth by majority rule from the
quarry owners to the home owners, with no regard for efficiency. Thus, the danger
remains that a move from common law to statutory or administrative law might find
its motivation in a desire to create an inefficient result, thus increasing the value of
the homeowners' assets while destroying the greater value of the quarry in
operation. See supra, note 28, for a similar case.
31. "Self-government does not consist in having a hand in everything, any
more than housekeeping consists merely in cooking dinner with one's own hands.
The cook must be trusted with a large discretion as to the management of the fires
and ovens" (Wilson, 1968:374).
32. For example, see Brennan v. United States Postal Service, 439 U.S. 1345
(1978).
33. The judicial rules of venue and standing may provide appropriate models for
other public-sector decisions. The Supreme Court's decisions concerning several
areas of law involving the possibility of federal preemption, however, are confused
and contradictory, both between and among specific subject matters. See Middlesex
County Sewerage Authorityv. National Sea Clammers Assoc., 453 U.S. 1 (1981), and
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City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). For a discussion of decentralized
environmental quality control see Aranson, 1982.
34. This is not an ideological claim for "states' rights" and "local options.''
Rather, it rests on the simple parallel with comparative statics in economics, that
with large numbers of competing producers (here, governments) the price elasticity
of demand is perfectly elastic.
35. Exactly this phenomenon of strategic use of regulation to limit productivity
in competing states is documented in Ackerman and Hassler, 1981.
36. Tiebout, 1956. Several empirical studies provide conflicting evidence about
the Tiebout hypothesis. See Edel and Sclar, 1974; Epple and Zelenitz, 1981; Epple,
Zelenitz, and Visscher, 1978; Gramlich and Rubinfeld, 1982; Oates, 1969; and
Yinger, 1982.
37. An elementary review of the model is contained in Aranson, 1981, chap. 7;
a more rigorous review of developments through 1972 is available in Riker and
Ordeshook, 1973, chaps. 11 and 12.
38. The discussion of instability in the text concerns a simple example of three
voters and three alternatives using pairwise majority voting. The more interesting
developments, however, concern the absence of equilibrium in a spatial context. The
first full elaboration of this problem is in Plott, 1967. For more-recent developments
see Ordeshook and Shepsle, 1982.
39. This statement may be too strong, because if the citizenry is risk-averse,
then ambiguity induced by any cause will reduce welfare. This judgment afflicts
elections in which there is no pure-strategy equilibrium or in which the candidates
are tied in equilibrium but adopt different equilibrium strategies. For a discussion of
such elections see Ordeshook, 1970.
40. The absence of an equilibrium in the legislature (or perhaps, even in the
electorate) will obviously have public-policy consequences generally, and especially if
agenda control is present. We would have to know who was controlling the agenda,
however, what their preferences were, and other institutional rules and constraints,
before we could say exactly what those public-policy consequences might be.
Therefore, we might not be able to predict the legislature's public-policy decisions
without first studying the institution and its rules. See Riker, 1980; see also Shepsle
and Weingast, 1981b; Shepsle, 1978, 1979; and Fiorina and Shepsle, 1982.
41. Of course, group theorists such as David B. Truman and Robert A. Dahl
account for public-policy outcomes largely in terms of group processes. But as we
argue later, their formulation of group influence, insofar as welfare judgments are
concerned, is inadequate. See Dahl, 1951.
42. For a discussion of the nature of this intercession, especially in matters of
case work, see Fiorina, 1977.
43. Representative democracies obviously supply public goods. Examples
include national defense, environmental quality, and public peace. To sustain the
models depicted in table 4 .1 and later in inequality (1), in the face of this observation,
requires little imagination; for such goods are public in various aspects of their
consumption but are principally private in production. For instance, national-defense
production creates a multitude of pork-barrel opportunities-divisible benefits
politically allocated to identifiable firms and constituencies. See Weingast, Shepsle,
and Johnsen, 1981; and Shepsle and Weingast, 1981. Probably, constitutional forms
sanctioning the public production of goods such as national defense provide one
explanation for their production. But the explanation is largely hortatory, because
games such as the one depicted in table 4 .1 predict that no group will lobby for the
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technologically most efficient supply of an optimal level of a public good such as
national defense. But they will lobby for the production of particular weapons
systems or base locations, say, whose principal incidents remain largely private.
Thus, the animus for efficiency or optimality in the good' s public aspects,
considering the underlying political process, seems profoundly epiphenomena!.
44. Once again, the creation of many divisible benefits from the production, and
sometimes from the consumption, of such programs, simultaneously accounts for
their existence and their failure to bear a systematic relationship to efficiency criteria
(see note 43 supra).
45. The theoretical genesis of regulatory agencies as legislative lotteries in
such situations is developed in Fiorina, 1982; see also Aranson, Gellhom, and
Robinson, 1982. A case study of such a situation is described in Hacker, 1962.
46. There appears to be a parallel process occurring in the demand for
regulation. Scholars of the regulatory process have long identified the decline of an
industry with increased demands for regulatory protection (see Hillman, 1982).
47. Incomplete, but not self-contradictory. After all, the thrust of our argument
is that interest groups and legislatures fail to solve their prisoners' dilemma, as
evidenced by the continued production of inefficient private-benefit legislation. And
the production of public goods and the suppression of public bads appear to be
epiphenomena!.
48. Congressional constituencies are organized to do legislative battle in the
person of their congressional representatives.
49. A review of the attack on centralization is provided in Aranson, Boyd, and
Lancaster, 1983.
50. For example, see the events surrounding American Trucking Associations,
Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Railway, 387 U.S. 397 (1967), in which the
Supreme Court acceded to an ICC change of heart. For years the ICC had abjured
authority to require railroads to offer "piggy back" services to truckers; then the
ICC asserted that it had the authority to do so.
51. Posner shows that the same framework applies equally to property and
contract law (1972b).
52. Precedent is usually established or changed at the appellate level, so that
jury decisions seldom figure in this analysis.
53. ''Under plausible assumptions the increase in the value of legislation will
exceed the increase in its cost, since a modest increase in the cost of enacting
legislation could multiply manifold the length of the period in which the legislation was
expected to remain in force" (Landes and Posner, 1975:879).
54. Presumably, Congress could eliminate the life tenure of judges, pack the
Court, or limit its appellate jurisdiction.
55. For example, see National Cable Television Association v. United States,
415 U.S. 336 (1974), and Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
56. There may be several sources of imperfect information. As noted earlier, in
the presence of a possible coalition of minorities or cyclical majorities, candidates
might obfuscate their real public-policy intentions. Furthermore, citizens might not
fully understand the manner in which proposed public-policy changes, even if
adopted, would affect their welfare. See Fiorina, 1982b.
57. With the symmetric density in figure 4.4b, the results require that
candidates operate only on the convex portion of the cumulative density.
58. The Supreme Court has probably eliminated legislative vetoes, in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
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59. There is a substantial incentive for jurisdictions to export taxes and higher
costs to the extent that that is possible. Severance taxes on the mining of natural
resources, taxation of foreign (i.e., out-of-state) corporations, and regulatory
impositions on in-state producers of exported goods and services provide three
examples of this phenomenon. Judicial nullification of these actions under the
"negative commerce clause" provides only a partial and uncertain constraint on this
process (see McLure, 1983). A radical decentralization of governmental functions,
however, might create new possibilities for judicial review of these actions.
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5
Pluralism in Its Place: State
and Regime in Liberal Democracy
Stephen L. Elkin

The distinguishing feature of liberal democracies is the division of labor
between market and state. Ownership of productive assets is largely placed
in private hands, and major social decisions, including the pattern of work
organization, industrial location, compensation for labor, and choice of
industrial technology, are made through private exchange relations in which
owners and managers are afforded a good deal of discretion (Lindblom,
1977, esp. pts. 3, 4, 5). Social well-being thus depends significantly on
market transactions. Public officials, though they share responsibility for the
level of citizen well-being with private controllers of assets, cannot command economic performance but can only induce it. The concern of public
officials with the well-being of citizens stems from the organization of the
state: public authority is subject to popular control, and a variety of
devices-most importantly, elections-exist to foster the connections between citizen preferences and public action. In addition to elections,
arrangements exist that protect citizens from arbitrary acts of officials and
provide them with information sufficient to develop views about public
affairs.
Once we recognize this division of labor, we commonly ask: What are
the effects of this sort of property-based market system on such a state?
The answer to this question in tum is typically treated as a matter of
power-the respective power of business interests and other actors over
public officials. Opinions are divided over whether business interests are the
more powerful or whether a variety of other interests have a substantial
effect on the actions of public officials (e.g., Bell, 1960; Dahl, 1961; Mills,
1956; Lowi, 1979; Domhoff, 1978; Rose, 1967). This focus on power either
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leads to the view that popular control is insignificant, because business
interests are said to dominate public action, or to an underestimation of the
political importance of market exchange, private property, and business
enterprise, because popular control is claimed to be sufficient to substantially constrain the serving of business interests. Both lines of argument are
problematic: neither succeeds in giving sufficient weight to both market
organization of production and distribution and to popular control of
authority.
The relationship between market and popularly controlled state,
however, is not essentially a matter of the power of actors. Much can be
learned about their connection simply by considering that there is a division
of labor: this is itself the most important thing in explaining the behavior of
public officials. This division between market and popularly controlled state
is the crucial characteristic of liberal democratic regimes. A regime is a
complex of social practices that constitutes the way of life of the citizenry.
These practices help to define the manner in which citizens are related to
each other; they also imply standards of conduct that are necessary in order
to keep those relations in repair. "Market" and "popular control" are
designations for the two major sets of practices that constitute a liberal
democratic regime. Instead of investigating then the power of business over
state officials, the question posed here is: Given a regime that is characterized by a division of labor between market and popularly controlled state,
how does this division affect the actual workings of the state?
Before considering the regime argument at length, we will examine in
more detail the unpromising manner in which the relationship between
market and state has most often been investigated. In particular, we will
consider pluralist and elitist analyses, both of which are built around
arguments concerning the power of actors. Discussion of the regime itself
will then proceed in several steps. 1 First, and in particular contrast to
pluralist-elitist arguments, we will establish that the division of labor
between market and state means that public officials do not need to be
pressured into serving business interests. Second, we will give popular
control its due weight in explaining the operation of the state. The aim is to
show that popular control both contributes to a concern for business
performance and potentially impedes it.
Finally, we will look at the implications of the view that the liberal
democratic state is shaped by both a concern for business performance and
the fact of popular control. The principal implication is that the state is
neither an arena nor a tool of domination. The liberal democratic state is a
mixed state, and as such, not only does it mediate major interests, but it
also embodies competing claims to just rule. The view of the liberal
democratic state that emerges from the regime argument is: it is not
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derivative of economic arrangements, but neither is it divorced from them.
Differently stated, we understand more if we speak of ''liberal democracy''
rather than of "capitalism." On the one hand then, I want to resist taking a
too-simple view of the importance of the market for liberal democratic
politics-either by essentially ignoring it or by reducing it to the power of
business actors. On the other hand, I want to resist the attractions of
thinking that politics is something else, in this context-namely, a very
complicated and elaborate handmaiden of capital accumulation.
It is worth emphasizing that although the argument is intended to apply
to liberal democracies generally, its principal empirical frame of reference is
the United States. With amendments, some of which are indicated, it can be
applied to other cases.

PLURALIST AND ELITIST ARGUMENTS
Much of the American study of liberal democratic politics takes the
view that politics is activity directly tied to the actions of government. The
most prominent and forceful expression of this position is in pluralist theory.
Lowi, for instance, characterizes the pluralist view as follows: ''In the
pluralist system, modem developments have brought about a discontinuity
between that which is socio-economic and that which is political" (Lowi,
1979; original in italics). While there clearly are connections between
politics and economics-organized business's political activities, protection
of property rights, regulatory legislation, and so forth-the division of labor
between market and state itself exerts no profound effects. Little or nothing
about the actions of the state may be inferred or deduced from the existence
of private ownership of productive assets. Empirical investigation is necessary, pluralists contend. 2 Even the observation that state authority is
regularly used in liberal democracies in order to create and maintain markets
does not often lead pluralists to the inference that the state is in some
manner serving business interests. They often argue, instead, that while
business power has been a danger to democratic control at various
junctures, this danger has been contained through popular movements that
succeeded in gaining hold of the levers of state authority. Rather than
promoting the interests of property holders, state activity has often in fact
been the principal vehicle for democratic control of business power. 3
At the heart of this pluralist view of the relation between state and
market is an understanding of politics in which the exercise of power by
individuals, or by groups understood as aggregations of individuals, is
central. Power itself is understood, roughly, as A getting B to do something
that B otherwise would not do. 4 It is seen to be exercised in two contexts:
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actors may contend over what is to be discussed, as well as over the action
to be taken (see, e.g., Bachrach and Baratz, 1970; Cobb and Elder, 1972;
Crenson, 1971). Contention may involve direct struggle, or results may be
achieved at a distance, with historically given advantages playing a crucial
role in both cases.
The building blocks of a pluralist conception of politics are the efforts of
individuals and groups to realize their own projects. 5 These projects are said
to reflect their interests, which are subjectively defined. Interests are
psychological matters of desire and do not arise out of any objective features
of the political-economic order. 6 Society and social structure are understood
as being neutral backdrops against which these actors speak. At most they
are terms used to designate the array of possible protagonists and allies; or
they are summary terms for historically given advantages and disadvantages. 7 They have little or no independent explanatory status. Similarly, the
state is seen as a neutral arena in which actors may settle their disputes, or
as a neutral instrument that the various actors may be able to use in
attempting to serve their interests. It may thus be seized for use by
particular interests, or particular interests may be excluded from its use. In
either case the state has no intrinsic qualities other than its inherent
authority; any interest may, in principle, use it. 8
' 'Actors'' here can include public officials and governmental agencies.
They, too, can be considered to have interests, in which service they may
attempt to exert power. That they are public officials or agencies thus is
incidental, an additional source of power. For these government actors, too,
the state can be either arena or instrument, 9 at least if not all public officials
are simultaneously driven by narrow self-interest.
In the pluralist view, then, the connection between market and state is
understood primarily as a struggle among various actors, including businessmen, a variety of nonbusiness groups, and public officials. Government
support of markets, the extent of government regulation, and similar
matters are largely viewed as one of the products of conflict among the
variety of interests. There is nothing intrinsic to the basic political and
economic arrangements of the society that prevents public officials from
acting against the deepest interests of businessmen. How well businessmen
do in the battle over the use of state authority depends largely on how
politically adept they and their adversaries are and on historically given
advantages. Overall, business interests, though powerful, must compete
with other groups and are not able consistently to shape state action to their
purposes.
This view of politics-with individuals, their interests, and the struggles between them at the center and with the state as an arena and neutral
instrument-is very much a part of liberal political theory. Of particular
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interest in the present discussion is the adoption by pluralists of liberalism's
conception of value as being a subjective interest or desire . 10 In such a
subjective conception, we do not finally know what actors want unless they
signify it through their behavior. Thus, when pluralists discuss power, they
tum to analyses of behavior: without knowing what actors want, we can
hardly talk about power. If liberalism's subjective conception of value is
vulnerable, so is pluralism's understanding of power. And pluralism's
analysis of the distribution of power is the foundation on which its
interpretation of liberal democratic politics rests.
More important for present purposes, however, is the following
peculiarity. While liberalism as a theory of politics is fundamentally concerned with property and the importance of the private realm, these have
been left on the shelf in its pluralist version. The study of politics has been
turned into the study of governmental process and the struggle between
interests. It is therefore highly ironic that the version of liberal political
theory that is embodied in pluralist thought should largely treat the political
significance of business in terms of interest groups. That is its principal
failure: it does not take its own liberalism seriously. Only half of society is
intensively investigated, and the connection between public and private is
conceived of as being little more than a question of the power of particular
actors. It seems unlikely that the central fact of the division of labor between
market and state can be so accommodated: market exchange, property, and
business enterprise are pervasive features of liberal democracies, not
merely a limited piece in an explanation of how the liberal democratic state
operates.
The pluralist version of state-market relations in liberal democracy is,
of course, not the only one. A common alternative is the ruling-class thesis,
whose central premise is that businessmen are not just another interest, but
also the most powerful one .11 The influence that market exchange, private
property, and business enterprise have on state action is construed in terms
of the political power of an economic group. Proponents of the thesis, in
fact, honor liberal thought with their dominating concern for the place of
business, but the honor is a perverse one. They are perhaps best seen as
disappointed liberals: they think in terms of actors and their power but argue
that because business exerts such power, the claims of liberalism (particularly in its pluralist guise) that it enhance freedom are not met.
In its simplest form, the ruling-class thesis ties state action to market
processes by positing a socioeconomic elite. This group is variously defined
in terms of wealth, ownership or control of the means of production, or
social status. The group is said to rule, both directly, through its members
holding positions in the state, and indirectly, through agents who do its
bidding or otherwise have coincident interests. Elaborate attempts may be
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made to show that this group or class is aware of its common interests and
that it is able to communicate them to the necessary officials. The more
sophisticated discussions also establish that the ruling group manages to
serve its interests in the face of resistance by non-ruling-class types who
have access to elections and other forms of popular control. Such arguments
cite the ability of the ruling elite to eliminate resistance at its source by
inducing a general outlook and a set of preferences consistent with rulingclass desires. Invoked also are more readily observable efforts to control
the public agenda and to triumph in particular policy disputes. State action is
in the service of class interest because there is a high-status, wealth-owning
class that is powerful enough to see that it happens.
Formulated in this manner, the ruling-class thesis can clearly be seen
to share major premises with pluralist theory: it sees the state as a set of
levers to be grasped; major actors as interests (albeit differently defined);
and the exercise of power by actors as the central political act (see Offe,
1974; also Poulantzas, 1973). In the pluralist view sketched above, these
premises lead to the conclusion that no one interest dominates the state,
even if some actors are more powerful than others. Proponents of the
ruling-class view, of course, reach a different conclusion. The difficulty lies
in sustaining it.
In the most favorable circumstances for the ruling-class thesis, class
interests can be established, 12 and major opposition is silenced. If the thesis
cannot be sustained under these conditions, its credibility is greatly
weakened. But even then, the difficulties appear to be insuperable because
an improbable degree of rationality on the part of the putative rulers is
required. Rule in the ruling-class thesis depends heavily on a form of
comprehensive planning that cannot be done (see, e.g., Braybrooke and
Lindblom, 1970; Simon, 1976; Hayek, 1973; Banfield, 1961). The class,
directly or through its agents, must be able to identify decisions that are
crucial to its interests and to analyze them in sufficient detail to devise a
course of action-all in a rapidly changing environment. The difficulties are
patent.
The second important aspect of rule, which creates a cultural climate
conducive to serving ruling-class interests, is probably less demanding of
rational calculation, since it is not a matter of specific decisions but of
general atmosphere. Still, a generalized investment problem presents itself
to a putative ruling class if that class wishes to stay in business over time:
What aspects of cultural transmission are crucial to maintaining the appropriate climate? But whether the existing cultural homogeneity can be explained
by reference to so centralized a process is doubtful. Moreover, if we
concede that cultural values are genuine and widespread, it is unclear in
what sense the ruling class can be said to rule, at least in its own interests.
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We may say, then, that if there is an aspiring ruling class, it may try to
rule; but the complexity of social action will defeat it. This conclusion also
suggests that all class arguments-including a ruling-class view-face
another difficulty. In a complex, uncertain world, fundamental class interests, as such, are likely to have limited behavioral significance. The
concrete interests of the actors are more likely to emerge out of social
interaction than to be discovered through ratiocination. This has particular
relevance for the ruling-class thesis, since interaction with public officials
provides one way for the class to learn about its interests. The difficulty is
that these interests will, to a large extent, be defined by public officials, who
for a variety of reasons need to make sense out of what may often be
inchoate demands and proposals. Agent and principal have undergone a
reversal.
An additional difficulty with the ruling-class thesis is that it inevitably
does not take proper account of popular control: class rule requires a
clearing of the popular decks. Such a view is made suspect, however, by
instances of successful popular mobilization in the face of business interests:
for example, environmental and safety regulation most recently. Proponents of the ruling-class thesis might argue that some instances of rule are
more important than others and that the class has the knowledge as well as
the ability to act on it. Popular control is then not vitiated but is reduced to
operating in areas where ruling-class interests are said not to be central.
This argument requires heroic assertions about the sort of knowledge that a
ruling class possesses and tends to make the argument drift into post hoc
trivialities: if members of the ruling class did not fight over this matter, it is
evidence that they did not need to. 13
Arguments about social complexity and popular control need not,
however, shatter the credibility of the ruling-class thesis. Proponents could
attempt the difficult task of elaborating a conception of rule that would be
expansive enough to accommodate various forms of indirect control without
weakening assertions about class dominance. They might argue that
businessmen are in a position akin to that of monopolists in the market. 14 As
a group, they have substantial control over many of the resourcesparticularly organization, expertise, and finance-that public officials and
citizens require in order to serve their own purposes. As a consequence,
officials and citizens regularly tum to business organizations to accomplish
public purposes, and businessmen thus find themselves in a favored position
for serving their own interests. While this line of argument is promising, it
finally leads to the regime argument that will be presented below. The
ruling-class thesis, which turns on business power, is then transformed into
a quite different argument in which public officials play the crucial role. On
the other hand, if we stay within the boundaries of an argument about
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business power, treating monopoly as a source of power, the difficulties of
accommodating the fact of popular control remain.
If the state in liberal democracies cannot be understood by examining
actors and their respective power, what are the alternatives ?15 One
alternative is to pursue an essentially functionalist approach, which argues,
broadly, that capitalists on their own cannot carry out the necessary tasks
for the continuation of a capitalist society. A variety of reasons might be
suggested for this, an important one being that capitalists are, by their very
nature, fragmented and competitive. They thus require the existence of an
agency-the state-which must be autonomous enough to organize and
assure continuity in the features that are necessary for the reproduction of
the society. An obvious problem here is how to tum what is necessary in
order for a result to occur into an explanation of its actual appearance, an
objection that is common to functionalist arguments . 16 A more serious
objection for present purposes is that all state actions, and politics more
broadly, seem to become functional for capitalist reproduction. 17 This may
not be inherent in the argument, but any attempt to show which actions are
necessary for reproduction and then to explain why other sorts of actions
arise-particularly, ones that are directed at impeding business interests-is
likely to prove difficult.
It may be possible to argue that some measure of popular control is, in
fact, an essential feature of the capitalist system and, thus, that when the
state works to reproduce the system, it is doing more than serving the
interests of capital. Unless this line of argument is developed considerably
beyond its present position; however, we simply have an elaborate way of
noting that in liberal democracies, popular control and the promotion of
business interests can operate simultaneously . 18 We are still left with the
theoretical problem of how the two are joined together in practice. 19 It is to
this and related tasks that the discussion now turns.

THE REGIME ARGUMENT
We may best start by reiterating the opening remarks concerning the
liberal democratic division of labor. Liberal democracy is a type of regime
where the distinction between "public" and "private" is central, signifying
the distinction between authority and production and how each is to be
organized. When we talk about the regime, we are then referring to the
basic organizing principles of the society. The state itself is the constitutional-legal entity that sets out the authoritative policies of the society and
wields much of the organized means of coercion. The extent of its legitimacy
may range anywhere from mere acquiescence to active support.
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A state that is operating in a liberal democratic regime requires
"satisfactory" economic performance from the private holders and managers of productive assets, and it needs this for at least two reasons. 2 First,
most of its important officials are directly subject to popular approval
through elections or indirectly through appointment by those who have been
elected. Sustained poor performance, and thus low or declining levels of
material well-being, will mean electoral difficulties and possibly electoral
rout. 21 Even many of those whose appointments do not depend on electoral
returns are also concerned about consistently poor economic perlormance,
since it may result in an undesired rearrangement of their responsibilities.
Second, state activities require revenues, the production of which is
not in the hands of state officials. 22 Economic performance to produce
revenue is required for a variety of reasons, ranging from officials paying for
their prerequisites to financing policies that are central to their careers and
to their conception of larger national purposes. The performance of owners
and managers of productive assets is of even more concern to the state to
the degree that a substantial portion of national revenues originates through
trading abroad. If the nation is highly integrated into the world economy,
owners and managers in effect become public officials, helping to earn the
nation's keep. So much is obvious. The implications are less so.
A first step towards seeing the implications is to summarize the
preceding discussion as a basic premise of the liberal democratic state:
officials of the state are beholden to the citizenry but cannot meet the
citizens' concerns, serve their own careers, or manage the state without a
satisfactory level of economic performance. Public officials cannot run the
state without at least the tacit cooperation of owners and managers of
productive assets. Of course, the extent of officials' concern will vary, not
least because the citizens' interest in economic performance and their ability
to forcefully express their views are subject to variation across space and
time. Public officials will, however, be concerned about the level of
economic performance.
None of this would be a problem if businessmen on their own would
engage in the necessary activities. Economic performance would be high
enough so as not to outrage citizens, and at least modest levels of state
action would be possible. But whereas businessmen will clearly make some
investments, take some risks, and employ some labor, even in difficult
times, the great productive apparatus that is required to employ a growing
population, to generate future investment capital, to provide public services, and otherwise to pay the public bill will not arise unaided. Commanding
businessmen to perform will clearly not be sufficient, precisely to the
degree they are guaranteed disposition over productive assets. As Lindblom puts it, owners and managers must be induced to perform, and public

°

187

Stephen L. Elkin

officials have long engaged in making such inducements (Lindblom, 1977,
chap. 13). At the heart of the matter is likely to be the large scale of
investment that is required and the high degree of uncertainty, which
necessitate some fragile combination of the following: daring entrepreneurial vision-or at least ' 'animal spirits' '-and the promise that risks can
be controlled, that rewards will be high, and that compensation for failure is
possible. These last three are at the center of the state's inducements to
perlorm. 23
Public officials therefore really have two tasks (Block, 1977). On the
negative side, they must try to avoid reducing the confidence of businessmen. Low confidence means low investment. Erratic management of the
currency or talk about nationalization will distress businessmen and make
them less inclined to take risks. On the positive side, actual inducements
must be offered. These may run from tax incentives and state provision of
research money and research findings, to facilitating the granting of various
permits. The latter may involve punishing rapacious officials and replacing
them with those who will perform in nonarbitrary ways. Not only are the
alternatives manifold; they can be organized in a variety of ways. In some
liberal democratic states, everything may be accomplished centrally, while
in others-the United States case being a conspicuous example-much will
be done locally (see, e.g., Elkin, 1978). Thus, there are many ways to be
concerned with economic performance, but once again, public officials will
be concerned.
It is important to emphasize the differences between the view that is
elaborated here and any theory built around the great power of owners and
holders of productive assets. We might be tempted to conclude from the
preceding discussion that the connection between market and state is much
as the ruling-class thesis proposes, with perhaps a clearer understanding of
just why property holders are so powerful. Public officials are more or less
completely dependent on owners and managers for economic performance
and thus are subject to manipulation: businessmen are powerful because
they are needed, or so it would be argued. If there were no more than this
to the regime argument, it would indeed be in danger of collapsing into an
assertion about the power of actors. The essential feature of the liberal
democratic regime, however, is not that owners and managers can exert
power but is the very shape of the regime itself, particularly the division
between market and popularly controlled state. Public officials do not have
to be told to worry about economic performance or to facilitate it: they
understand that for them to do their job as public officials, to stay in office,
and to serve their ambitions, the owners and managers of productive assets
must do their job. 24
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Differently stated, officials do negotiate with particular business interests, and power struggles may well result. But their real interest lies in the
level of economic performance more generally, and that is not a matter of
particular businessmen coordinating their efforts, 25 deciding to invest or
not, and bargaining with or attempting to coerce government, but of large
numbers of businessmen responding as individuals to market incentives. 26
Officials, then, are concerned with the workings of a social process, namely,
the market. Indeed, if business-state relations consisted predominantly of
officials dealing with business spokesmen who were in a position to
coordinate the actions of large numbers of their fellows, power considerations would play a larger role in explaining state action. For in addition to
business groups trying to extract particular concessions, other businessmen
would be attempting more generally to press class interests.
There is another reason that the argument presented here is not
essentially about power: the division between market and state is a two-way
street. Businessmen are not unschooled in the workings of the political
economy. They know that if they demand too much-and if they do it in a
clumsy overweening fashion-their position may become precarious. For
their part, public officials see the perlormance of owners and managers as a
central question because the latter have a choice. They may, for example,
consume substantial portions of their capital in ways that do little for future
productivity, or they may export it. But the choice is theirs, because
property rights are extensively enforced; if owners and managers do not
exercise discretion, they may find that the basis for their choice has been
eroded. To this we may add that the division between market and state
means that those who control productive assets also require various state
authorizations; this, too, is understood. To be sure, the disposition of
businessmen to restrain their desires is probably less powerful than that of
public officials to see that economic perlormance is substantial: the consequences for public officials are more proximate and tangible. But as public
officials pursue their concerns about economic perlormance, they are likely
to find businessmen exercising some restraint. In summary, it is the mix of
popular control and the possibility of choice in the form of property rights
that provides the underlying dynamic for business-state relations.
If the story were to end here, the relationship between public officials
and controllers of assets would be close and intimate, or distant but
amicable. Public officials would need only to maintain business confidence
and, where appropriate, directly to facilitate performance. There would be
little to prevent them from taking their cues from businessmen. Businessmen could happily be left to sort out among themselves what was necessary
for their performance and to convey through various means the results of
their deliberations. In some contemporary liberal democratic regimes this
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indeed may approximate present arrangements, and historically it may well
have been true at one time of most. These cases must be explained,
however, because it is not obvious why popular control of authority should
only find expression in an essentially passive form-simply providing the
motive for public officials' concern with economic petiormance-and should
be confined to judging the overall results. Even if citizens agree that a
substantial portion of the social product should be directed towards ensuring
high levels of economic performance, the question of how much may be
consumed and paid out in the form of wages and public benefits is likely to be
a continuing source of dispute. And even if the mass of citizens have little
sense of the connection between the present division of the social product
and future performance, they will certainly have an opinion on what
constitutes a fair division and how those who lose out should be treated.
This potential for conflict is built into the very arrangements of liberal
democratic regimes. The very existence of public forums for consideration
of the public's business invites the transformation into a public matter of
what might initially be thought of as a private grievance. Furthermore,
because the means of achieving satisfactory economic performancenamely, the market-will force citizens to change jobs, move, or otherwise
greatly alter the basic features of their life circumstances-something that
we may reasonably assume they do not wish to do-they will probably tum
to the available instruments of popular control to prevent it. They will, for
example, seek to constrain business choice, provide compensation to those
who lose out, and resist aids to business performance that contribute to
major alterations in basic features of their lives. 27 Perhaps it is the notion of
a "free market" that blinds us to what is otherwise obvious. Having a
choice between alternatives is freedom, the freedom of the marketplace.
But the ability to keep one's life circumstances as they presently are is also
freedom. 28 This the market does not offer. Citizens know this and act on the
knowledge when possible.
In other words, citizens will inevitably be drawn towards employing
institutions of popular control in ways that will make it more difficult for
public officials and businessmen to arrive at any agreement, even a tacit
one, about how economic performance is to be assured. The reasons for
citizens so acting may be other than specified here; that is of no consequence. It matters only that they will inevitably be drawn to act in a fashion
that will make it difficult to promote economic performance. That citizens
also wish for economic growth is, of course, true. Indeed, as I have said, the
concern of public officials for business performance partly rests on this wish.
Popular control is, however, just that: citizen concern with the full range of
public matters.
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The extent to which citizens make known their views and press them
with vigor will vary, but the potential is always present, requiring that
measures be taken to ensure that popular control does not greatly interfere
with the assessment of how to promote economic performance. Unless
popular control is constrained, the liberal democratic regime will collapse or
be transformed. Either private control of productive assets will be markedly
reduced, or businessmen will cease to perform, or both. The means by
which popular control is constrained and the degree of constraint that is
achieved are the principal features that distinguish liberal democratic states
from one another. A number of means are, however, common to all; they
simply follow from basic features of liberal democracy and operate quite
apart from conscious efforts to reduce the impact that citizens have on the
relations between public officials and controllers of assets.
Consider, first, that the strength of popular control is in the electoral
arena. The threat of electoral penalty strongly motivates officials; and
indeed, without elections, other forms of popular control would be considerably less effective. But the potency of popular control diminishes the further
we move from the electoral arena, and by the time we get to decisions made
by executive agencies, it is clearly weak and indirect. Yet, the administrative arena can and does serve as a forum for negotiating at least some of
businessmen's concerns and some of what they may wish for by way of
inducement. Liberal democracy allows for the broad facilitation of economic
performance simply because the reach of popular control is limited.
Additionally, even if the methods of maintaining business confidence
and facilitating performance appear on the public agenda, owners and
managers have fundamental advantages in the discussion. As is already
apparent, they need not press for access to public officials; the most visible
of them may even be solicited. Moreover, the very fact of owning
productive assets provides controllers of these assets with the solution to a
problem that other interests must struggle with and indeed may not master.
Opinion without benefit of organization and other resources is weak.
Business enterprises, especially larger ones, are, however, already organizations with a complement of human and financial resources that may be
employed to pursue other than business ends.
Finally, it is not only public officials who realize that social well-being
depends heavily on business performances; so, inevitably, do many citizens,
to whom businessmen appear to be more than a sectoral interest. This, plus
a natural tendency to approve of those who flourish under the existing social
rules, provides a substantial reservoir of positive opinion upon which public
officials and businessmen may rely.
One implication of these built-in advantages must be emphasized: they
operate with a kind of historical carry-over. As a group of citizens at a given
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moment attempt to offer an assessment of the distribution of the social
product, they are, for example, attempting to do so in the context of a set of
institutional arrangements. These arrangements are themselves at least
partly the results of historical disputes in which the built-in advantages have
operated. In short, the built-in advantages cumulate. This has the simple but
profound consequence that the ordinary flow of public action works to
screen out challenges. Those citizens, for example, who think that the
operation of banking laws is unnecessarily weighted in favor of promoting
business performance not only must object to particular actions but must
also undo the institutional arrangements that created the agencies to take
the actions.
Even as there are, however, certain features of liberal democratic
states that work to limit the expression of popular control, citizens will still
offer assessments of how to deal with the question of economic performance. Expressions of citizens' opinions are constrained, rather than
squashed, not least because there will always be available some public
officials who derive advantage from mobilizing citizens to challenge the
present form of concern for business performance. However, there will be
limits to the number of public officials so inclined and to the distance that
they will be willing to travel. This is, after all, a dangerous road, since a
citizenry that is in full cry may come to look askance at the present
institutional arrangements that the existing, as well as the aspiring, officials
wish to help manage. Additionally, even combative disaffected politicians are
likely to be leery of inducing deep dismay in businessmen, since eventually
these politicians either will have to operate a political economy in which
businessmen are central or will have to deal with the consequences of poor
performance that attend any major transformation. In their turn, however,
businessmen are likely to recognize that officials must be seen to be
responsive to strong expressions of citizen opinion, quite apart from any
preference they have in the matter.
It will help to summarize the argument to this point. The facts of
private control of productive assets and popular control of authority mean
that public officials are inevitably drawn to promote economic performance.
Because promoting satisfactory performance requires at least the tacit
cooperation of controllers of productive assets (they will not do what is
necessary on their own), their definition of what is required to gain the
desired result will weigh heavily in the choices that officials make. Even
though controllers of assets may not always agree among themselves or
with public officials on what will serve economic performance, such
agreement is not necessary for us to say that inevitably the state broadly
serves business interests.
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When we say then that the state promotes business interests, we are
making two closely related but distinct points. First, officials are concerned
about economic performance, and in their efforts to facilitate it, they
attempt to see that business enterprise will flourish. Of course, particular
enterprises will suffer at any given moment, but the aim is to see that in a
general way, controllers of assets will reap enough rewards to induce them
to continue performing at a satisfactory level. Second, in their efforts to
facilitate performance, the actual definition of what is necessary is heavily
shaped by what businessmen say is required. For both of these reasons, the
interests of owners and controllers of assets are well served.
Public officials, however, are not unconstrained in their concern for
economic performance, because citizens may and do offer their own
assessments on such matters as the distribution of the social product. But
basic features of regime and state operate to prevent any regular complication of the complex mutual accommodation between controllers of assets
and public officials. Breaches of these limits do sometimes occur, but in no
way do they alter either the disposition of public officials to facilitate
economic performance or the prominent role of businessmen in defining
what this requires.
The practices of public officials give actual content to the formal
institutions that are crucial to operating the state. By their efforts to pay
attention both to businessmen's definitions of how to promote economic
performance and to assertions of popular control, public officials make
possible the coexistence of contradictory claims. They in fact lead an
elaborate minuet. If there are limits on popular control, but a danger that
such limits may be breached, how is business performance to be maintained? If businessmen demand too much to perform, including a substantial
reduction in the exercise of popular control, what will prevent a shift from
citizen acquiescence to mass mobilization?
Neither overweening businessmen nor a citizenry that is in full
democratic cry can be accommodated for very long in a liberal democratic
state. Ambitious politicians who are bent on exciting the citizenry need to be
reminded by their peers of the consequences of excessive incitement for the
state as a whole: businessmen will reduce their performance. Businessmen
who are attempting to have most or all of their dealings with the state
handled administratively, out of citizen view, or who are resisting democratic prerogatives to control market behavior need to be reminded that
failure to concede some regulation raises the possibility of even greater
efforts at popular control. They also need to be reminded that national
security may demand that their prerogatives be curbed. Citizens need to be
reminded that even as efforts are being made to protect and promote their
ability to participate in politics, so that they may be a credible deterrent to
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the more greedy and overbearing among owners and managers, the health
of society depends on business investment.
There is no guarantee, however, that officials will prove capable of
managing the state in the manner just indicated or of maintaining these
practices over time. The incentives to do so-which presumably include
some mix of approval of the regime's features, of the state that has been
built on them, and of a desire to pursue a career within such a state-are
diffuse and long-term. Short-term gains are tempting because of their
promise of immediate tangible rewards. Encouraging businessmen who
think they need more inducements to invest, or exciting already mobilized
citizens to demand even more, is probably easier than reminding either of
them about what is required to run a liberal democratic state. In any case,
even if most public officials were to take the longer view, they might be
incompetent or overwhelmed by the uncertainty of social affairs. Perhaps
more importantly, a vital liberal democratic state rests on more than having
public officials manage state institutions. At the least, the desire for popular
control must be continually renewed outside of state institutions, as must
the desire individually to accumulate capital, which lies at the heart of the
enterprise-based market. For any or all of the above reasons, the balance
between popular control and the promotion of business performance may
shift enough to transform the liberal democratic state and the regime on
which it rests. This line of argument will be pursued further in a later
section.
Our sketch of a theory of the liberal democratic state is not yet
complete. 29 The discussion has centered on the state's facilitating economic
performance, and the significance of popular control has been largely
interpreted in this light. Such a focus, while it is essential to any state
theory, leaves too much unsaid. We cannot yet differentiate, for example,
between policy making concerning tax incentives to stimulate investment
and the protection of civil liberties, nor are we yet clear as to whether all
state actions that might in some way facilitate economic performance are to
be treated equally. Unless we can elaborate the theory further, we will
inevitably be drawn into increasingly implausible assertions about the
actions of public officials and the controllers of assets, since virtually all
policy choices in one way or another potentially impinge on economic
performance. If we mean to argue that the state inevitably facilitates
economic performance, we must show that this does not mean that all
aspects of public action are equally relevant to this concern. At issue is the
extent to which the interests of business dominate across the spectrum of
policy domains and, concomitantly, the extent to which popular control, and
thus a variety of other than business concerns, shapes policy discussion (see
Stone, 1980, 1981).
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Given the argument outlined so far, the connection made by public
officials and businessmen between economic performance and any particular
policy question is a good first step towards explaining this variation across
policy domains (Stone, 1980; Elkin, 1980). A well-understood connection
will more readily focus the thinking and action of public officials and will make
them more receptive to the approaches of business spokesmen. By the
same token, owners and managers will take some trouble to indicate their
preferences in the matter. Moreover, if the process of mutual accommodation between public officials and businessmen spills out into the public arena,
officials are more likely to resist proposals that are offered by citizen
spokesmen as they (officials) attempt to arrive at a course of action aimed at
actually facilitating economic performance.
If no close connection is perceived, public officials are more likely to be
guided by the variety of interest group and broader citizen concerns. But
state action is still not completely free of the interests of business, as may
also be inferred from the propositions already advanced. When policy choice
involves complex implementation of programs and when business organizations that are capable of carrying them out are already in existence, public
officials will be drawn to options that make use of such organizations. The
officials' desire to be successful, whether in terms of career or larger
purposes, impels them in this direction. The very fact of private ownership
creates this incentive (Stone, 1980). A revealing example here is the
American preference for health-insurance schemes that rely on private
insurers. In addition, of course, the relevant business enterprises themselves are likely to promote private alternatives, and businessmen in
general argue that economic performance is itself at stake. Still, when the
connection between the policy at issue and economic performance is seen to
be weak, the pulling and hauling characteristic of a developed interest-group
politics is most likely to occur. It is then that business groups are one among
many. The other typical form of politics under these conditions is the
coziness of "iron triangles."
Perhaps the best way to see the connection between these two types
of policy domains (where economic performance is and is not seen to be at
issue) is to note the rapidity with which iron triangles, or vital contests
between equally matched interest groups, can turn into a discussion
dominated by a concern with the interests of business. On their own,
businessmen probably cannot bring about such a rapid shift and, indeed, may
lose out to other interests; but once public officials believe that economic
performance is at stake, the transformation of one sort of policy domain into
another can be quick indeed.
It is important to emphasize that the proposition ''The state promotes
business interests'' is not first and foremost an assertion about the outcome
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of a series of decisions but about the disposition of public officials to facilitate
economic performance and why they are likely to be guided by businessmen
in this regard. Empirically, the concern for business interests is likely to
dominate a wide range of outcomes, but businessmen can and do lose. It is
perhaps most revealing of the nature of the argument being presented that,
in comparison to pluralist or ruling-class views, it is not essentially an
argument about the exercise of power. It is most assuredly an argument
about advantage (but not only that, as we shall see). However, the promise
of the theoretical argument is precisely that we can now see the state as
being active and independent, neither neutral in its actions nor up for grabs
in a scramble for power among interests. And we can say all of this without
having to rely on implausible arguments about concentrated power and its
exercise; the arguments follow from the very character of the regime.
Pluralist views of liberal democratic politics go astray in that they do not
take the regime seriously as it shapes the actions of the state. The rulingclass thesis goes astray in thinking that the impact of the regime can be
reduced to a study of the power of a business elite; that is, in a different
manner, the thesis does not take the regime seriously.
The shift away from explanations that rely on the power of actors is
part of a larger and common theme in social science: the search for systemic
explanations. Aside from the shortcomings already noted, the form of actorpower explanations is inadequate. Both pluralist and ruling-class notions are
essentially simple causal explanations, dealing in efficient causes. They
locate an agent or agents who are supposed, by their actions, to produce an
outcome. The regime argument directs our attention to the character of the
whole and says, in effect, "Don't look for particular actors and efficient
causes.'' A state of affairs is not explained by an agent and its actions but by
the set of relations in which the agent is embedded. The explanation of why
the state serves business interests is not only not business power, neither is
it, at bottom, the disposition of public officials. Businessmen have an
attentive audience, and officials are disposed in particular ways because of
the very form of the regime.30

IMPLICATIONS OF THE REGIME ARGUMENT
We now have sufficient understanding of the workings of the liberal
democratic state, built upon a regime argument, to consider some of its
implications and thus to make a prelimmary assessment of its promise.
We can start by indicating how the regime argument helps us interpret
the rise of the welfare state. We can now see that the welfare state is not
necessarily a way station to anything else but is, in fact, simply one of the
196

PLURALISM IN ITS PLACE

historical forms that liberal democratic politics and the liberal democratic
state have taken. At their center, the welfare state and the managed
economy still have public officials who are concerned with promoting
business performance. Also, popular control is still limited, even though
citizens are perhaps better able to articulate independent conceptions of
what promotes economic activity. The story of change in the twentieth
century is a liberal democratic story, even as it has revealed some of the
possible variations on that theme.
In the same vein, as the state has become increasingly involved in
aiding and regulating business enterprise, managing the business cycle, and
distributing benefits to citizens, there has been considerable discussion
about the increase in the scope of government (see, e.g., Crouch, 1979;
Gough, 1979; O'Connor, 1973; Weinstein, 1968). Is this increase the result
of struggle by ordinary citizens or a means by which capitalists have sought
to deal with their difficulties?
To use present terms, did it grow out of assertions of popular control
or concern for business performance? On the basis of the preceding
analysis, we can see how both have been at work and how politicians have
probably played a central role in effecting the changes. Over time there have
been shifts in the degree to which citizens have been organized to press
their assessment of economic performance and how it might be facilitated.
Politicians have been instrumental both in stimulating this organization and
in using it to convince businessmen that economic performance could be
enhanced by various forms of state-provided economic and social security.
They have also indicated that in the absence of such concessions, citizens
might offer even more troublesome assessments of economic performance
and how it might be promoted. Similarly, politicians have also shaped and
interpreted cues from businessmen about the kinds of public action that
would induce satisfactory economic performance. Any story that interprets
the rise of positive welfare-oriented states as the means by which either
capitalists solved their problems or the working class dealt with theirs
overlooks that it is more nearly a case of liberal democratic politicians
solving theirs. 31
This line of argument can be extended to clarify the status of pluralist
politics, whether we mean a more or less vigorous pluralism (Wilson, 1979)
or interest-group liberalism and the private appropriation of public authority
(Lowi, 1979). Interest groups are revealed as being one of the forms that
popular control has taken in such states. More important, we can see that
the mobilization of interests in various forms, though real, cannot be the
central form of political activity, as is implied by pluralist theories of politics.
Citizens do present assessments of economic performance and of how
satisfactory levels may be achieved; businessmen do try to protect their
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prerogatives and argue for a variety of inducements to perform. And indeed,
a whole array of interests press their cases. But all of this takes place within
the broader activity that follows from the character of the regime. Conflict
between the different interests has an important place, but it is not at center
stage. That is reserved for the intricate process of accommodation between
businessmen, public officials, and citizens concerning the terms under which
economic performance will be facilitated and business interests will be
served.
In general, neither pluralism nor well-developed social-welfare programs are inconsistent with the state's having an inevitable concern for
business interests. The welfare state leaves intact the major features of the
liberal democratic state; pluralism as a form of popular control also leaves
intact the concern for business interests and the limits on citizen assertiveness.
An additional advantage of the view of the state presented here is that
it helps us to sort out a number of claims that have been made concerning
business-state relationships in liberal democracies. First, those who argue
that the state is in the service of capital-whether as an agent or in some
other way that is central to the reproduction of capitalism-are likely to have
difficulty with the suggestion that state action is in fact adding to present
economic difficulties (Bowles and Gintis, 1980). Given recent economic
performance among liberal democracies, however, it is useful to allow for
the possibility that the state will be capitalism's gravedigger. The argument
outlined here has the room. Within its terms we can simultaneously say that
the state must be devoted to facilitating business performance, even as
public officials may, in fact, get it all wrong, and as a result performance
declines.
Second, we can make sense of businessmen's assertions that state
action is not helping economic performance, even as we argue here that the
state inevitably aims to help it. State officials are at various junctures likely
to arrive at independent judgments about what is necessary for satisfactory
performance and may insist for a considerable time to businessmen that
businessmen are the ones who have it all wrong. As a consequence,
businessmen may lose struggles over gaining new prerequisites or protecting existing ones and, believing that these prerequisites are necessary to
economic performance, may conclude that public officials do not share their
concern for the economy. At various times, moreover, public officials may
do for businessmen what they cannot do for themselves-namely, devise a
plan of action that will overcome the diversity of their interests and their
short time horizons.
More generally, two common and seemingly diametrically opposed
observations about the present character of business-state relations can
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now be reconciled. Some observers contend that the state is promoting
capital, while others argue that businessmen feel constrained and overwhelmed by an expansive state. We can now say that there is some truth in
both observations. The state may assert a conception of how to facilitate
business performance that businessmen find disagreeable; and the state will
assert and indeed attempt to act on such a conception-if that is what the
workings of popular control require at the moment. Businessmen in liberal
democracies are not a ruling class that dominates the state, nor are they
merely a particularly powerful interest group. But then, neither is the state
neutral with regard to the well-being of business. The liberal democratic
state cannot be captured in any of these simplifications.
On more concrete matters, the regime argument also turns out to be
helpful in explaining some of the fundamental features of making policy
decisions. Even if the characterization of the state activity presented above
proves to be no better at accounting for particular policy outcomes than,
say, a more standard combination of bureaucratic and interest-group
politics, it has some significant advantages .32 Most important, we can
account for some central aspects of the pattern of policy discussion itself.
Being able to explain the subject and the form of policy discussion is at least
as important as being able to explain the actual outcomes, because
outcomes are often strongly influenced by the former.
The regime argument suggests, for example, that the central concern
of public officials and businessmen is not that business interests dominate
policy decisions but that they always be present. Public officials and
businessmen may rest reasonably satisfied as long as the basic relationships
that prompt and allow officials to be particularly attentive to business
concerns remain intact. Less obviously, the regime argument also affords us
insight into the centrality of courts and regulation in liberal democratic policy
discussions. 33
A danger in liberal democratic politics is that facilitating economic
performance might be viewed as nothing more than the promotion of a
particular interest. If this view becomes widely accepted, the state becomes
increasingly difficult to operate. The problem recedes, however, to the
degree that institutions of popular control direct public officials to engage in
such activities, most obviously by passing laws to this end. We thus witness
the growth of legislation that is supposed to express public sentiment about
public matters but that is visibly designed to benefit the business sector.
This, in tum, is justified by the assertion that the health of this sector is
particularly valuable to the whole community. Nevertheless, this approach
is inherently precarious, not least because others may try to press the claim
that their performance is essential too. The dilemma is that institutions of
popular control may soon not be perceived as such at all; and public officials
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who are anxious to face down overweening businessmen in the name of the
larger community may discover that they are trying to do so within
institutions that only respond to particular claims.
Legislation, in any case, is a cumbersome instrument if the problem is a
repetitive one. Hence, a major part of the burden of reconciling a concern
for business performance and popular control passes to regulatory agencies
(or their equivalents) and to the courts. It now becomes clearer why in
liberal democracies-especially when facilitating business performance has
turned into direct promotion-regulatory agencies and the courts are central
institutions. They carry out a fundamental task of the liberal democratic
state and will inevitably be criticized. Voices will be heard, on the one hand,
saying that regulatory agencies are acting as custodians of business
interests and need to be strengthened as agents of popular control (Nader
and Green, 1976); on the other hand, many will argue that the agencies do
not promote business interests because they are either self-serving (Wilson, 1980) or have been captured by those who, in the service of some
vague public interest, wish to impede business performance (Weaver,
1978). Similar criticisms are and will be made about the courts, which have
the unenviable task of interpreting many of the regulations that are issued
(see Elliot, 1974; Glazer, 1975; Chayes, 1976; Freedman, 1978) . Over
time, then, policy discussion in liberal democracies assumes a pattern, as
criticisms of the means to reconcile business performance and popular
control become regularized and even stylized. The means themselves
eventually seem to lose their virtue. A pattern of "let's try this" -only to
discover that we have tried it once before-becomes apparent. 34 The
particular policy outcomes themselves are likely to be less important than
the fact that the same problems keep reappearing, with the same solutions
attached and with the same criticisms that the solutions are not adequate.
Two often-noted features of reform efforts in liberal democracies now
also come into view. State control of business corporations has increased,
and popular control has been expanded, at least with regard to particular
matters. Reform, then, is clearly possible. This is consistent with what
conventional views of liberal democracy teach us-namely, that through
organized exertion, political and economic arrangements may be noticeably
altered. Such changes, however, are not easily accommodated with a rulingclass analysis except at the cost of eviscerating the argument. Nor are the
apparent limits to reform easily explained by talking about the general play
of interests, and particularly about the power of organized business to
resist. Once we have understood the disposition of public officials and its
source in the division of labor, the obstacles in the way of substantial reform
become apparent, as do the inadequacies of pluralist and ruling-class
accounts of its characteristic pattern in liberal democratic states.
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Most important of all, the regime argument makes it clear that the
state is not an extension of class war by political means. The implications of
this understanding reach beyond the particular point. It is in the extensions
of this, normative, analysis that the real power of the regime argument
becomes apparent.
We have already argued that the state is neither a neutral arena nor
merely an instrument of domination by a powerful class. Might it not,
however, be a battle ground for large-scale interests into whose service
public officials have been recruited? The practices that we have describedbroadly, of public officials promoting economic performance while at the
same time responding to assertions of popular control-might lend themselves to such an interpretation. The state might be seen as an ensemble of
activities embodying the struggle between those who are striving to create
a new political economy and those who are working to protect the existing
arrangements, of which they are the major beneficiaries-in short, a
struggle between labor and capital.
This is, in fact, a tempting interpretation, precisely because the liberal
democratic state does seem to have contending forces at its heart. If we
were to adopt it, however, the state would become the realm of ''unfreedom" (Kelly, 1979), just as much as if it were merely an instrument of
domination by a powerful class. The fact that the struggle may be a
relatively even one between two (or more) interests does not alter the fact
that it is a struggle for domination. Nor does anything fundamentally change
if we root for one side to win. The prize is still the chance to use the state to
further class (or other) interests.
The problem remaining is to establish the credibility of yet another
alternative: the state is neither a neutral, passive arena nor only a potential
or actual instrument of domination. If we look more closely at the political
practices described earlier, this alternative comes into view. Starting from
the idea of a regime will help us to see that the liberal democratic state is a
mixed state in the sense that it embodies at least two genuine claims to rule.
C. B. Macpherson provides a useful beginning point. 35 He characterizes the political practices that are associated with the concern for economic
performance as being liberal. The central impulse of liberalism is the
promotion of individual choice. A primary vehicle for the exercise of such
choice, he argues, is a market system based on private property, although
liberalism has also been concerned with such rights as the exercise of the
franchise and of free speech. Liberal advocates have also praised ambition
and the desire to accumulate wealth as being integral features of a society
that rests on individual choice. Liberal political practice then, we may say, is
devoted to supporting the realization of market and political choice (Sartori,
1965; Friedman, 1962). A concern for economic performance is a liberal
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practice, because it rests on promoting to high levels the operation of
property rights and free exchange in the marketplace. 36
Popular control, by contrast, is best understood as embodying democratic political practices. The central democratic impulse is participatory. Its
emphasis is communal-collective rule by all-not individualistic; and its
preeminent theorist is Rousseau, just as liberalism's is Hobbes. The
democratic impulse is also egalitarian, because rule by all requires not only
political equality but also economic equality sufficient not to vitiate the
premise of equal participation. Its egalitarianism may also spring more
directly from discussions of what constitutes a fair distribution of wealth.
Clearly, the democratic impulse is a potentially far-reaching one, but for
reasons that are partially enumerated or implied above , its embodiment in
liberal democracies is restricted to what we have termed popular controlor democracy as method rather than substance37 -and the extent of that
has, in tum, been circumscribed.
To call the political practices that are associated with the operation of
popular control "democratic" is not to deny that there has been a
substantial convergence between liberalism and democracy around some of
the desirable features of the state. The observation about democracy as
method suggests the point. Both liberalism and democracy promote free
elections, a variety of political rights, and civil liberties. But such agreement
on particulars does not mean that liberals and democrats share fundamental
concerns. The democratic impulse is not limited to the forms of popular
control that we have described, and the potential issue of the democratic
impulse, even in its limited form, is a substantial restructuring of property
rights and market operations. Similarly, the distinctive claim of liberalism is
that it promotes individual choice and employs state action in ways that are
least damaging to that individualism, even if extensive activity by that state
may be called for .
Nothing that has been said so far rules out the possibility that the liberal
and democratic practices that I have described are no more than polite
names to cloak efforts to dominate. We might be merely talking about the
struggle between capitalists and proletarians and thus be back to a version
of the idea of the state as unfreedom. The regime argument would then
teach us that the state is not merely in the service of capital, but the
argument could do no more.
The question at issue is how we may know that when liberal or
democratic claims are made, they are not only attempts to gain advantage
but are genuine assertions about how political rule should be organized.
Since the question is a central one in political theory, it can hardly be settled
here. But we can start by pointing to some historical evidence. Liberalism
was understood-certainly by its principal early advocates-to be more than
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a claim that individual freedom and property holding should be advanced; it
was also a claim about a freer society altogether. Similarly, the theorists of
democracy clearly thought they were arguing not only for a class interest
but also for a society in which men would more likely be free and would
more nearly realize their potential (see Macpherson, 1966). In the contemporary world, the efforts that are made by public officials in liberal
democracies to facilitate business performance are translated, in some
quarters at least, into a concern for fostering ambition, individual freedom,
and the accumulation of wealth-all of which are understood to be elements
of the common good. Similar translations of efforts to extend popular control
are also made.
There is, however, a rriore theoretical point to make. Politics is not a
private affair, taking place in the closet. As Hanna Pitkin comments, ''there
is no such thing as private politics, intimate politics" (1972:204). Politics is
essentially a public activity, and as such, it is an activity in which justification
is essential: I am unlikely to gain any adherents if I claim that a particular
mode of organizing the society advances my interests only. Nor can I hope
to run a society only by physical force, because even armies must have
adherents and because, in any case, force has limits as a durable mode of
social coordination. In short, I must talk in terms of our interests, about why
promoting virtues such as the ones that I and others possess is good for us
as a community. There is, of course, nothing to prevent someone from
proceeding in completely cynical fashion, simply casting around for a
doctrine that has a large enough appeal to suit his or his group's purposes. If
he continues to assert his doctrine, however, even as its popularity is
lapsing, this seems more likely to stem from genuine belief in its merits than
from tactical considerations directed at maintaining his following. 38
The doctrines of liberalism and democracy, then, are not only concerned with who should rule-and thus about advantage-but about how
they should do so and why. Both particular interests and public interests are
being asserted. Similarly, liberal and democratic practices are more than
attempts to promote particular interests; they express claims about just
rule.
If we are willing to concede this, the liberal democratic state does
indeed become a genuine mixed state. We may call it '' democratized
liberalism'' (Macpherson, 1966; Sartori, 1965, chap. 15), an appellation that
gives pride of place to liberalism but that clearly identifies popular control as
being a vital force. This is an important conclusion, because it helps us to
avoid the temptation of seeing liberal democratic politics as a morality play.
Rather than a struggle between progress and reaction, or between the
general interest and particular interests, or between any variation on these
themes, liberal democratic politics becomes precisely that intricate minuet
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that I described earlier. The minuet now has an important additional feature:
that of maintaining a state that embodies competing, widely shared normative claims. Liberal democratic politicians are neither mere power brokers,
moving between various interests, nor spokesmen for class interests. More
important, they are the central actors who are engaged in the mixing of
competing and attractive claims to rule. 39 In the story of liberal democratic
politics, pride of place must go, not to interests and classes, but to the
institutions of the state as they are operated by public officials (cf.
Huntington, 1968, chap. 1).
Understanding the liberal democratic state as a mixed state is not only
valuable in itself; it also points to a weakness in current theoretical
discussions of a possible legitimation crisis in market-oriented societies.
Some theorists treat democratic institutions as providing an imprimatur.
They are presented as a source of legitimation for what otherwise might
lack it, namely, the accumulation of capital and the promotion by the state of
economic performance. In this view, liberal political practices are the
beneficiaries of legitimation, not a part of it. Legitimation is seen as a kind of
function, something that the state does in order to keep itself and the larger
regime intact. In particular, democratic forms, symbols, and even democratic substance are understood to be products that are produced in order to
allow something else to happen. 40 To be sure, these theorists admit that
governing through democratic forms is risky, because the electorate may
take democracy seriously; but this chance must be taken, since liberal
practices such as promoting economic performance are said to lack
legitimacy. 41
The complement to this view of democratic institutions focuses on
another product as crucial for legitimation, namely, economic growth. Both
views see the state as being a machine that is manufacturing a kind of
political widget in the form of so many units of legitimation. But as we have
said, the liberal democratic state is in fact an intricate set of practices that
are both claims for advantage and claims about how the community should
be ruled. The acts of legitimation, then, are the state itself in motion.
Legitimation is not a product of the state; in a real sense, it is the state-at
least to the degree that the practices are indeed freely expressed claims
about how the community should be ruled. As Bernard Crick remarks, ''the
moral consensus of a free state is not something mysteriously prior to or
above politics: it is the activity (the civilizing activity) of politics itself"
(1964:24). 42
With these remarks about legitimacy in mind , we can assess some
current proposals on how to respond to the present decline in economic
growth and productivity. 43 Some on the Left seem to talk as if their only real
interest was to extend democratic practices. In the work place, for
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example, they seem not to notice that any decline in legitimacy that follows
from reduced growth can be met not only by increased democratization but
also by putting greater emphasis on the heart of liberal practices, namely,
individual choice. Citizens who have a sense of freedom in their daily liveswho are, in a word, involved in liberal practices (which, translated, might
mean fewer regulated markets)-may be less concerned about declines in
growth. Of course, many promoters of corporate well-being seem not to
understand this either: liberal practices are not just instruments to promote
high growth and profits; they are also forms of relation between citizens
which embody a (partial) way of life. Many on the Right seem also not to
recognize that citizens who are involved in democratic practices are
probably more likely to accept modest levels of real income. 44
The preceding remarks about legitimation also suggest that the decline
in liberal and democratic practices is in itself a principal source of the
legitimation problem. An increase in either of these practices is not easy to
imagine, because the growth of large-scale public and private organizations
has meant that relationships between citizens are increasingly being defined
by organizational roles. The extent to which state action is tied to the
requirements of bureaucratic organizations has increased markedly, and
while citizens may be told and may tell each other that these are really
liberal and democratic practices, the reality is otherwise. Legitimation,
which arises from citizens' being related to each other in liberal and
democratic ways, is thus corroded, particularly since an ethic for a
bureaucratized politics seems difficult to develop (cf. Unger, 1975). The
liberal democratic state is made more precarious because the growth of
bureaucratic organizations makes it even more difficult for politicians to mix
liberal and democratic practices.
The crisis of liberal democracy, however, cuts even deeper than the
rise of administration. Once again, seeing liberal democracy as a mixed state
is helpful. The state may be able to survive problems of declining
productivity and capital accumulation, fiscal undernourishment (see O'Connor, 1973), overloading (see Huntington, 1968), and disaggregation (see
Wilson, 1980). These all cut deep, but because they are probably imbalances within existing arrangements, profits can be raised, interest
aggregation can be increased, and citizen mobilization can be reduced and a
crisis thus averted. There may be "structural" reasons why necessary
actions are difficult: for example, to do one thing may make other things
worse. This would be serious indeed if it could be demonstrated. But
potentially more serious would be a decline in the basis of liberal democratic
politics itself (and in the possibility of any acceptable form of politics).
Liberal democratic legitimation depends on the continuation of a public or
political community that is itself increasingly precarious.
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Liberal and democratic claims are addressed to a public, to the
presumed beneficiaries of just rule. Liberal democracy is an unstable
compound, not only because it requires assiduous efforts by politicians but
also because conflict really exists between liberal and democratic claims to
rule. Liberalism, as it is commonly defined, requires that coercion by all
agencies-including the state-be kept to a minimum, while democratic
ideas tend to promote an expansive state. The fact that these are claims
about justice for the whole political order and that they are subject to
compromise may soften the conflict between them but does not eliminate it.
The specter of the state as unfreedom is not so easily dismissed.
To keep the compound both stable and acceptable, something else is
required. Consider what happens when belief starts to disappear in the
public to whom liberal and democratic claims are addressed. This may occur
because widely shared belief in the possibility of having any evaluation at all
disappears or because there is no longer any sense of a public or larger
community to exercise that judgment. If belief in a public capable of
evaluation fades, liberal democratic politics degenerates. 45 At a minimum,
the effort to clothe self-interest that is induced by the knowledge that others
will be asserting broadly couched claims will decline. Degeneration becomes
more pronounced as politicians lose interest in maintaining the institutions
that make possible the mixing of liberal and democratic claims. The
politicians' exploitation of the nooks and crannies of public authority for their
own advantage then really begins to flourish. At the same time, citizens
increasingly come to believe that the only purpose of political institutions is
to confer advantage. 46 The result? Politics increasingly degenerates into a
crude pluralist or crude Marxist fantasy that sees no further than my
interest and yours, my class and yours. How a liberal democratic politics can
survive in such circumstances is not clear. For the truth of the matter is that
it cannot. If a liberal democratic state is to survive, the political community
or public must be seen as a source of evaluation. Just how this is be done is
less clear.
The analysis can be extended to the regime. After all, the market
itself-just as much as efforts by the state to facilitate economic performance-and the institutions of popular control themselves-just as much as
the liberal and democratic practices that are the state in action-embody
assertions about how the society should be justly organized. The regime is
political just as much as the state. In either case, a picture of men who are
worried only about themselves would be as much a curiosity as one in which
they only worried about justice. Both state and regime join together the
exercise of power and the search for common purposes. As such, they must
rest on a conviction that it is possible to reason about the best ways to carry
out such an endeavor.
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NOTES
This paper builds on ideas that were first presented by Charles E. Lindblom
(1977). Lindblom's theoretical concerns, purposes, and language are somewhat
different, but it was by coming to terms with his arguments that I was able to write
this essay. For an initial effort, see Elkin (1982) .
In a recent paper (1980) my colleague Clarence Stone has arrived at formulations similar to some of the ones presented here. As we discussed the central ideas
over several years, it is not easy to say where his ideas leave off and my own begin.
Suffice it to say, the present paper could not have been written without him. Others
who have contributed to the formulations here include Fred Alford, Don Babai, Diana
Elkin, Ira Katznelson, Joe Oppenheimer, Ron Terchek, and Alan Wolfe.
1. The discussion here thus starts from the division of labor, i.e., from the
regime. Aside from positing the reality of market exchange, the argument assumes
the minimal operation of popular control. Officials must actually stand for office, with
competition allowed. Elections must not be marred by widespread coercion and
corruption, and some modest level of information about public affairs must be
available. For an expanded list and general discussion see Dahl (1970). While such
minimal conditions are not widespread, these are not heroic assertions about most
Western societies.
It is also worth emphasizing that there are other questions to ask than the one
posed here. We might, for example, inquire into whether a particular type of state is
suitable to a market system based on private ownership, or we might wonder about
the historical connection between popular control of authority and such market
arrangements or about the origins of property-based market systems and of popular
control. All are important areas of inquiry in their own right.
2. Cf. Polsby's (1980) comment on the study of community power: "The first
and most basic presupposition of the pluralist approach is that nothing categorical can
be assumed about power in any community."
3. Galbraith (1956) provides an exemplary rendition of this argument.
4. See Dahl's early formulation (1957) and the discussion by Lukes (1974).
5. To a greater or lesser degree these views and the ones that follow are
embodied in Polsby (1980), Dahl (1961), Lowi (1979), Olson (1965), Wilson (1973),
and Sayre and Kaufman (1965).
6. See Unger (1975), Lukes (1974), and Balbus (1971) . That interests are
subjective does not mean that no account may be given of their sources. Truman
(1960), in a classic pluralist statement, seems at times to argue for an objective basis
for interests; but this position, if it is held, would be inconsistent with much of the
rest of the book.
7. For a fuller statement see Elkin (1979).
8. See Offe 's (1974) argument on this point. Schmitt (1976), talking about
English pluralists such as G. D. H. Cole, comments that the pluralist view of the
state results in treating it as " nothing else than a revocable service for individuals
and their free associations" (p. 45). Implicitly, many American pluralists seem to
hold such a view.
9. Niskanen (1971) and Wildavsky (1979) show evidence of this view.
10. Unger (1975) argues for the connection between pluralist tenets and liberal
political thought and also has a particularly sweeping and penetrating critique.
11. A contemporary and very explicit version of this view is Domhoff (1979).
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12. For critical comments from very different points of view see Offe (1974)
and Polsby (1980). The discussion of class interests is closely connected to the issue
of ''real interestsn (see Balbus, 1971). Of course, not all proponents of a realinterest view hold to a ruling-class thesis. It may simply be part of an attempt to
demonstrate that businessmen, or others, are exercising power when overt
interaction suggests agreement (see, e.g., Crenson, 1971).
13. But see the discussion below, where a similar, if not perhaps as demanding,
distinction is made between policy domains that are central to economic performance
and those that are not.
14. This argument plays an essential part in Stone (1980).
15. Class theories that do not argue for a ruling class but, rather, talk about a
clash between classes are typically a version of the pluralist argument, with the
number of relevant interests curtailed. Aside from the criticisms I have already
made, additional considerations are advanced below in connection with the state as
the realm of ''unfreedom.''
16. Block (1977) argues that this sort of functionalist argument collapses into a
ruling-class analysis because, as the argument now stands, the only guarantee that
public officials serve the interests of capital (aside from some assertions about the
functions of the state) is that the capitalist class can finally make it happen.
17. Cf. Lenin's (1949) remark that ''the reason why the omnipotence of
'wealth' is more certain in a democratic republic is that it does not depend on ...
the poor political shell of capitalism'' (p. 15).
18. For an important effort see the work of Offe. See also Habermas (1975) and
O'Connor (1973). Offe and Habermas probably write out of an epistemological
position that is different from the one employed here. Comparison of the merits of
the various approaches would need, then, to go well beyond empirical questions.
Epistemological differences frequently bedevil comparisons between Marxist and
non-Marxist accounts (not to mention within each category), and in a limited space it
is impossible to do more than establish a theoretical position and indicate where else
the interested reader might tum for complementary formulations. For an example of
the difficulties of disentangling empirical and epistemological issues see the debate
between Poulantzas (1969) and Miliband (1973a and 1973b). See also Elkin (1979).
In general, the epistemological issues here are not well explored in a manner that is
useful to those who are trying to understand the detailed workings of actual political
economies. For one effort see Wright (1979). The heart of the matter is probably the
relation between parts and wholes in social phenomena. The following works are
particularly revealing in this regard for the study of liberal democracy: Ollman
(1977), Unger (1975), and Georgescu-Roegen (1971).
19. Another theoretical approach might loosely be called structural Marxism.
The leading theorist here is Poulantzas. The complexity of the argument, the fact
that he seems to have shifted ground considerably (compare State, Power, and
Socialism to Political Power and Social Classes), and the fact that a number of
critiques exist (Bridges, 1974; Wolfe, 1974; Laclau, 1979; Miliband, 1970, 1973a,
and 1,973b; Jessop, 1977; and more generally on structural approaches, Thompson,
1979 'and Williams, 1977)-all indicate that there is little profit to be gained from a
discussion here. Crouch (' 'The State, Capital, and Liberal Democracy,'' in State and
Economy in Contemporary Capitalism, ed. Colin Crouch [New York: St. Martin's],
1979) suggests that the structuralist view has strong affinities with functionalist
arguments. Indeed, the principal difficulty is to ascertain just what sort of argument
is being made. It clearly doesn't rest on the triad of actors, interests, and power.
208

PLURALISM IN ITS PLACE
Because functionalist arguments also are criticized, that cannot be the basis, at least
as far as Poulantzas is concerned. These don't exhaust the alternatives, to be sure,
but much detective work is required.
Over and above all the reasons that I have noted for not discussing at length
explicitly Marxist theory, one stands out. The real issue presented by such theories
is whether they are political theories at all and whether they are in fact critiques of
the possibility and desirability of politics. In Arendt's view, for example, Marx
intended to bring the whole enterprise of political theory to a close (see The Human
Condition, particularly pt. 6). Beside the consideration of this issue, other criticisms
of Marxist theory are marginal. Pluralists and elitist theories are, however thin, still
political theories.
20. The following recognize the importance of one or both reasons: Lindblom
(1977, chap. 13), Block (1977), Offe and Runge (1975), O'Connor (1973), Bridges
(1974), Bowles and Gintis (1980), Stone (1980), Crouch (1979), and Miliband
(1973b, chap. 6).
21. For an early sophisticated discussion of the extent to which economic
performance affects electoral fortunes see Tufte (1978). Tufte also documents how
politicians, acting on the basis of that connection, attempt to manipulate economic
performance for electoral advantage. A good deal of investigation will be required to
estimate how poo_r pertormance must be and for how long before electoral defeat will
actually loom. But even sustained mediocre performance will probably require
greater efforts if politicians are reelected.
22. To the degree that citizens' concern with economic performance translates
into a desire for certain kinds of publicly provided services, the two points merge.
23. See, e.g., Schumpeter's (1950) discussion of entrepreneurs and the
general problem of risk and reward, and Commons (1957). For a stimulating essay
see Wolin (1981).
24. Cf. Block (1977). Witness John Kennedy's statement in 1961: "This
country cannot prosper unless business prospers. The country cannot meet its
obligations and tax obligations and all the rest unless business is doing well. Business
will not do well and we will not have full employment unless there is a chance to make
a profit. So there is no long-run hostility between business and government. There
cannot be. We cannot succeed unless they succeed" (emphasis added; quoted from
Wolfe, 1981).
25. As it would be with workers. This, plus the degree of choice each has,
discussed below, helps to distinguish labor from capital.
26. Block (1977) makes a parallel argument.
27. A particularly impressive current example is that workers in historically
high-wage industries, such as steel or automobiles, are reluctant to give up income in
order to move to other industries, particularly if that means building another union to
promote and protect wage gains. They are trying and will continue to try to use state
authority to prevent their having to move and to prevent reductions in wages.
28. For an exceptional essay building on the observation that the market
regularly alters life circumstances see Berman (1978).
29. Nor, indeed, can a complete theory be outlined here. At a minimum, the
place of the state in a changing world system must be considered. It is worth noting
two obvious points of connection between the argument presented here and the
workings of the world system. First, as I have already indicated, public officials, in
their concern for economic performance, are likely to be more attentive to

209

Stephen L. Elkin
businessmen the greater the nation's integration into the world economy. Second,
while the examples below regarding variation in concern for business interests
across policy areas all deal with domestic matters, the analysis may be easily
extended to foreign affairs. In general, the claim on which this essay rests, however,
is that it is useful to start with the domestic state and then work outward to the
international system. It is not obvious how the merits of this theoretical strategy, as
against starting with the international order, can be judged before theoretical work
has been attempted.
30. See Thomas Kuhn's discussion of Aristotle's distinction between efficient
and formal cause in ''Concepts of Cause in the Development of Physics'' (in Kuhn,
1977). In formal causes, Kuhn says, "Effects are deduced from a few specific innate
properties of the entities with which the explanation is concerned'' (p. 28).
31. See, e.g., the discussions of Roosevelt by Freidel (1973).
32. It is worth noting that we need not concede any supposed superiority in this
regard to analyze built on pluralist assumptions. Past successes are not obvious, and
if the distinction is refined between policy domains where economic performance is
deemed to be central and where it is not, the state theory offered here may prove to
be exceedingly useful in accounting for particular policy outcomes. See the
discussion by Stone (1980), in the context of city politics, for how much might be
understood by proceeding in the manner outlined here.
33. For a related discussion with a different emphasis see Unger (1975).
34. See the discussion of the history of economic regulation in Stewart (1975).
35. Particularly in The Real World of Democracy; see also Wolfe (1977).
36. Some efforts to promote economic perlormance can, of course, have
perverse effects in this regard.
37. Compare here, Rousseau, in The Social Contract, to Schumpeter (1950),
pt. 4. Rousseau wishes for citizens to develop a particular understanding of the
connection between their own and the community's well-being, whereas Schumpeter wants a device for selecting and controlling political leaders.
38. The tactical considerations would center on maintaining a reputation for
probity by not discarding doctrines of declining utility.
39. This conclusion is in the spirit of Bernard Crick's (1964) remark that ''the
bourgeois state, Marx said, contains 'inner contradictions' (indeed it does, that is
what it is all about).''
40. O'Connor (1973), in an otherwise penetrating book, argues in this fashion.
41. Among others, see O'Connor (1973), Wolfe (1977), Offe (1974), Habermas
(1975), Bowles and Gintis (1980), and Best and Connolly (1976). Not all of these
theorists, however, share this functional view of legitimacy.
42. Crick (1964), p. 24. Cf. Geertz's (1980) comment on nineteenth-century
Bali: "The stupendous cremations, tooth fillings, temple dedications, pilgrimages,
and blood sacrifices, mobilizing hundreds and even thousands of people and great
quantities of wealth, were not means to political ends: they were the ends
themselves, they were what the state was for. Court ceremonialism was the driving
force of court politics; and mass ritual was not a device to shore up the state, but
rather the state, even in its final gasp, was a device for the enactment of mass ritual.
Power served pomp, not pomp power,, (p. 13). It is also worth considering the
connection between this view-that is, political action as the end itself-with the
argument above that theories emphasizing the power of actors (and causal theories)
are flawed.
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43. On the decline see Bowles and Gintis (1980), Edwards (1979), Nordhaus
(1972), and Denison (1978). On the response see, e.g., the discussions cited in note
41 and Commentary, April 1978.
44. Cf. R. H. Tawney's comment, quoted in Michael Walzer, "Life with
Father," New York Review of Books, 2 April 1981: "It is quite true that the bearing
of risks is bracing, if it is voluntarily undertaken, because in that case a man balances
possible gains and losses and stakes his brains and character on success. But when
the majority of persons are hired servants, they do not decide what risks they shall
bear."
45. For some suggestive arguments in this context see Joseph Cropsey (1977).
46. Consider any recent compilation of United States polling data on citizen
trust in government.
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6

Political Futures
Norman Furniss
- - - - - - - - - - - ---- - · - -

----------

I have three aims in this essay. The first is to show that advanced capitalist
states are at a "historic juncture," which is characterized by a crisis or
breakdown in previously stable or apparently stable international regimes.
This regime crisis, when linked to domestic social and economic changes,
results in a tendency toward a ''new order of functioning'' within and among
advanced capitalist states. Second, I want to outline the implications for
future political development. Un1ike the ''historic juncture'' of the 1930s,
the major impetus within advanced capitalist democracies is not toward
leftist ''reform'' but toward retrenchment, which I will describe as a retreat
from more or less comprehensive forms of the welfare state. As in the
1930s, however, there is no law that mandates that certain policy changes
must take place. Britain managed to get through the 1930s without making
any significant movement toward what somewhat ironically is called economic or social Keynesianism. Sweden may be able to mount a similar
defense of what Timothy Tilton and I have termed the '' social welfare
state.'' My third aim is more speculative. I shall consider the arguments for
radically different approaches to political and policy orientation. The need for
a different approach was articulated by Sartre in his final ''interviewdiscussion'': '' Either the left is going to die, in which case man dies at the
same time, or new principles must be discovered for it to live by" (Sartre,
1980:399). These new principles are of two distinct types. The first focuses
on the '' socialism of production,'' which rejects the traditional distinction
made in advanced capitalist states between politics and markets. The
second promotes civil society against the state; its goal is self-management,
or ''autogestionnaire democracy.'' The first strategy is advanced most
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consistently in France. The second, which is not dominant anywhere,
underlies the "citizens initiatives," including the "peace movement," in
the Federal Republic of Germany.
Like Braybrooke in his essay, then, I intend to make a survey of
possibilities. But because the four future political possibilities-retrenchment, the status quo, socialism of production, self-management-are not
logically derived but empirically inferred, I must include observations and
projections. Complexity, but I hope also understanding, will be increased by
the need to describe distinct types of capitalist states. That there are
distinct forms of capitalism is well argued in the essay by Benjamin and
Duvall. I would go further and propose that within ''postindustrial capitalist
states'' there are distinct differences that make me less sure about how far
any generalizations can be supported. 1 These differences, which can be
described in terms of policy patterns, certainly ought not to be associated
with claims to future success. We can posit claims to inertia; we will witness
the difficulties that even a Margaret Thatcher has had in altering the pattern
of British policy. And we can suggest that some types of advanced capitalist
states should prove more receptive to certain types of reforms. It is no
coincidence, as Marxists used to say, that the ''socialism of production'' has
been attempted in France rather than in the United States or even m
Sweden.

THE NEW ORDER OF FUNCTIONING
In a major work first published in 1965, Andrew Shonfield, in Modern
Capi,talism, posed what he thought was the essential question: ''What was
it that converted capitalism from the cataclysmic failure which it appeared to
be in the 1930s into the great engine of prosperity of the postwar Western
World?'' His answer was that advanced capitalist democracies in large part
owed their unprecedented rates of steady economic growth and their social
peace to an enlarged and facilitating public sector employing Keynesian
economic management and fostering increasing private and public intellectual coherence. Shonfield saw the process as self-sustaining: "The central
thesis of this book is that there is no reason to suppose that the patterns of
the past, which have been ingeniously unravelled by the historians of trade
cycles, will reassert themselves in the future." The reasons given were
that the policy of full employment '' added a new dimension to international
trade'' and that ''the accelerated pace of technological progress . . . has
made possible a high and steady increase in output per man-hour. This
process will continue and may accelerate" (1965:62, 63).
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Shonfield then delineated the features of this new animal, '' modern
capitalism.'' First, public authorities had a vastly greater influence on
economic management. Second, this management, both public and private,
developed forms of national economic planning. Third, in the private sector
itself ''the market has been tamed.'' Fourth, in the public sector, socialwelfare policies had become a major preoccupation. And finally, with
reference to the public at large, "it has now come to be taken for granted,
both by governments and by the average person in Western capitalist
countries, that each year should bring a noticeable increase in the real
income per head of the population .... It is in fact capable of being fulfilled,
at any rate for a long time to come" (Shonfield, 1965:66).
It was not Shonfield's intention to confirm the assumptions of much of
the then-recent "end of ideology" literature. A major portion of his book
was devoted to the political problem of how modem capitalism, operating, in
his striking phrase, as a "conspiracy in the public interest," could be
reconciled with notions of governance by popular consent. Moreover, one
can extend Shonfield 's concern to ask the more general question of whether
the price of modern capitalism in terms of human autonomy or ecological
balance could be too high. This concern lay behind much of the discussion
surrounding the May 1968 upheavals in France and similar protests
elsewhere. Modern capitalism was not attacked because it failed to deliver
the goods. It was condemned because the goods were deemed tawdry and
their enjoyment ultimately alienating. 2 Our purpose here is not to enter this
debate and to assess, in retrospect, whether the effects of modern
capitalism, on balance, were "good" or "bad." Rather, our purpose is to
emphasize the stark contrast between the problems and the potentialities
that were being ascribed to capitalist states during the late 1960s and the
ones that were seen less than ten years later.
In broad terms the differences are clear enough. Distinguishing
features are highlighted in a useful study done by the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), ''Towards Full Employment and Price Stability" (1977). As befits an OECD report that was
supervised by distinguished economists who have close ties with the
government (Paul McCracken, Guido Carli, Robert Marjolin, etc.), there is
much use of the optative and a tendency toward reassurance. The main
argument of the report, however, emerges clearly: economic growth is
desirable and possible, but only if governments recast their policies and
assumptions. Governments and groups must recognize that beyond some
threshold there are adverse consequences of public expenditures for
economic growth and that in many countries this threshold already has been
reached. All countries must ''balance the books'' in the medium term.
Inflation is identified as being the main enemy. It has been fueled by
215

Norman Furniss
excessive public expenditures and by groups that are seeking to maintain
not merely nominal but real wages. In general, there is much concern with
low profits, or, as it is usually described, a reduced '"incentive to invest."
Policy implications flow naturally. Market solutions are preferred.
Governments need to bring home the consequences of inflationary behavior. In this connection, incomes policies are gingerly discussed. There is
much more enthusiasm for a tight monetary policy. ''We all agree that while
there are other ways this can be done, the public announcement of targets
for the rate of growth of the money supply may provide one of the best
ways.'' And as for full employment: ''We believe the route to sustained full
employment lies in recognizing that governments cannot guarantee full
employment regardless of developments in prices, wages, and other factors
in economic life. The explanation of the paradox lies in the key role of
expectations in determining economic behavior. . . . The 1974- 75 recession has been a painful revelation, but it also provides a new opportunity''
(OECD, 1977:193, 185).
When these recommendations are framed in terms of Shonfield' s
features of ''modem capitalism,'' the contrast is pronounced. First,
according to the new wisdom, public authorities should work to restore
markets, not to direct them. Second, economic planning is to be replaced by
monetary planning. Third, the market is too tame. 3 Fourth, the high level of
public expenditures is a major concern. Finally, the public must realize that
to expect regular real increases in one's standard of living is to fuel inflation
and to foreclose any hopes for full employment. Together, these strictures
suggest a new image of capitalism. Far from being a great engine of
prosperity, capitalism is a delicate plant, capable of producing fruit in
moderation, but only if given loving care. This new image of the economic
system can be linked to broader changes in the nature of the state in ways, it
need hardly be mentioned, that the OECD study did not project.
These changes in the nature of the state, which in sum have been
described as a "new internal order" (Dommergues, 1980), can be developed along several dimensions. In most advanced capitalist democracies,
the OECD policy prescriptions have been followed, producing results that
Shonfield hardly would have found inspiring. For some commentators,
indeed, the economic and social record of advanced capitalist states over the
past few years seems at last to presage a major collapse. We must
emphasize that evidence in support of this view is scanty. Economic growth
continues, more or less. International trade expands, albeit more slowly.
Research and development continue to be funded at high levels. The
structures of the ' 'welfare state' ' help to forestall physical misery, except
for marginal groups. (The definition of "marginal group" varies among
countries; more on this and on the welfare state below.) Average real wages
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in many instances have risen. On another level it is hard to affirm that
advanced capitalism is beset by contradictions, if we define ''contradiction' '
to mean a logical flaw that, over time, must destroy the structure. It is
perhaps more useful to postulate that rapid change within a structure can
reduce the probability of change in the structure.
I will propose that what we have described is not a collapse or the onset
of a final contradiction but a regime crisis. The term itself needs elaboration.
I use the world ''crisis" first as presented by Paul Valery: "A crisis is the
passage from one particular mode of functioning to another'' (1962:72). A
major purpose of this paper is to persuade the reader that my use of
"crisis" in this sense is warranted. To Valery's definition I add the widely
cited dictum by Gramsci that '' the crisis consists precisely in the fact that
the old is dying and the new cannot be born.'' This idea leaves open the
future political possibilities; the emerging ''mode of functioning,'' while it is
likely to continue, need not be dominant everywhere. By ''regime'' I adopt
the definition of a set of negotiated or mutually agreed upon rules and
procedures that constrain the actions of nation states.
The regime crisis shows itself first in the decay or decline of
international agreements. Nothing has replaced Bretton Woods; even
partial efforts like the European Monetary System have not succeeded in
bringing exchange-rate stability among the states of the European Community. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is subject to
increasing constraint; it is estimated that less than a quarter of world trade
is now actually "free." The international banking system similarly is in
disarray. To institutional weakness is added the lessened ability of advanced
capitalist states to influence other actors directly. To cite examples in the
age of OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) is superfluous. The emphasis perforce has turned to indirect measures. Dirty,
dangerous work is, insofar as possible, shipped out. "Less developed
countries" are generally receptive. A report in the Wall Street Journal (17
December 1980) is instructive and worth citing at some length.
The debate in the West over excessive regulation of factory
health and safety appears a bit trivial from a Malaysian perspective .... Here there hasn't been any debate; cost-cutting comes
first. Usually an injured or sick Malaysian worker is even barred
from suing his employer for negligence. "We don't need any more
litigations," says Lee Chee Wing, deputy head of the government's Social Security Organization. ''We believe the employer
needs a little protection.'' Adds a Health Ministry doctor who asks
not to be identified: ''The first question an investor asks is, What
regulations do you have, and how well do you enforce them? If he
finds these two areas are weak, he comes in.''
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Obligation for human consequences is then mmimized by feigned or real
ignorance. Aspirin is prescribed for lead poisoning. As for asbestos, a
government study found no illness among workers. ''The man who did the
study says he thinks a possible explanation is the 'Asian body' is immune.''
Unpleasant or polluting work that cannot be exported is subject to
more subtle treatment. The most obvious method is to bring in '' guest
workers.'' An alternative is to tolerate ''illegal aliens. '' A third option is to
tolerate a ''black economy.'' A fourth is to classify particular groups as not
needing the full array of benefits or rights-such as women, teenagers.
(Thus, for example, we hear in the United States the proposal that the
minimum wage for teenagers be lowered. As usual, the suggestion is
phrased with the best interests of the particular group in mind.) The goal
throughout is to limit policy responsibility.
Pressures on individual states to conform to this pattern are also great.
The sober discussion in a 1983 OECD study, "The Importance of
International Economic Linkages," highlights the problem. Under the
current regime, ''the openness of individual OECD economics to the OECD
economy as a whole ... is such that the performance of the overall OECD
economy goes far towards determining the performance of each country
individually. . . . In particular, there is a marked tendency towards international coincidence of both business cycles and policy stance. '' Moreover, this
tendency would be greater if countries were to attempt individually to
pursue ''socialist'' policies, because ''pressure to respond to a change in
current account position generally comes when a country moves into, or
further into debt; surplus countries are often not put under equivalent
pressures to adjust." Nor are the pressures entirely financial: the study
reports delicately that "exchange rates are, at times, affected by incipient
capital movements induced by foreign financial disturbances or political
considerations" (OECD, 1983). 4 In other words, declarations that one is
undertaking, to use a phrase often heard after Mitterrand's 1981 electoral
victory-a ''phased break with capitalism'' -are likely to produce a vigorous
reaction, and in France they did so.
The mode of functioning in what remains of ''domestic'' affairs is less
novel. There appears to be a tendency (not only in the Federal Republic) to
outlaw Systemveranderer, to make it illegal to try to change the rules of the
game. Expenditures on "law and order" gain ready exemptions from
budgetary restraints. Unionized workers are urged to show wage restraint
and are reminded (in good OECD style) of the prospects of unemployment if
wage rates go beyond what can be sustained profitably. Finally, questions
are raised concerning whether past social undertakings can be maintained.
Behind these questions is the assumption that the advanced capitalist state
no longer can perlorm all of its ascribed functions. Whether due to rising
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expenditures or rising demands, belief that the state can construct creative
new policy approaches or avoid massive policy failures has withered.
Moreover, the poor economic record of the past few years is used to
confirm, not the inadequacy of the OECD approach, but the necessity for
greater rigor.
This position poses an immediate challenge to the viability of social
democracy as a public philosophy. 5 Indeed, it is not too much of an
exaggeration to suggest that social democracy was the public philosophy of
"modern capitalism," involving, in different national contexts, the construction of a "Great Society" (Lyndon Johnson) or "das modeme
Deutschland'' (Willy Brandt); applying the ''white heat of the technological
revolution" (Harold Wilson); or "marrying one's century" (Charles de
Gaulle). These visions have faded, and even in the Scandinavian bastion
there are doubts (see Logue, forthcoming). Socially, there is the problem of
which class is to be the beneficiary of and the support for social democracy.
In a society that is predominantly urban and that is also oriented (in style, if
not in numbers) around industrial occupations, social-democratic strategy is
clear. In a society in which people prefer home ownership over subsidized
apartment living and in which the steel industry, shipbuilding, and automobile manufacturing are declining, the foundation of social democracy is
more problematic. For this type of society it is not just that manufacturing
employment as a whole has declined; its internal composition is changing. In
the United States, for example, from 1970 to 1977, manufacturing establishments that employed fewer than 100 workers increased their net employment by 225,000; establishments that employed from 100 to 500 workers
increased theirs by 190,000; and establishments that employed more than
500 workers had a net decline in employment of 846,000. One cannot
foresee that this trend will be reversed; it presages a qualitative change in
the social composition of the manufactupng work force. (In some countries
the change is even more striking. From 1970 to 1977, Britain lost almost 20
percent of its employment in large manufacturing establishments.)
Economically, social democracy has been linked to the assumption that
capitalism is indeed a '' great engine of prosperity.'' This assumption
permits the state the luxury of being both the ''ideal capitalist,'' of making
the machine even more efficient through labor-market and other policies,
and of being the ''ideal social conscience,'' of using economic surplus for
worthy ends. It also provides an effective argument against formal state
ownership. To change the metaphor, why, asks one social-democratic
theorist, should we disturb the capitalist ''milk cow'' when our goals can be
achieved piecemeal without divisive confrontation (Adler-Karlsson, 1969)?
When the dynamism of capitalism cannot be taken for granted, economic
options are much less pleasant. On the one hand, there is less surplus to use
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for new projects, and funding for past commitments becomes more
onerous. On the other hand, the state is urged to take various expensive
measures-such as subsidies, tax cuts, and expansion of public employment-to shore up capitalism itself! The Swedish case is instructive. From
1979 to 1982 a "bourgeois" government was in power for the first time
since the mid 1930s, a significant development in itself. Not surprisingly,
new welfare initiatives were not launched. But at the same time, there was
a large increase in the percentage of industrial production under state
control and in the number of workers in what is called "sheltered
employment." The reason for this anomaly is clear. In the absence of state
intervention there was a risk of massive bankruptcies and of official
unemployment levels that were considered to be politically unacceptable.
Perhaps the greatest challenge to social democracy, however, is to its
theoretical outlook, which can be seen concretely in the issue of property
rights. The "ideal" social-democratic position, as expressed by R. H.
Tawney, Michael Harrington, and Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, among others, is
coherent and reasonably fruitful. 6 For owners of productive property there
is the effort to reinstitute the old idea of "stewardship" in property
relations. Holders of productive property rights that are not fungible (who
are generally capitalists) are, in Adler-Karlsson's words, to be given "a
continuous set of compromises with which they will be able to agree." Over
time, nonfunctional property rights are to be taken from private hands by
"salami tactics" (Adler-Karlsson, 1969:65, 66). Holders of functional
productive property rights are thereby put on guard: only for as long as
private possession of these rights advances the public purpose are they to
be spared nationalization. For individuals who do not hold productive
property rights, there is an attempt to construct surrogate forms. The most
significant is the idea of the property right to a job, which was elaborated at
least as early as John Commons and was given forceful expression by Frank
Parkin (1979a, 1979b). For Parkin, as jobs become "a form of property,"
class struggle is tamed. Those who are economically subordinate become
politically dominant, and economic subordination loses its unacceptable face.
Thus, the appeal of social democracy increased, because, for Parkin, there
is no halfway house between it and the "socialism" of eastern Europe.
Leaving aside potential internal inconsistencies, we can see that the
assumptions underlying the position are far from secure. "Salami tactics"
are presumed to yield something of value. But when unemployment rates in
most OECD countries are above 7 percent, to speak of full employment as a
right is today to speak with many qualifications. More directly, if the OECD
study is correct in finding that the route to sustained full employment ''lies
in recognizing that governments cannot guarantee full employment,'' then
we have come across a most peculiar form of property right. The idea of a
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property right to a job can be advanced only when it will not be used. This is
equivalent to saying that stockholders can sell shares only in a bull market.
In brief, the difficulties of retaining full employment during this regime crisis
indicate the extent to which major traditional tenets of social-democratic
thought could rest on the viability of ''modem capitalism.''
We are now able to consider what political and policy possibilities exist
for advanced capitalist states. In the next section we will describe the
alternatives of welfare-state retrenchment and welfare-state defense.
These alternatives, while they are more likely in practice, are less
interesting theoretically, because they represent a response, not a solution,
to the regime crisis. The possibility that this crisis could produce a ''historic
juncture'' for reform is unfulfilled. In the final section of this paper I will
present two possibilities that are intriguing in theory, albeit often less
inspiring in practice.

POLITICAL FUTURES
I begin with one of the principal themes of this volume: to say that ''the
capitalist state" has "relative autonomy" is not to say enough. Indeed, all
capitalist states are interventionist. All have modified structures of property
rights, and all have intervened in various ways in the operations of the
"market." This general situation does not, however, mean that all
interventionist states are alike. Specifically, the major issue is not that all
states have a policy of intervention but that different states have different
institutional capacities and policy styles that are linked to different balances
of political and social power. 7 These differences, I will propose, result in
coherent policy patterns. Timothy Tilton and I have made distinctions
among three kinds of public intervention in the operation of private property
and unregulated markets according to the ends that advanced capitalist
states pursue and the instruments that they employ. We attempt to
encapsulate these types of intervention in three ''models'': the positive
state, the social-security state, and the social-welfare state (Furniss and
Tilton, 1977).
Briefly, by the term ''positive state'' we mean a state whose primary
aim is that of protecting existing property holders from the perils of
unregulated markets and redistributive demands. The ''positive state" is
the home of Lindblom's ''privileged position of business,'' the dynamics of
which are well developed in Stephen Elkin' s essay. In the field of welfare
policy (not, let us be clear, elsewhere) the positive state hesitates to do
anything inconsistent with market conceptions of economic efficiency.
Public programs conform, in sum, to Titmuss' s ''residual welfare model''
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(1977) . Within this model one can make the additional distinction between
those "entitlements" that rest on the principle of social insurance, which
both deflects potential redistribution to noneconomic categories and extends
benefits widely, and those in which the disabled, the poor, and the "truly
needy" are singled out for special treatment. The latter are particularly
susceptible to cuts during times of financial stringency. Examples or
approximation of the positive state have included Australia and the United
States.
The "social security state" differs from the positive state on precisely
this point of universality of welfare effort. Its primary aim can be described
as the fulfillment of the liberal vision of equal opportunity for all through the
provision of a guaranteed national minimum. No one is to be prevented from
achieving his or her potential because of inadequate health care, housing, or
education. Furthermore, it is recognized that the inherently nonproductive
(i.e., the old, the severely disabled, and the mentally ill) have a right to state
assistance. This right, however, does not extend beyond basic provision.
The Beveridge Report, which provided the ideological foundation for the
British welfare system after World War II, is clear on this point: " The state
in organizing security should not stifle incentive, opportunity, responsibility;
in establishing a national minimum it should leave room and encouragement
for voluntary action by each individual to provide more for himself and his
family" (Beveridge, 1942:48). The social-security state, then, has a very
definite role. It is not concerned with economic organization. At the same
time, however, the national minimum is to be guaranteed, not by the
affected individuals or through the political process, but through the
administrative procedures of the state. T. H. Marshall makes the point
succinctly: The duty of what he calls the " welfare principle" is "to provide
not what the majority wants but what minorities need" (1981:109, 126).
The difference between this vision and that of the "social-welfare
state" is evident in the position of Ernst Wigforss, one of the leading
theoreticians in the Swedish Social Democratic party. For Wigforss, the
wage earner
cannot readily agree to that view of the welfare state . . . that it
should secure a minimum livelihood for all, but allow whatever
goes beyond this to be won through each individual's or each
group's asserting itself in an unlimited competition for standards,
wealth, and power. That spirit clearly conflicts with the ideas that
both the trade union movement and social democracy seek to
follow in their public labors . . . that it still shall be the labor
movement's ideas of equality, cooperation, and solidarity, that
shall set their stamp upon society's continuing transformation.
(Quoted in Furniss and Tilton, 1977:18, 19)
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The achievement of this vision requires a policy mix designed to lessen the
importance of market relationships in daily life-that is, to avoid economic
segregation in housing and to promote the public provision of education,
health care, recreation, and social activities. Concomitantly, the socialwelfare state aims to redistribute resources in a more egalitarian fashion.
'' Solidaristic wage policy, '' as developed and practiced by the Swedish
trade-union movement, attempts to equalize pretax incomes by capturing
relatively larger wage increases for low-wage workers. Industrial democracy erodes capitalist domination within the firm. Environmental planning
injects social and collective values into domains that were previously ceded
to private business. These policies mandate the collaboration of producer
groups (in particular, organized labor) and the state in decisions involving
wages, investments, and employment. Examples include the Netherlands
and Sweden.
If we look at the developments within these types of state from World
War II to the first "Oil Shock," we can see broad tendencies toward
consolidation and even movement toward more ''developed'' types of
welfare states. In the United States, for example, the major expansion of
AFDC (Aid for Dependent Children) and the food-stamps program pointed
toward the de facto creation of a social-security state. In Britain there was a
major concern about the ''take-up rate''; elaborate informational programs
were launched to assure that all who qualified to receive aid knew their
rights. And in Sweden, proposals such as the Meidner Plan, which aimed
gradually to divest capitalists of productive property rights by socializing a
percentage of their profits, seemed to point beyond the social-welfare state
toward some form of ''socialism." These initiatives corresponded to the
regime of '' modem capitalism. '' With the current crisis the impetus has
shifted from reform to retrenchment, the form of which can be understood
again in terms of our three models.
In the United States the Reagan administration has attempted, with
some success, to eliminate the accretion of "social-security-state" programs that were launched or given impetus in the mid 1960s. Food stamps
and AFDC funds have been cut substantially. The percentage of unemployed who receive unemployment benefits is the lowest since World War
II. Occupational-safety regulations are laxly enforced, union wage rates are
under pressure, and so on. Some effects have been immediate. According
to Census Bureau measures, the proportion of the population below the
"poverty line" rose in 1981 to 14.0 percent; the percentage in 1982 again
reached the level that existed before the impact of Great Society programs
(New York Times, 27 July 1982, p. 11). Ironically, none of this has led to
reduced federal deficits or even to major reductions in the overall level of
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spending. One reason is that the United States is a positive, not a laissezfaire, state; the line of claimants for public largesse is still large. Of
particular relevance in domestic policy is the status of pensioners whose
benefits have not been cut significantly and whose "poverty rate" accordingly has not risen. The results of the 1982 congressional elections further
show that there are limits to making cuts in benefits. There also seems to be
a consensus among Republican leadership in Congress that even the ''truly
needy" have sacrificed enough.
This experience had been foreshadowed in Britain, where it is fair to
say that the prime minister, Mrs. Thatcher, has aimed to move away from
the social-security state toward the positive state. She has had some
success. Supplementary benefits for strikers' families have been cut. The
earnings-related supplement on unemployment compensation has been
abolished. Levels of unemployment benefits are now dropping below the
levels of supplementary benefits. Capturing the essence of the changed
priorities of providing social welfare is the preoccupation that fraud, not the
take-up rate, is the major problem with welfare. The government, as in the
United States, has set up special teams to investigate and expose fraudulent
claims. Claimants now become suspects. Brian Abel-Smith concludes that
''if the government continues along this road it will be the end of the postwar Butskellite consensus on the welfare state'' (1980: 17). At the same
time, as is the case with the positive state in the United States, forces that
want to retain the status quo are still strong. Within the Conservative party,
even within Mrs. Thatcher's cabinet, even after her sweeping triumph in
the general election, the position of what are called "the wets" has not
been undermined. The British social-security state remains in reduced and
meaner form.
Perhaps the most interesting example of proposed policy retrenchment
however, has occurred in the Netherlands. Since World War II the
Netherlands has developed a complete and structured pattern of welfare
provision; only Sweden now spends more (see Furniss and Mitchell, 1984).
With its "open economy" being extremely sensitive to international
competition and with the departure of the Social Democratic party from the
governing coalition, there has been a basic policy decision to move toward
the social-security state. 8 Faced with apparently uncontrollable pressures
for further public expenditures, the government presented to Parliament in
June 1981 and in August 1982 two memorandums on the Reconsideration of
Public Expenditures. For our purpose the significance of the memorandums
is not found in the details of proposed spending cuts for public education,
health, the arts, and social assistance; rather, it is found in the spirit of the
memorandums. Deregulation and privatization are commended; the bu224
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reaucracy is scorned, except in its role in reducing welfare fraud. And it is
made clear that the basis of security programs must be changed. In the
worlds of the memorandums, the Netherlands must move ''from welfare

state to guarantee state. ''
To conclude this section, we should emphasize that we posit no single
future for advanced capitalist states. Our concern is not with how international changes will drive states in similar directions but with how political and
state structures will respond to international change. One possible response
is to internalize pressures enough so as to avoid any major policy changes at
all. Sweden is the current example. Unlike the rest of Scandinavia, Sweden
still has a Social Democratic government in power; and unlike the Netherlands, Sweden still has structures of the social-welfare state that remain
unchallenged. The price has been to set aside future welfare-state reforms.
This price could be high. Previously we outlined some social and political
challenges to the future viability of social democracy. Here the challenge is
to the reason for the existence of social democracy. The rhetoric and
declared values of the Swedish prime minister, Olof Palme, point to the
nature of the problem. Palme typically speaks of himself as being '' a
Swedish social democrat, a European Democratic Socialist.'' The values of
this movement derive directly from the Enlightenment. ''We regard
ourselves as a freedom movement. Democratic socialism is a movement for
the liberation of man.'' The ''reformist labor movement,'' then, is transnational (Palme, 1977). And its progress is unilinear. While one country may
have progressed farther from another, all are on the same path (Brandt,
Kreisky, and Palme, 1975). We need also note the stress on "reform" and
on ''labor.'' Concerning the former, Palme emphasizes that ''reformism is a
slow process. But it is the only way of really transforming society on the
ideals of democracy" (Palme, 1980). One must also never lose sight of
economic constraints (Palme, 1971), but one must never forget that the
labor movement has the crucial task of extending the drive for democracy
from the political so as to include the economic and social spheres. These
steps the bourgeoisie, whether through cowardice or self-interest, refuses
to take unaided. 9 Under the '' new order of functioning,'' this discussion
raises two fundamental questions. First, if social democracy is transnational,
is its essence threatened when most parties are retreating down the path of
social democracy or even wandering out of bounds? Can one have '' social
democracy in one county''? Second, even in Sweden, for how long can the
reformist impetus be deferred without risking the enterprise of progressive
liberation? What is the danger of having the ''Swedish model'' become the
''Swedish aberration''?
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POSSIBLE WORLDS
We have now outlined the likely futures for advanced capitalist states
under current conditions of regime crisis. Most likely, retrenchment and
reaction tempered by institutional and political inertia. Also possible,
maintenance of the status quo. If we give equal time to less likely
possibilities, it is because they pose much more exciting theoretical efforts
to alter fundamentally the ''political economy of the state.'' The first,
socialism of production, proposes to eliminate the ''division of labor
between market and state,'' which is described at the microlevel in Stephen
Elkin's essay and is presented at the macrolevel by Charles Lindblom in
Politics and Markets and even more forcefully in his 1982 article ''The
Market as Prison.'' The second, autogestionnaire democracy, proposes to
strengthen the authority of civil society against the state. As such, it
represents an even greater challenge to traditional leftist or radical thought.
It also should entail a new spirit of public discourse. I will end this essay with
a few speculations about what this spirit might involve.
We begin with "socialism of production," which can be described
broadly as an effort to shift the meaning of ''welfare'' away from consumption principles . 10 These principles we can define as state-supported action
that (1) provides resources, irrespective of the market value of an
individual's work, or (2) aims to transcend ''the market'' altogether through
the provision of universal nonmonetary services. Production principles are
designed to affect more the generation than the distribution of wealth. They
can be defined as any state-supported action that aims to alter the
distribution of property rights among capital, management, and labor. Any
experiment in the '' Socialism of Production,'' then, could have wide
theoretical and political significance. Public officials would no longer, as Elkin
elaborates, have to ''try to avoid reducing the confidence of businessmen.''
Looked at another way, there might no longer be a fixation on the fiscal
limits to the welfare state; and as we have seen in practice, any "fiscal
crisis'' tends more readily to undermine the legitimacy of social reform than
of state power. Even more, it might be possible for the Left to seize the
initiative in political debate. Attention might shift from how much to cut
welfare spending to how to reorganize and reanimate the productive forces
of society. This we will describe as the intention of the French Socialist
party. Of course, the reality of the French experiment to date does not fulfill
this promise. But it is, I will argue, premature to conclude that the
experiment is a disaster, still less that a viable leftist political strategy based
on production, rather than on consumption, is foreclosed.
The French Socialist position has been presented concisely by Maurice
Duverger in a series of articles, ''Three Faces of French Socialism,''
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written for Le Monde in late December 1982. 11 Duverger begins by
distinguishing the aims of French socialism from those of social democracy.
According to Duverger, social democracy, as it is practiced in northern
Europe, reflects our category of consumption principles. It is designed to
redistribute incomes and to foster a feeling of security. French socialism is
different. It is a '' socialism of production founded on economic growth which
is the only way to achieve social progress." It is based on the premise that
industries that are owned or controlled by the state are the growth polls for
France. For those who are interested in seeing how "socialism of
production'' could work, the proper model is not Scandinavia but japan.
Japan-like France(?)-puts production first, involves the state in basic
investment decisions, and has a long-term industrial strategy. In short, both
nations, in Duverger' s words, have "a vision of collective interest."
This vision is not, then, a creation of French socialism; it issues from
the French state. France historically has been the home of what Fred
Hayward has aptly called "heroic policy-making," which is based, first, on
the setting of explicit objectives for future development, together with a
commitment by the government to work toward their realization; second,
on the rejection of incrementalism in favor of the ordering of priorities; and
third, on what one might term the guided coordination of relevant groups
(Hayward and Watson, 1975). This style achieved its clearest policy
expression in the French Plans of the 1950s and the early 1960s, and it
formed its clearest political advocate in General de Gaulle, who saw that "as
Head of State, it would be for me to [be] ... concerned with the Plan,
because it was all-embracing, because it fixed the targets, established a
hierarchy ofnecessities and priorities, induced people in charge and even in
the public consciousness a sense of what is global, ordered and sustained"
(1971: 134-35). The task of the Socialist government has been to reanimate
this spirit and to direct endeavor toward economic growth with justice and
solidarity.
I should note that I do not mean to imply that the French experience,
with its ''heroic policy making,'' arose from the machinations of bureaucrats
or from the personal proclivities of political leaders. It issues from the
nature of the French state itself, which elsewhere I have called '' democratic
state corporatist" (Furniss and Mitchell, 1984). The first mark of this
centralized state is the form of state-group interaction. Rather than
following the pattern of "liberal corporatism" as developed by Gerhard
Lehmbruch, groups in the democratic corporatist state do not "penetrate"
the state, nor do they bargain among themselves. Rather, bargaining takes
place between the state and groups selected by the state, with decisions
then being imposed on other relevant actors.1 2 Second, historically, the
state must have assumed primary responsibility for economic growth and,
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therefore, inter alia, for economic welfare. The final condition is that the
state must be differentiated from a dominant economic class; to use an
expression of some current popularity, the state must have significant
"relative autonomy." On this dimension Pierre Birnbaum offers an interesting contrast between Germany and France. In Germany, "the state
however developed or institutionalized nonetheless emerged as the instrument of a dominant class. Thus social domination was clearly visible through
political domination. It is thus understandable that the main union was
subordinate to the [social democratic] party. H In France, on the other hand,
''the institutionalization of the state was accompanied by marked differentiation from the dominant class. . . . Domination was thus experienced first in
its political dimension" (Birnbaum, 1980:676). To summarize the argument
thus far, an attempt to institute production-level policies in a democratic
corporate state like France is furthered by supportive historical and
institutional traditions and by a ''political culture' ' that recognizes the
legitimacy of forceful state action. The other side of the coin is the likelihood
that organized working-class support, either political or industrial, will be
weak. This weakness, we shall see, the French Socialist government has
not overcome.
The absence of a mass base for leftist reform can be appreciated
through a comparison with the Swedish case. In Sweden over 90 percent of
manual workers belong to the major trade-union federation (LO), which in
tum is linked closely to the Socialist Democratic party. In France,
membership is much less extensive; union federations are divided on
ideological lines. None of the federations are linked closely to the dominant
factions of the Socialist party. Still less, in good syndicalist tradition, do
union leaders want to be seen as associating too closely with the government. As Frank Wilson (1983:902) reports, the fear of being accused of
collaborating with the government was as great in 1982 as it was in 1979,
before the Socialist party's victory. In regard to the parties themselves, the
Swedish one has a large membership, a strong-enough tradition of government to lead to "political hegemony" theses, and a full panoply of interest
and research groups. The French Socialist party has a long history of
divisions and a short history of political power, with many militants looking
back to the events of May 1968 but drawing quite different conclusions from
its failures. Membership in it, while impressive by French standards,
remains relatively small. The party has approximately one member per forty
voters, compared to one member per three voters in Sweden. The stillrestricted social basis of party shows up well in a study of the socioprofessional background of the party's 1981 parliamentary candidates. Fully
40 percent of them were teachers, another 18 percent were categorized as
"cadres moyensn; 11.6 percent as "professions liberals"; and a surpris228
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ingly high 12 percent as ''cadres superieurs." Workers constituted 0. 7
percent of the candidates; "employes," 2.9 percent (Guede and Rozenblum, 1981). I have not been able to find comparable data for Sweden. One
study in Dagens Nyheter (24 December 1982) characterized 72 percent of
Social Democratic parliamentarians as being "public employees"; of these,
roughly half were party or trade-union functionaires.
That these employees have publicly guaranteed property rights helps
to underpin the reformist nature of Swedish politics. It also helps to explain
how Sweden can be said to have the highest percentage of individuals who
are employed by the state of any OECD country. 13 In France, the Socialist
government has been unable to substitute dialogue for command. Socialism
of production does remain the goal. The nationalization program remains in
place, with the public-banking sector, for example, holding 90 percent of the
total deposits. The Ninth Plan accords "absolute priority" to industrial
investment. And even during the current period of austerity, money for
research and development continues to be increased substantially . 14 But
without active participation, this type of socialism also remains, in Mark
Kesselman' s phrase, '' socialism without the workers.'' 15 Proponents of
''autogestionnaire democracy'' would say that the absence was inevitable.
They would concern themselves, not with how the state can build socialism,
but with how the people can regain their freedom.
In this sense, ''autogestionnaire democracy'' marks a major departure
from traditional leftist or radical thought. We might begin with the emphasis
on civil society, as opposed to the state, and on the value of fraternity, as
opposed to equality. Civil society is championed because it is the true home
of the "public sphere." The importance of this "public sphere" is
developed by Jean Cohen (1979:79 n.25). In reference to Habermas, he
argues that his ''later discursive model of truth, his reformulation of the
Weberian concept of legitimazation, and his famous 'linguistic turn' clearly
have their roots in the normative concept of the bourgeois public realm
whose guiding principle is the attainment of a rational consensus based on
the unconstrained formation of enlightened public opinion.'' The state
constrains this formation; even more serious, it threatens to end any
possibility of rational consensus by entirely absorbing civil society. This
threat is developed in Habermas 's concern with the '' colonization of daily
life'' (Lebenswelt) through what he terms the ''refeudalization of society''
(see 1979).
In value orientation the focus on civil society shifts attention from
"equality" to "fraternity.'' Equality is a state or statist ideal, and for our
purposes, its problems can be discussed profitably through reference to
Tawney and Marx. In his book Equality, Tawney rejects the charge that
socialism sought to make all men the same. He rejects this goal, not because
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it might be impossible, an empirical matter, but because it is not morally
central. His concern is not that men become the same but that they become
brothers. As for Marx, it is at least possible to propose that sameness would
have been dismissed as ''bourgeois equality,'' or legislated equality. The
type of equality that is worth having arises through concrete struggle,
during which the involved individuals became liberated. Sartre links these
two strands in his discussion with Benny Levy. To Levy's comment that
'' one must find a formulation that accepts the biological reference as an
assumption but can also be expanded on a level that is no longer biological
and is not mythological,'' Sartre replies:
That's it. So then what is this relationship between one
human being and another that will be called fraternity? It is not the
relationship of equality. It is a relationship in which the motivations
for an act come from the affective realm, while the action itself is
in the practical domain. Which is to say the relationship between a
man and his neighbor in a society in which they are brothers is,
first of all, affective/practical. Originally, people shared awareness
of that, you might say, but now it is a gift that has to be
rediscovered. (1980:413)
What this fraternity could mean is not a mystery. In how people are
conceived we emphasize the value of diversity. "It is in fact because
individuals and above all groups are different in many respects that equality/
uniformity can produce only inequalities'' (Rosanvallon and Vincent, 1977:
108). One must begin by acknowledging the fundamental autonomy of each
individual, his right to be different. Much ''socialist" argument does not
start here with the consequence that what, in his Presidential Inaugural
Statement, Fram;ois Mitterrand was not afraid to call ''the path of pluralism,
in which differences come face to face with respect for others,' ' is avoided.
Much ''liberal'' argument ends here, thus leading, as Daniel Bell and others
have perceived if not resolved, to the atomization of society and various
"cultural contradictions." Autonomy, as such, is not complete. Individuals
must operate in civil society. How are they to interact?
As with most political ideas, it is easier to outline what the relationships
would not involve. Rejected is the reliance on state, party, and political
program. "One arrives at a troubling conclusion: the historical left nourished a menacing and intolerant idea of the state .... We are faced with the
general crisis of the historical left, la gauche etatique'' (Macchiocchi,
1980:148). To condemn this gauche etatique is also to question the place of
its traditional agent, the "class-mass" political party. In the most optimistic
view, the party would have to be transformed. Jacques Julliard summarizes
the position well with this advice to his French Socialist party:
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Will the Socialist party . . . agree to be the Trojan horse of a civil
society in full expansion, in full vitality, rather than the repository
of all the old recipes and moribund doctrines? It would be
wonderful~but all the same, rather surprising-if the Socialist
party would substitute for the eternal cry of all victorious majorities~ toutes les places et toute de suite!-the demand of autogestionnaire democracy-une place pour chacun! De la place pour
tous! (Quoted in Berger, 1979:40)
A similar criticism can be made about party programs; by abstracting what
to be real must be concrete, political programs are inherently hierarchical
and elitist.
In turning from the state, party, and program as possible instruments
for reform, the strategy of "autogestionnaire democracy" must look within
civil society both for alternatives to the policy pattern of the new order of
functioning and, ultimately, for forces that could change the nature of the
state. The preliminary problem is the lack of obvious candidates. If, as
Benjamin and Duvall argue in this book, we can now speak of a ''postindustrial capitalist state, '' we can see the pertinence of the question ''What
is the movement that will occupy in postindustrial society the central role of
the workers' movement in industrial society?" (Touraine, 1978:48). The
proposition that the workers' movement may no longer be able sociologically to perform this function has, I trust, been argued sufficiently that
it must be taken seriously. Even at its most effective-for example in the
Swedish case discussed in the previous section-the movement is on the
d~fensive. The "movement for the liberation of man" (in Palme's phrase)
at best is stalled. Nor can we say that the French Socialist government's
effort to substitute itself for the workers' movement as yet has been a
success.
The alternative to the workers' movement is captured in Paul Feyerbend's slogan ''Citizens' initiatives instead of philosophy!'' (1980b). What
we find within advanced capitalist states (proponents of autogestionnaire
democracy would say within the civil societies of advanced capitalist states)
is the emergence of a new type of group which is oriented around new types
of political issues-such as women's rights, environmental protection,
independent neighborhood democracy, and the peace movement. The
groups themselves embrace what Jane Mansbridge calls ''unitary democracy,'' which has a different approach to internal decision making. And the
causes that are being advanced cut across traditional social and political
patterns, thus raising the potential of political realignment. These tendencies have progressed farthest perhaps in the Federal Republic of Germany,
where people have formed a plethora of Burger I nitiativen and where this
citizens' -initiatives approach has commanded some general public sup-
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port. 16 The most striking aspect of these movements, of course, is the
peace movement. The peace movement consists of from two to three
thousand autonomous groups that nonetheless have a marked capacity for
coordination. And in contrast, for example, to the American "nuclear
freeze" movement, the goal of the peace movement is linked to social
transformation in ways that make the peace movement less susceptible to
cooperation by the established political parties.
To be sure, nowhere are the citizens'-initiative movements dominant.
Rather than discussing particular successes and failures, it seems more
useful to raise a few theoretical possibilities and difficulties. We will start
with epistemological orientation. To enter the world of autogestionnaire
democracy is to abandon the insistence on a single truth and to embrace,
instead, the analysis of a situation with its attached possibilities. The idea of
possibility and its relation to necessity can be traced directly to Leibnitz:
''Possibility is truth in some possible world; necessity is truth in all possible
worlds.'' Put more formally, the distinction between necessity and possibility is that it is necessarily true that either "a" or "b" is correct; it is
possible that there exists an "x," such that "a" has a relation to "x." We
need not fully develop this reasoning here (Elster, 1978). It is enough to
show how the perspective of "possible worlds" can lead from a commitment to a unicity of truth toward a normative position that welcomes the
inevitable clashes of autogestionnaire democracy.
This perspective offers a number of advantages. First, it is actororiented, ''intentionalist.' ' 17 States that arise causally are excluded. Second, what is possible must be created: action can decide. Third, not all
possibilities need to lead in the same direction. Fourth, on strategies, there
can be no one ''line.'' It becomes permissible to think of multiple truths and
of overlapping strategies. The ideal of self-managing democracy, which
celebrates uncoordinated initiatives on many fronts, is given theoretical
grounding: the aim is not to create one possibility but to create possibilities
from which all subsequent possibilities will lead in the desired direction.
Moreover, strategies exist in time. The approach that declares that what
can be done in two steps can be done in one is rejected. Finally, one is faced
with the potential of inevitable failure. The set of states that come about
causally in time can never be empty. A state is succeeded by another state,
if only by a duplicate of itself. The set of states that is politically possible
with respect to that state can be empty. There may be states that present
the feature that purposive action is bound to fail (Elster, 1978). This I have
argued, perhaps too frequently, is the situation that threatens advanced
capitalist democracies. It is the reason that the addition of Gramsci's remark
to our definition of regime crisis as being the transition from one form of
functioning to another is not a paradox: ''The crisis consists precisely in the
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fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born." To take Gramsci's
remark seriously is to enter the reasoning of possible worlds.
We are also led to consider different types of political argumentation. It
is clear that the traditional political language of demands from the people (let
us label them ''citizens'') and grand promises from would-be governors is
inappropriate. This pattern both assumes and fosters differentiated knowledge from within civil society. This ''input-output'' exchange must be
replaced by a dialogue in which the goal is action, in which the given state is
seen as provisional. An idea of an alternative method of political argument
can be taken from the work of Chaim Perelman. For Perelman, the aim
should be to persuade, not to convice. To convince is to compel assent
through a rigorous chain of argument based on formal rules of logic. To
persuade is to engage in nonformal argument, to develop "a web formed of
all the arguments and all the reasons that combine to achieve the desired
result'' (Perelman, 1979:18). To persuade is to lead the adherent toward
action, whereas a person who is convinced could remain passive. For
example, someone who is convinced of a scientific "truth" need not do
anything different or, indeed, anything at all. This distinction, which can be
traced to Aristotle's Rhetoric (Arnhart, 1981), also implies different sets of
language structures and formal rules of logic. We are close to Habermas's
idea of '' communicative ethics,'' in particular, and to ' 'critical theory' ' in
general.
Nor can the problems of "communicative ethics" be escaped. It is fine
to say that the aim of political argument now is to break the bonds of existing
expectations. It is this dynamic potentiality that motivates actors to sustain
discussion; but within what institutional framework? The answer is by no
means clear. As with Habermas, there is a stress on '' the need for greater
participation in all areas of life where important public decisions are made;
but ... [there is] little indication as to what sorts of institutional forms are
appropriate for this purpose" (White, 1980:1015). Neither is the listing of
''procedural foundations'' an adequate substitute, for these are found to be
all too congruent with the values that sustain a viable '' civil society,'' which
is precisely what cannot be assumed.
Additional complexities intrude when we substitute groups for the
implicit image of individual citizens as the relevant actors in deliberations. It
now becomes essential that ''those who would change society should
organize themselves discursively" (White, 1981:463-64). In other words,
the orientation of autogestionnaire democracy is not just preferable; it is
mandatory. Similarly with political parties: a party, to refer back to the
exhortation of Jacques Julliard, must be a ''Trojan horse of civil society in
full expansion.'' Yet this phrase suggests an important ambiguity: How is
one to organize open discussion when other (most?) major parties and
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groups are committed to other goals? I offer a specific example. In 1979 the
French Communist Party (PCF) underwent a well-publicized conversion to
"democratic self-managed socialism." As presented by Georges Marchais
in his report to the Thirty-first Party Congress and confirmed a year later,
this conversion was accompanied by a host of favorable references to the
Soviet Union and to the socialist countries in eastern Europe. Marchais was
particularly proud of their high growth rates. Meanwhile, he reaffirmed that
the PCF was the repository of truth; to make the point clearer, he changed
the name of the party "theory" from "Marxist-Leninism" to "scientific
socialism.'' The problem here is not whether this conversion is sincere; the
failure of the PCF to "organize itself discursively" makes its pretense
illegitimate. The problem is that such a determination does not make the
party go away, and it could even lessen restraints on its future behavior.
What to do about those who are not thought to be likely (by whom?) to
adhere to procedural rules is a pressing matter. The operation of Article 18
of the German Basic Law ("Whoever abuses freedom of expression of
opinion, etc .... in order to combat the free democratic basic order, shall
forfeit these basic rights") is not encouraging. To endow autogestionnaire
democratic groups with the authority to coerce is to invest them with the
mark of statehood which they need unceasingly to combat.
This reference to the coercive authority of the state brings us to our
final set of difficulties. The regime crisis, which so restricts the possibility of
an effective institution of the strategy of the socialism of production,
impinges still more on the aims of autogestionnaire democracy. To economic constraints we can add geostrategic concerns. It is not remarkable
that most Western commentary has emphasized that the Helsinki Accords
helped to consolidate the Eastern Bloc. But of course the Western Alliance
has been similarly affected. Talk of an end to alliances has been replaced by
hopes that the existing alliances will be mutually civil. The implications for
experimentation among advanced capitalist states are clear.
The French Socialist government has been able to avoid sustained
pressure in part through its appeal to nationalism, in part through its control
of centralizing state institutions, and in part through President Mitterrand's
vocal support of the United States position on ''theater nuclear weapons.''
A triumphant German peace movement would have none of these defenses.
The Pershing II cannot suddenly be found to be a good thing to have,
because the centralizing state is viewed as the enemy. And even the idea of
nationalism is double-edged. When coupled with a call to end alliances,
German nationalism soon inspires fears of German neutralism and, still
worse, of German reunification.
In sum, theoretical difficulties and the new order of functioning present
advocates of autogestionnaire democracy with immense challenges. It still
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must be shown that even the current modest successes are anything but
defensive reactions to the dominant policy pattern of retrenchment. At the
same time, we must not overlook the potential to provide ''new principles
for the left to live by.'' The orientation toward pluralism, liberating action,
and decentralization can be seen as being congruent with evolving political
sentiment within advanced capitalist states. There is no reason to assume
that as a ''possible world,'' autogestionnaire democracy is foreclosed. And
that, for its proponents, is all that can and need be said.

NOTES
1. My ideas have been greatly influenced by the works of Pierre Birnbaum.
See, e.g., Badie and Birnbaum, 1983, pts. 2 and 3.
2. In those few nations where, for various ad hoc reasons, the "automatic"
prosperity of the mid 1960s seems still to apply, protests retain their "May 1968"
character. A prime example is Switzerland.
3. See, e.g., the statement by Aaron Wildavsky that "of all the countries in the
world today that are capitalist, none is wholly so and all are getting less so ....
Perhaps the world gene pool of institutions would be enriched by maintaining a few
examples of that vanishing breed, corporatus Americanus" (1978:234). Wildavsky is
reviewing Lindblom's Politics and Markets.
4. The quotations are from pages 19 and 20; the emphasis is mine.
5. I use this term in the sense developed by Samuel H. Beer: "An outlook on
public affairs which is accepted within a nation by a wide coalition and which serves to
give definition and direction to government policies dealing with them'' (1978:5).
6. I discuss this issue in ''Property Rights and Democratic Socialism,'' Political
Studies 26, no. 4 (1978).
7. Fortunately, to try to "order" these variables here would take us too far
afield.
8. The remainder of thls paragraph is drawn from Uriel Rosenthal, "The
Welfare State: Sticks, No Carrots,'' a paper presented at the conference Futures of
the Welfare State, Indiana University, Apr. 1983.
9. The 1981 Party Program included this typical statement: ''To the Social
Democratic Party, the demand for economic democracy is as self-evident as the
demand for political democracy.' '
10. The orientation or reorientation of social democracy towards questions of
production is discussed, inter alia, in a very useful compilation edited by Nancy
Lieber, Eurosocialism and America: Political Economy for the 1980s (Philadelphia:
Temple Univeristy Press, 1982).
11. The next three paragraphs are drawn from my paper ''The French Socialist
Government and Productive-Level Welfare,'' delivered at the conference Futures of
the Welfare State, Indiana University, Apr. 1983.
12. The distinctiveness of this pattern can be seen when one compares it to the
model of ''Liberal Corporatism'' developed by Gerhard Lehmbruch (1979) and
applied to the Federal Republic of Germany.
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13. See the study reported in Die Zeit, nos. 16-22 (Apr. 1983). Sweden was
shown to have 156 state employees per 1,000 inhabitants; France, 73. The Swedish
word translated above as "public employees" is ojfentliganstallda.
14. The Ninth Plan (1983-88), in according "absolute priority" to industrial
investment, also foresees continued restraint on consumer and general governmental spending. Trends are summarized in the table.

FRENCH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
PERCENTAGE OF INCREASE

Gross domestic product
Imports
Exports
Administrative budget
Household consumption
Investment
(Business investment)

1973-80

1980-83

2.9

1.7
5.0
3.5
5.0
3.1
0.7

3.4

1.4

5.5

6.5
6.4

4.3
3.9
1.0
1.5

1983~88
(Projected Ninth Plan)
2.5

6.3
7.0
2.9
1.9

Meanwhile, unemployment is expected to increase by around 600,000 individuals
despite a continuing reduction in the length of the workday. Note that our concern is
with the intention, not with the feasibility, of the Ninth Plan.
15. "Socialism without the Workers: The Case of France," Kapitalistate, nos.
10/11 (1983):11-41. JacquesJulliard calls the pattern "spectacle socialism'' (Kesselman, 1983).
16. The rival would be the Netherlands, which can claim to be the spiritual
home of both the peace movement and the squatters movement. The contrast with
the dominant position in the French Socialist government is seen in President
Mitterrand's statement of 16 November 1983 that "I am the deterrent," that the
credibility of France's nuclear forces rested on his will power.
17. For an approach within the "public choice" tradition that has a number of
similarities to "possible worlds" see the discussion of "artisanship" by Ostrom,

1980.
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